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The Application of Major Hazard Risk Assessment (MHRA) to Eliminate Multiple 
Fatality Occurrences in the US Minerals Industry 
 
By A. Iannacchione, F. Varley and T. Brady 
NIOSH 
 
Abstract 
 
Major Hazard Risk Assessment (MHRA)1 is used to help prevent major hazards, e.g., fire, 
explosion, wind-blast, outbursts, spontaneous combustion, roof instability and chemical and 
hazardous substances, etc., from injuring miners.  The structured process associated with MHRA 
helps to characterize the major hazards and evaluate engineering, management and work process 
factors that impact how a mine mitigates its highest risk.  The National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) studied the application of this technique to US mining conditions 
through a field-oriented pilot project.  Risk assessment teams used in the pilot project were 
primarily composed of mining company personnel.  Ten case studies were performed over a 
wide cross-section of mines.  These mines were representative of the important mining 
commodities in the US minerals industry, i.e. coal, metal, non-metal, and aggregate.  Also, the 
sizes of the mines ranged from small to large and were located across the country.   
 
The ten case studies demonstrate that most US mines have the capability to successfully 
implement an MHRA and that the MHRA methodology produced additional prevention controls 
and recovery measures to lessen the risk associated with a select population of major mining 
hazards.  The basic ingredient for a successful MHRA is the desire to become more proactive in 
dealing with the risks associated with events that can cause multiple fatalities.  A successful 
outcome is marked by a thorough examination of existing prevention controls and recovery 
measures.  When pressed to consider more controls to further mitigate the risk, a well-staffed 
risk assessment team was able to identify additional controls.  For these mining operations, it 
was important to add additional controls, even if they were not required by existing mining 
regulations, to lower the risks associated with the major hazards under consideration.  If a mining 
operation is not willing to commit its best people to an MHRA or will not provide them with 
sufficient time to see the process through to its conclusion, the MHRA output may prove to be 
useless.  Additionally, if a mining operation is not prepared to discuss its major hazards in an 
open and honest fashion and to present the findings of the risk assessment in a written report, the 
MHRA output will be unclear, and attempts to monitor or audit important controls may not be 
possible.  A MHRA is most effective when the mining operation possesses 1) a proper 
understanding of its hazards, 2) experience with informal and basic-formal risk assessment 
techniques, 3) proper facilities, machinery and equipment, 4) suitable systems and procedures 
that represent industry Best Practice, 5) appropriate organizational support with adequate staff, 
communications and training, 6) a formal and thorough plan for emergency response, and 7) a 
                                                 
1 Also referred to as Principal or Catastrophic Hazard Risk Assessment. 
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safety risk management approach that is promoted and supported at all levels of the organization.  
 
Executive Summary 
 
Major Hazard Risk Assessment (MHRA) is a process used to evaluate hazards that can cause 
great harm to a mining operation and its workers if they are not adequately controlled.  NIOSH 
evaluated the MHRA process at ten mining operations.  The general consensus was that the 
MHRA process provided information considered beneficial for a safer work environment.  Three 
of the ten case studies are rated as performing a more-than-adequate risk assessment, five as 
adequate, and two as less-than-adequate.  The degree of success was influenced by the existing 
risk management culture at the mining operation, the design of the risk assessment, the 
performance of the risk assessment team, the character of the risk assessment process, the extent 
of the existing controls, and the quality of the new ideas.  Lessons learned focused on improving 
the scoping document, the need to adequately train the risk assessment team, the important risk 
assessment tools and techniques, methods to assess the quality and character of the risk 
assessment team outputs, and the significance of the documentation process. 
 
Fundamental to successful utilization of risk assessment in the MHRA process is company 
support to form a team with the capability and intentions to address all hazards.  It is critical that 
the risk assessment be designed to capture the strengths of the MHRA approach in order for it to 
be successful.  The strengths of the MHRA approach are its ability to  
1. set clear direction to solve specific high-risk problems, 
2. focus on priority concerns, 
3. establish involvement and commitment from a wide cross-section of the mine’s 
work force, 
4. decrease potential losses for mining operations, 
5. help to build teams to solve major mining issues, 
6. go beyond merely complying with existing mining standards and regulations, and 
7. focus upper management attention on issues existing at the operational level. 
 
Conversely, the MHRA approach is unlikely to prove successful if the following issues or 
concerns take precedence during a risk assessment: 
1. inappropriate focus on changes within the existing way the mine conducts 
business, 
2. time taken away from activities directly related to production, 
3. focus on additional time constraints being placed on a mining operation’s “best 
people,” 
4. the cost of implementing new prevention controls and recovery measures, 
5. inappropriate alteration of a mining operation’s priorities, 
6. need for there to be an existing risk management structure to build upon, and  
7. need for an openness in management / labor communications. 
 
This NIOSH pilot project demonstrated that US mines have the capability to successfully 
implement an MHRA and that the basic requirement for a successful MHRA is the desire to 
become more proactive in reducing risks associated with events that can cause multiple fatalities.  
An MHRA can be most effective when the mining operation possesses a proper understanding of 
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its hazards, has some experience with risk assessment techniques, uses systems and procedures 
that represent industry best, or attains wide organizational support for the MHRA activity.   
 
The power in the MHRA process comes from the risk assessment team as it examines new ideas 
that will help to further reduce risk.  These new ideas are presented to management in the form 
of an Action Plan.  This Action Plan is contained within a written document that summarizes the 
risk assessment team’s actions and is presented to management.  The Action Plan also suggests 
that management assign a responsible person to evaluate each of these new potential controls and 
recovery measures in a more in-depth manner.  Management can then select the new ideas most 
appropriate for their mine. 
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1.0 - Introduction 
 
The reoccurrence of multiple fatality events in the US Minerals Industry supports the need for 
improvements in the way major hazards are identified, assessed and managed.  Many solutions to 
reduce mining disasters have been proposed including additional regulations, improved training, 
more reliable equipment, and better technology.  In December of 2006, the National Mining 
Association’s Mine Safety Technology and Training Commission stated that a new paradigm for 
ensuring safety in underground mines was needed.  The Commission recommended that the 
industry consider a systematic and comprehensive risk management approach (Grayson et al., 
2006).  In March of 2007 during a congressional hearing, the NMA announced its support of a 
risk assessment based approach for the mining industry (Watzman, 2007).  In another 
congressional hearing, Davitt McAteer asked that Best Practices be prepared which could be 
used to hold mine operators to a higher standard of care, i.e. risk assessment and risk control 
(McAteer, 2007).  
 
The elimination of multiple fatality events is arguably one of the most important safety issues 
facing the US Minerals Industry.  Ten case studies are presented that use a range of practices to 
lower the risk from site-specific major hazards.  These practices ranged from standard to those 
that are leading the industry.  This paper evaluates how the use of Major Hazard Risk 
Assessment (MHRA) might help to eliminate multiple fatality events.  The MHRA process was 
developed by the Australian mining industry over the last decade as a means of mitigating 
catastrophic hazards from its mining operations. 
   
Most case studies were viewed as successful by the quality of the barriers, controls and recovery 
measures produced during the risk assessment and the responses of the individual risk 
                                                 
2 Minerals Industry Safety and Health Centre, University of Queensland, Australia 
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assessment teams.  However, some unsuccessful outcomes were also observed.  Of particular 
importance was the need to communicate risk management principles to both management and 
labor, the knowledge of the hazards possessed by the team used to conduct the risk assessment, 
and the ability of the existing and proposed prevention controls and recovery measures to go 
beyond simply complying with existing government standards and regulations.  This report 
should be viewed as a guidance document to provide the industry with information and tools 
needed to implement a successful MHRA program. 
 
1.1 – Trends in Managing Major Mining Hazards 
 
A proven way to manage the many hazards associated with mining is to characterize the risk they 
present and put into place controls that will lower these risks to acceptable levels.  Typically risk 
acceptability is characterized by managing risk to as-low-as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) 
or as-low-as is reasonably practicable (ALARP).  An industry’s ability to manage risk is often 
measured by its injury and illness rates.  If rates are falling and lower than those of other 
developed countries or comparable to other similar high-hazard industries, then that industry is 
considered to have demonstrated a proficiency in managing hazards.  One way to examine the 
US Minerals Industry’s proficiency in managing its risks is to examine multiple fatality trends.  
Over the last 10 years, there have been 18 multiple fatality events in the US, fatally injuring 67 
miners (Figure 1).   
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Figure 1 - Cumulative multiple fatalities over the last 10 years in the US Minerals Industry. 
 
Sixteen of the 18 multiple fatality events occurred in coal mines and 15 at underground 
operations.  The most frequent event type is strata instabilities with 8 events fatally injuring 21 
miners (Table 1).  Explosions were involved in fewer events, 4, but had the highest number of 
fatalities, 33.  Powered haulage, fire, heat strain, equipment failure and slip or falls of persons are 
other examples of major hazards in the US Minerals Industry.  These data suggest that major 
hazards exist in our nation’s mines capable of causing multiple fatality events.  They also support 
the need for additional actions to lesson the impact of these hazards on miner safety. 
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Table 1 - Hazard types associated with multiple fatality events in the US Minerals Industry, 
1997-2007. 
Hazard Type Events Fatalities 
Strata Instabilities 8 21 
Explosions 4 33 
Powered Haulage 2 4 
Fire 1 2 
Equipment Failure 1 2 
Heat Strain 1 2 
Slip or Fall of Person 1 3 
 
 
2.0 – Minerals Industry Risk Management 
 
Risk management systems have been used in many industries to manage inherent hazards in their 
business.  In fact, some countries mandate risk management approaches in their minerals 
industries.  Others, like the US, produce technically detailed regulations, often reacting to a 
particular disaster, with the purpose of prescribing specific industry actions.  By evaluating these 
different approaches to risk management, an assessment can be made of the impact of the risk 
management framework on miner injuries. 
 
2.1 – The US Experience 
 
Prescriptive mining standards rely on existing normalized rules, largely based on past-experience 
and current Best Practices, to mandate safety standards.  These standards can produce lengthy 
and detailed regulations.  Changing technology and mining conditions require the regulations to 
be constantly reviewed and, on occasion, modified.  However, prescriptive standards are 
sometimes incapable of dealing with hazards associated with specialized and dynamic mining 
conditions.  They can also produce a culture of compliance that does not necessarily emphasize 
leading practice.  The above process could potentially lead to a reactive approach towards 
hazards. 
 
Alternatively, regulatory standards with a General Duty Clause3 require employers, suppliers and 
employees to provide, design for and adhere to reasonable activities ensuring that workers are 
protected.  Many industries, e.g. nuclear, petrochemical, environmental, have used structured risk 
management approaches to develop proactive approaches in managing their risks.  In these 
industries, safety plans often focus on a local site’s approach toward assessing risks and 
mitigating these risks through targeted controls. 
 
The experience of these industries provides an opportunity to examine how a risk management 
approach may help to eliminate major hazards in US mineral industries.  In addition, many of the 
                                                 
3 In commonwealth countries including the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, a similar clause is often found 
in regulation referred to as the Duty-of-Care. 
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commonwealth countries, e.g. United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, have used risk 
management as their guiding principles for current mining standards.  Perhaps the country that 
has had the most extensive transition, from a prescriptive-based health and safety philosophy to a 
more proactive, duty-of-care philosophy, is Australia.   
 
2.2 – The Australian Experience 
 
In Australia, the minerals industry began its movement towards risk-based management systems 
in the mid-1990s, shortly after the Moura coal mine explosion fatally injured 11 miners 
(Hopkins, 2000).  Later in 1996, the Gretley coal mine inundation reinforced the drive for 
change.  As a result, industry began using risk analysis methods to mitigate certain key hazards, 
e.g. fires, explosions, inundations, spontaneous combustions, etc.  Later, the various regulatory 
bodies in Australia began to mandate safety management plans for principal hazards.  In New 
South Wales, the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (NSWDPI, 1997) published a risk management 
handbook that offers a process to anticipate and prevent circumstances which may result in 
occupational injury or death.  Queensland followed (QDME, 1998 and QMC, 1999) with its own 
standard.  In Western Australia, where the largest concentration of metal mining occurs, duty-of-
care legislation was enacted in 1994; however, risk management approaches saw less application 
until recently (CMEWA, 2003).  Most of these regulations require mines to perform some form 
of risk assessment on a regular basis to address the possibility of unwanted events such as 
spontaneous combustion, gas outbursts, explosions, air blasts, inundations and roof falls.  In 
addition, mine managers are generally expected to demonstrate competency in risk-based 
management systems through training and certification.  As is evident from this discussion, the 
Australian Minerals Industry performs MHRA, in part, because it is mandated.   
 
In response to these different approaches to duty-of-care regulations, an Australian Standard on 
Risk Management (Standards Australia, 2004) was established, providing an important risk 
management framework (Figure 2).  First, hazards are identified by the location, nature and 
magnitude of energies present within a mine.  The risks these hazards present are then identified 
and assessed.  Next, the mine operator decides whether to eliminate, mitigate or tolerate these 
mining hazards.  Typically it is most effective to eliminate hazards early in the life of a mine 
when design activities are the most prevalent.  Mitigation actions can consist of equipment, 
materials, rules, methods, competencies, labels or other mechanisms to control hazards.  If a 
hazard is tolerated then administrative controls, specialized training or recover measures are used 
to minimize losses.  As these actions are taken, their performance must be monitored.  This is 
typically done on a regularly scheduled basis and changes are made to the process as needed.   
7 
Take Action
Decide to 
Tolerate
Decide to 
Eliminate
Monitor for 
Change
Monitor 
Performance
Decide to 
Mitigate
Assess the 
Risks
Identify the 
Risks
 
Figure 2 - Principal risk management framework used in Australia (Standards Australia, 2004). 
 
2.3 – Has the Risk Management Framework Worked to Reduce Miner Injuries? 
 
In Australian underground coal mining, following an increasing fatality rate in the early 90s, 
there has been a marked decrease in these same rates over the last 10 years with a dramatic drop 
in the last three years ( 
Figure 3).  Unfortunately the fatality rate for US underground coal mining has not seen this same 
drop.  In underground Australian metalliferous mining, a significant decrease only occurred in 
the last 5 years.  Also, the US metal/non-metal underground mining fatality rate, once well above 
the level for US underground coal, is now consistently lower than coal.  It is also worth noting 
that there has not been a coal mine multiple fatality event in Australia since the Gretley 
inundation in 1996; however, there have been two multiple fatality events in metalliferous mines 
(Bronzewing and North Parks) during this same time frame.  The general downward trends in 
Australian underground mining fatality rates are, in part, attributed to the introduction and 
acceptance of risk-based management systems.  It should be noted that the Australian experience 
also demonstrates the need for continual improvement and government oversight in response to 
improperly managed risk-based management systems (Freeman, 2007). 
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Figure 3 - The running three-year underground mine fatality rates for Australia and the US. 
 
2.4 – The Minerals Industry Safety and Health Centre (MISHC) 
 
To assist in evaluating the MHRA approach, NIOSH sought help from a leading Australian 
institution involved in implementing mineral industry risk management programs.  Several major 
companies and the government of Queensland help to form the Minerals Industry Safety & 
Health Centre (MISHC) at the University of Queensland in 1998.  This centre conducts research 
and education as well as develops industry resources on risk management topics.  MISHC has 
developed a Minerals Industry Risk Management (MIRM) model for achieving “safe 
production” (Joy, 2006), requiring managers to be knowledgeable about hazards inherent in their 
operations and to follow a logical framework to define effective barriers or controls.  The MHRA 
approach used in the ten NIOSH case studies follows the approach taught by MISHC and is 
indicative of the approach used by most Australian mining companies to manage hazards with 
multiple fatality potential.  MISHC is also responsible for maintaining the Minerals Industry 
Risk Management Gateway or MIRMGATE (www.mirmgate.com).  This site was found to be a 
good source for Best Practice hazard management guidelines, lessons learned and innovations. 
9 
3.0 – Risk Assessment and Analysis Techniques and Tools 
 
Risks are determined in terms of the likelihood that an uncontrolled event will occur and the 
consequences of that event occurring. 
 
Risk = Likelihood of occurrence × consequence  
 
The above relationship is used in both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis methods.  A 
quantitative risk analysis method is a probabilistic estimation of risk where risk is calculated as a 
continuous series from high to low.  A qualitative risk analysis method is a basic estimation 
where risks are typically ranked from high to low.  Qualitative methods rely on a risk matrix 
similar to that demonstrated in Table 2 where qualitative categories are defined, i.e. low-to-high, 
unlikely-to-likely, etc. 
 
Table 2 - A generalized risk matrix used in many qualitative risk analysis techniques. 
Likelihood of Occurrence  
High value Medium value Low value 
High value High risk   
Medium value  Moderate risk  
Co
ns
eq
u
en
ce
 
Low value   Low risk 
 
Risk assessment and analysis techniques and tools consist of a systematic, logical set of actions 
used to identify hazards, assess risk, and implement controls to mitigate high-risk conditions.  
These techniques and tools can be described by their levels of formality, the types of analysis 
performed, and the work processes they are attempting to address. 
 
3.1 – Risk Assessment Techniques 
 
The most fundamental risk assessment activity, called an informal risk assessment, occurs when 
workers are asked to think about the hazards in the workplace before work commences, 
determine what could go wrong, and report or fix the hazards.  More formal risk management 
activities require structured procedures, often focusing on work processes that involve multiple 
levels of an organization.  These activities are practiced at some mines and are typically 
organized by an operations safety official and developed with the help of individuals familiar 
with the work practice in question.  Higher level risk management activities focus on major 
mining hazards or on major changes in the mining operations involving the entire organization, 
such as reopening a mine, moving to a new location within the mine, and utilizing a new mining 
technique or process. 
 
3.1.1 – Informal Risk Assessment Techniques 
 
Most informal risk assessment techniques consist of multiple steps where the worker is asked to 
look for hazards, determine the significance of the hazard, and take some action to mitigate the 
risk.  Many systems have been proposed and are widely used in mining.  Examples include, but 
are not limited to: 
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• Stop-Look-Analyze-Manage (SLAM) asks workers to stop and consider the work 
process before it is started, examine the work environment, analyze the work 
process, and manage the risk, 
• Take-Two for Safety calls for persons to take 2 minutes to think through a job before 
it starts, 
• Five-Point Safety System compels employees to take responsibility for the safety 
within workplace, 
• Take Time, Take Charge requires miners to stop, think, assess and respond to 
hazards in their workplace. 
 
3.1.2 – Basic-formal risk assessment techniques 
Basic-formal risk assessment techniques are characterized by the requirement to follow a 
structured process that occurs prior to performing specific higher risk work activities.  These 
techniques also require documentation that allows management to monitor and audit individual 
risk assessment activities.  The most commonly used basic-formal risk assessment technique is 
the Job Safety Analysis (JSA).  A JSA typically leads to development of Standard Operating 
Proceducres (SOP) that define how to best approach a task considering the hazards identified in 
the JSA. 
A JSA is a technique used to identify, analyze and record the specific steps involved in 
performing a work activity that could have hazards associated with it.  JSAs are typically 
performed on work processes with the highest risk for a workplace injury or illness.  It is 
essential that all actual or potential safety and health hazards associated with each task are 
identified and that actions or procedures for performing each step that will eliminate or reduce 
the hazard are documented and recorded.  Other techniques similar to JSAs include Job Hazard 
Analysis (JHA), Critical Task Analysis (CTA), and Job Hazard Breakdown (JHB). 
An SOP is a set of instructions that act as a directive, covering those features of operations that 
lend themselves to a standardized procedure.  An SOP is typically a set of instructions or steps a 
worker follows to complete a job safely and in a way that maximizes operational and production 
requirements.  SOPs can be written for work processes by the individual or group performing the 
activity, by someone with expertise in the work process, or by the person who supervises the 
work process. 
3.1.3 – Advanced-formal risk assessment techniques 
 
Advanced-formal risk assessment techniques require the use of a structured approach that 
incorporates one or more risk analysis tools (see Section 3.2) and produces a documented 
assessment of the risk associated with unwanted events.  MHRA, the subject of this 
investigation, is an advanced-formal risk assessment technique.  An MHRA can focus on a single 
major hazard, all the relevant major hazards, or an important change of mining method at a 
mining site.  One study demonstrates the complexity that a change of mining method can bring 
to the risk assessment.  In this case, a full week of effort from a large team was needed with 
multiple risk analysis tools.  All other MHRAs studied are focused on a single hazard and were 
completed in 1 to 3 days.  
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3.2 – Risk Analysis Techniques and Tools 
 
When conducting an MHRA several risk analysis techniques and tools may be needed.  A brief 
description of the most common tools follows. 
 
3.2.1 – Workplace Risk Assessment and Control (WRAC) 
 
The Workplace Risk Assessment and Control (WRAC) tool is a broad-brush risk ranking 
approach, allowing the user to focus on the highest risk.  As applied to a MHRA, this structured 
preliminary analysis begins by breaking down the mining process associated with the potential 
major hazards at the mine in some logical manner.  This is often accomplished using a flow chart 
or process mapping technique where the potential major hazards of each step in a work process 
are identified.  The mining process could be a breakdown of a major project or a geographical 
breakdown of the underground mine.  JSAs and SOPs can be used as a framework for the 
WRAC analysis. 
After preliminary analysis, the team then considers each breakdown segment of the mining 
process and identifies the potential unwanted events associated with the identified hazards 
(Figure 4).  The likelihood and consequence of each stage are determined using some variation 
of a risk matrix, followed by a risk rating calculation. 
 
Part of mine, phase of 
mining, etc. 
Potential unwanted 
event 
C
onsequence 
Likelihood 
R
isk rating 
     
     
     
↕ 
     
     
Figure 4 - An example of a WRAC risk ranking form. 
 
Prior to ranking the hazard, the team must come to an agreement on how to categorize the 
consequences for consistency purposes.  Consequences should be considered as either the 
maximum likely or the maximum potential consequence.  For example, while the maximum 
potential consequence of a slip/fall is a fatality, the maximum likely consequence is a severe 
injury.  Variable scales are often used when determining the maximum reasonable consequence 
associated with different kinds of unwanted events.  Table 3 provides some examples of the 
maximum reasonable consequence for safety, equipment, production and environmental risks.  
This table also provides a scale for determining the maximum reasonable consequence of a 
specialized safety event, in this case a mine fire. 
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Table 3 - Examples of variable scales used to determine the maximum reasonable consequence 
associated with different kinds of unwanted events. 
 Safety Equipment Production Environment Mine Fire 
1 Multiple fatalities > $ 5 M 1Week > $ 5 M Huge fire 
2 1 Fatality $ 1 M 1 Day $ 1 M Major fire 
3 Major lost-time injury 
(LTI) 
$200 K 1 Shift $200 K Moderate fire 
4 Avg LTI (4-5 days) $50 K 1 Hour $50 K Small fire 
5 Minor injury (1 day or less) < $ 10 K <1 Minute < $ 10 K Smoldering 
LTI = lost time injuries 
M = million 
K = thousand 
 
The ranking of likelihood will be influenced by the choice of consequences.  There is no correct 
choice, but there is a need to be consistent in the application of ranking across the exercise.  
Examples of variable scales used to determine the likelihood of different kinds of unwanted 
events is given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 - Examples of variable scales used to determine the likelihood of occurrence for different 
kinds of unwanted events. 
 Based on Maximum Reasonable Consequence Based on the Events / Year 
1 Common Highly likely Expected > 10  
2 It has happened Likely High 1 to 10  
3 Possible Possible Moderate 0.1 to 1 
4 Unlikely Unlikely Low 0.01 to 0.1  
5 Almost impossible Very unlikely Not Likely < 0.01  
 
3.2.2 – Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
 
The Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is another broad-brush risk ranking approach.  Like the 
WRAC, this tool identies all potential hazards and unwanted events that may lead to miner 
injuries and ranks the identified events according to their severity.  Its main purpose is to identify 
those unwanted events that should be subjected to further, more detailed risk analysis.  Once the 
potential unwanted events are risk ranked by the team, they can be prioritized so that the highest 
risk unwanted event is listed first and so on.  The technique or form for the PHA method is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
# Description of potential unwanted 
event 
Total Exposure Likelihood Most Likely 
Consequence 
Risk 
Rank 
1      
2      
3      
4      
Etc.      
Figure 5 - The Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) Form. 
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3.2.3 – Failure Modes, Effects and Analysis (FMEA), also FMECA 
 
Generally, an FMEA is used to determine where failures can occur within hardware and process 
systems and to assess the impact of such failures.  For each item, the failure modes of individual 
items are determined, effects on other items and systems are recognized, criticality is ranked, and 
the control is identified (Figure 6). 
 
Effects on 
Item Failure Mode Other 
items System 
Likelihood 
(L) 
Consequence 
(C) 
Criticality 
(LxC) Control 
        
        
        
↕ 
        
        
Figure 6 – Item-by-item risk assessment worksheet for FMEA. 
 
Robertson and Shaw (2003) provide an example of the application of the FMEA approach where 
the risks to the environment, workers and the public associated with the closure of a mine were 
identified.  This was accomplished by developing a FMEA worksheet for potential unwanted 
events post-closure of the mine. 
 
3.2.4 – Fault / Logic Tree Analysis (FTA/LTA) and Event / Decision Tree Analysis (ETA/DTA)  
 
The Fault and Logic Tree Analysis are systematic, logical developments of many contributing 
factors to one unwanted event.  The FTA evaluates the one unwanted event while the LTA 
evaluates a wanted outcome.  With both tools it is necessary to first clearly define the top event, 
followed by an analysis of the major potential contributing factors.  Each contributing factor is 
broken down into discrete parts.  A logic tree can be used to test the analysis with the use of 
“and/or” gates.  Factors can be ranked from major to lesser.  The product of the analysis is a 
deductive list of potential hazards.  This tool is well-suited to quantitative risk analysis 
techniques when probabilities for each factor can be assigned. 
Systems engineering and operations research approaches use a decision tree (or tree diagram) to 
help examine the decision.  Event and decision tree analysis (ETA or DTA) uses graphical 
models to examine the consequence of decisions.  A decision tree is used to identify the strategy 
most likely to produce a desired outcome.  In the tree structures, leaves represent classifications 
and branches represent conjunctions of features that lead to those classifications.  These tools are 
appropriate for establishing lines of assurance and determining their success and failure in 
preventing accidents. 
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3.2.5 – Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 
Hazard and Operability Studies or HAZOPs have been used extensively in the chemical 
industries to examine what impact deviations can have on a process.  The basic assumption when 
performing a HAZOP is that normal and standard conditions are safe and hazards occur only 
when there is a deviation from normal conditions.  A HAZOP can be conducted during any stage 
of a project although it is most beneficial during the later stages of design.  Typically a process 
or instrumentation diagram is used to trace the properties of materials or products through a plant 
by breaking down the process node by node (Figure 7).  The properties can be flow, level, 
pressure, concentration or temperature.  What-if guidewords are used to identify possible 
deviations.  A HAZOP typically lacks a risk calculation. 
 
Process Unit:_________________________________________________________________ 
Node: ________________                   Process Parameter: _____________________________ 
Guide Deviation Consequence Causes Suggested Action 
     
     
     
↕ 
     
     
Figure 7 - Process analysis form for a HAZOP. 
 
3.2.6 – Bow Tie Analysis 
 
The Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) was developed by Shell Oil in the 1980s as part of its Tripod 
package of concepts and tools for managing occupational health and safety in its business.  The 
“Top Event” in the BTA is a statement about the initiating event that might lead to the major 
consequence (Figure 8).  Threats (also referred to as potential causes) are discussed and controls 
examined that could mitigate the hazard (left side of the bow tie).  Next, the consequences (also 
referred to as the potential outcomes) of the initiating unwanted event are identified and recovery 
control measures examined to reduce or minimize the loss (right side of the bow tie). 
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Figure 8 - Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) method. 
 
Together, the prevention controls and recovery measures identified represent a comprehensive 
list of actions required to adequately control the hazard.  Often these actions are assigned to 
individuals and controlled by the management planning and monitoring tool known as a risk 
register.  A risk register provides for continuity in the way an organization deals with risks even 
as changes occur in management. 
 
3.2.7 – Work Process Flow Chart 
 
All mining processes have supplies, inputs, processes and outputs.  Mining processes are sets of 
activities that produce a desired outcome.  Many of these activities can be thought of as loops.  If 
the outputs are wrong then adjustments are made to the inputs or the process.  Defining these 
work processes in a step-by-step manner produces a flow chart that can be used in risk 
management.  Flow charts are meant to describe a large, sometimes complex, process as small 
elements.  Hazards are easier to identify and characterize with this type of systemic approach. 
 
3.2.8 – Exposure and Risk 
 
When miners are exposed to variable contact with hazards, it is often useful to determine the 
influence of exposure associated with different work processes or at particular work sites.  An 
example of the variable scales used to define the effects of exposure on risk is given in Table 5.   
 
Table 5 - Examples of variable scales used to define the effects of exposure on risk. 
 Exposure (% of workforce) Frequency of exposure 
1 Most > 50% Continuous 
2 Many – 30% Several times/day 
3 Several – 10% Once a day 
4 A few – 5% Weekly 
5 Very few < 1% Monthly 
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There are many ways to account for exposure when performing a risk analysis.  One example is 
provided in Table 6.  Here, the total exposure is estimated by combining the effects of the 
frequency of individual miner exposure versus the exposure to the total workforce. 
 
Table 6 - A method to determine the total exposure using a 5 x 5 matrix. 
Frequency of exposure (Table 5) 
1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL EXPOSURE 
Continuous Several x/day 1/day 1/week 1/month 
1 Most > 50% A A B C D 
2 Many – 30% A B C D E 
3 Several – 10% A C D E E 
4 A few – 5% B D E E E Ex
po
su
re
 
(T
ab
le
 5
) 
5 Very few < 1% C D E E E 
 
Once the total exposure level has been estimated, this value can be used to determine the overall 
likelihood (Table 7) and consequence (Table 8) of potential unwanted events occurring. 
 
Table 7 - Estimation of overall likelihood by combining the estimates of likelihood and total 
exposure. 
Total exposure (Table 6) LIKELIHOOD OF AN 
EVENT A B C D E 
Common A A A B C 
Has happened A B B C D 
Possible B C C D E 
Unlikely C D D E E 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
(T
ab
le
 5
) 
Very unlikely D E E E E 
 
Table 8 - The combinations of maximum reasonable consequence and the likelihood of the 
maximum reasonable consequence to establish the most likely consequence level. 
Likelihood of the Consequence (Table 4) MOST LIKELY 
CONSEQUENCE Highly likely Likely Possible Unlikely Very unlikely 
Multi-fatality A A B C D 
1 fatality A A B C D 
Serious LTI B B C D E 
Avg LTI C C D E E M
ax
im
um
 
R
ea
so
na
bl
e 
C
on
se
-
qu
en
ce
 
(T
ab
le
 3
) 
Minor LTI D D E E E 
 
The total probability and consequence of the potential unwanted event are then determined using 
a 5 x 5 risk ranking matrix (Table 9). 
 
Table 9 - 5 x 5 risk ranking matrix. 
Overall Likelihood (Table 7) 
RISK RANK A B C D E 
A 1 2 3 7 11 
B 3 5 8 12 16 
C 6 9 13 17 20 
D 10 14 18 21 23 
Overall 
Consequence 
(Table 8) 
E 15 19 22 24 25 
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4.0 – Elements of an MHRA 
 
The elements of the MHRA approach used in the case studies are established and published by 
MISHC (www.mishc.uq.edu.au).  During these studies, MISHC personnel assisted NIOSH in 
conducting the MHRA.  Training on the MHRA process was given to participants when possible.  
A risk assessment scope and the potential team participants were most often identified during 
these training sessions. 
 
4.1 – Risk Assessment Design (Scoping) 
 
The risk assessment design or scope is best defined prior to the MHRA exercise.  Major hazards 
to be discussed, decisions on risk assessment team membership, and time allotment for the 
activity are best addressed with a scoping document.  This document provides an opportunity to 
break down the MHRA process into reviewable parts containing the following information: 
1. An objective statement that identifies potential major hazards of interest to the 
mining operation, 
2. The boundaries of the mining system or work process, 
3. The risk analysis methods and risk assessment tools, 
4. The names of potential team members, 
5. The time and dates of the MHRA, 
6. The location of the MHRA, 
7. Determination of the potential data requirements, i.e. in-house safety statistics, 
MSHA data related to the hazard(s), and similar assessments from the MIRMgate 
website (www.mirmgate.com), 
8. The use of experts from outside the mining operation, and 
9. The types of documents that will be produced. 
 
4.2 – Risk Assessment Team 
 
A fundamental part of an MHRA is the risk assessment team.  This team must include an 
appropriate cross-section of knowledgeable persons familiar with the hazards to be investigated 
(Figure 9).  The team must be capable of identifying all relevant hazards, unwanted events and 
possible controls.  The process leader is the facilitator who has the appropriate qualifications, 
knowledge and experience.  The facilitator is responsible for following a quality risk assessment 
process designed to meet the risk assessment scope and is responsible for making sure the team 
and the process remain focused on a quality output.  It is important for the facilitator to act as a 
teacher and coach without dominating the discussion while making sure to avoid conflict and 
imbalance in involvement of team members.  Open ended questions are often used to elicit 
participation from the group.   
 
It is also important to consider non-management/labor entities for team participation.  Miners 
responsible for performing tasks that are part of the work processes under review can validate 
information and provide insight, perspective and ideas that are invaluable to a quality output.  
These team members are also helpful in communicating adherence to existing prevention 
controls and recovery measures and in embracing changes brought about by the application of 
new ideas. 
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Figure 9 - Example MHRA team structure (MISHC, 2007). 
 
The individuals assigned to the MHRA should fully dedicate their time to this effort during the 
assessment.  It is very important for team members to receive instruction on the MHRA approach 
prior to the risk assessment.  The time allotted for the MHRA should be determined by the 
complexity of the topic.  A focused topic could be done in one day, while more complex topics 
or a site-wide MHRA could take 3 to 5 days.  The venue for the activity is also important.  The 
location should be quiet, free from disruptions, with tables set in a U-shaped pattern to promote 
discussions and equality among members. 
 
4.3 – Risk Assessment 
 
Five basic steps make up the MHRA process: 
1. Identify and characterize major potential mining hazards, 
2. Rank potential unwanted events, 
3. Determine important existing prevention controls and recovery measures, 
4. Identify new prevention controls and recovery measures, and 
5. Discuss implementation, monitoring and auditing issues. 
 
4.3.1 – Identify and Characterize Major Potential Mining Hazards 
 
The first step is to identify all relevant hazards or possible problems that could lead to a potential 
multiple fatality event.  If the list is incomplete, the risk assessment will be inadequate.  The 
types of hazard that should be identified are best thought of as uncontrolled releases of energy 
that have the potential to cause significant harm (Standards Australia, 2004).  The energy 
approach is used to think about what could go wrong specifically at a mining operation.  If an 
accident can be thought of as an uncontrolled release of energy, then it follows that the risk of an 
accident is higher when the energy is large.  An exact measure of energy is not needed, only 
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recognition that it can do serious harm.  Potential energies inherent in many mines are contained 
within the roof and rib of the underground mine, the highwall of the surface mine, the chemical 
energy in toxic or explosive gases, and the fluid energy of water above or adjacent to the mine 
workings.  The process of mining also brings large-scale energy into the mining environment, i.e. 
the mechanical energy in mobile and processing equipment, the shocking energy in electrical 
equipment, the air and hydraulic pressure in fluid systems, etc.  Energy that is not completely 
controlled leads to some level of risk, depending on the likelihood of release and the 
consequences should the energy be released.  When the unwanted release occurs, it can cause 
serious injuries.  Table 10 is used to list typical sources of energy and to characterize their 
possible locations and magnitudes. 
 
Table 10 - Categorizing the location and magnitude of the worst hazards using the energy 
approach. 
Hazard (Energy approach) Location Magnitude (worst case) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4.3.2 – Rank Potential Unwanted Events 
 
After a comprehensive list of hazards is identified and characterized, a broad-brush risk 
assessment tool such as the WRAC or PHA is used to risk rank the potential unwanted events.  
Depending on the topic, the individual hazards should be broken down using a process mapping 
technique or by the geographic location within the mine.  For each step in the work process or 
for each geographic location within the mine, a likelihood of occurrence and a consequence for 
each potential hazard are determined.  It should be noted that in some MHRA case studies, 
likelihood is ignored because the consequences of the unwanted event are deemed significant.  
For all field studies, a qualitative risk ranking procedure is used, integrating some variation of 
the risk matrix shown in Table 2.  At the conclusion of this step, the team has successfully 
ranked the risk.  The highest rank risks are almost always unacceptable and the lowest rank risks 
are often acceptable. 
 
4.3.3 – Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
Additional risk assessment tools are used to help determine what prevention controls and 
recovery measures are currently being used.  In most cases, the BTA or the work process flow 
chart are excellent tools to conduct detailed analysis of the highest ranked risks.  At the end of 
this step, a detailed list of all existing prevention controls and recovery measures for the hazard 
in question are documented so they can be monitored and audited on some regular basis. 
 
4.3.4 - Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
The same process that identifies existing prevention controls and recovery measures is used to 
identify new prevention controls and recovery measures.  This is a crucial step since it 
potentially produces a list of actions to be investigated that are capable of further reduction of 
risks at an underground mine site.  It is important for management to consider the merits of each 
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new idea suggested by the risk assessment team.  Typically, these new ideas are presented in the 
form of an action plan. 
 
4.3.5 - Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing issues 
 
A document is produced at the conclusion of the MHRA that focuses on a description of the 
hazards examined, the ranks of the potential risks, and a summary of both existing and new 
prevention controls and recovery measures.  The document does not rank the new ideas nor 
should it attempt to define a specific course of action or recommend a specific design solution 
for management.  A post-risk assessment presentation by the team to management is made to 
gain acceptance and understanding of the MHRA outcomes.  Two key responses from 
management are needed.  First, management needs to make sure that all existing prevention 
controls and recovery measures identified by the risk assessment team are monitored, audited, or 
investigated to ensure that unacceptable risks are controlled.  Second, all suggested new ideas 
should be, at a minimum, investigated. 
 
4.4 – Effectiveness of Controls 
 
The important output of the risk assessment team is the list of existing and new controls.  
Assessing the quality of this output can only be accomplished when the effectiveness of these 
controls is understood.  In this study, the controls were categorized using a hierarchy framework 
(Table 11) used by MISHC personnel.  When a hazard is eliminated, the risks associated with the 
hazard are also eliminated.  This should always be the first action of the risk assessment team – 
to investigate how to eliminate the hazard.  However, this is usually difficult to do, since a 
hazard can owe its origin to many different factors.  Some of these factors are poorly understood, 
while others may represent a condition of business that is perceived to be difficult to change. 
 
Table 11 - Control categories based on risk reduction effectiveness. 
Control Category Based on 
Hierarchy Framework 
Major Control 
Issues 
Potential for Human 
Error 
Risk Reduction 
Effectiveness 
Eliminate Hazard (EH) Economic/strategic Doesn’t exist Complete 
Minimize/Substitute Hazard (MH) 
Physical Barriers (PB) Engineering 
Human error plays a 
minor role High 
Warning Devices (WD) Assessing Human error is possible Medium 
Procedures (P) 
Personnel Skills and Training (PST) 
Administrative and 
work processes 
Human error can play 
an important role Low 
 
If it is not possible to eliminate the hazard, attempts must be made to mitigate the potential 
effects of the hazard.  Mitigation consists of actions to minimize the hazards (MH), most often 
with engineering methods, or to implement physical barriers (PB) capable of separating the 
hazard from the worker or the work process.  Warning devices (WD) are often used to assess the 
performance of engineering controls (MH) and physical barriers (PB) or to prompt a change in 
administrative or work processes.  Controls that are largely focused on operational and work 
process issues consist of procedures (P) and personnel skills and training (PST).  Procedures (P) 
can often rely on the personnel skills and training (PST) of the worker.  The reliance on worker 
behavior increases the potential for human error and reduces the risk reduction effectiveness 
when compared to mitigation efforts (Table 11).  If controls fail to prevent the unwanted event or 
are not possible, then the hazard is tacitly tolerated and recovery measures are put into place to 
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minimize losses.  It is then appropriate to consider the hazard as a real threat and not just a 
potential threat.  Recovery measures can include all control categories listed in Table 11. 
 
Analyses of the ten case studies presented in this report require an evaluation of the controls 
identified by the risk assessment teams.  These controls are the principal output of the MHRA.  
To accommodate this analysis, every identified control was assigned to one of the categories 
listed in Table 11.  The characteristics of each category are given below: 
 
Eliminate Hazard (EH) – The characteristics of this category are self-evident – 
elimination of the hazard under consideration.  This can also be done with changes in 
equipment, changes to the mining process or method, or changes in the location of the 
hazard which eliminate personnel exposure. 
 
Minimize or Substitue Hazard (MH) – The characteristics of this category consist mainly 
of engineering controls, i.e., improved ventilation, fire fighting equipment, backup 
systems, fire suppression systems, use of an event simulator, enhanced information about 
the hazard, improved construction / drilling / exploration techniques, electrical 
component performance characteristics and fault protection, designing to standards, 
improved equipment (values, brakes, tubing, etc.), available medical and rescue teams, 
etc. 
 
Physical Barriers (PB) – The characteristics of this category are focused on physical 
barriers that separate the hazard from the worker, i.e., roof rock reinforcement, equipment 
skirting and guarding, sealing, rock dusting, refuge chambers, shielding, barriers, walls, 
special containers, heat wraps, self-rescuers, personal protective gear, etc. 
 
Warning Devices (WD) – This category is primarily concerned with systems that monitor 
environmental / equipment conditions, i.e., gas monitors, PEDs, sampling pumps, gages, 
extensometers, tags, indicators, microseismic monitors, bag samples, alarms, sirens, 
certain kinds of communication systems, etc. 
 
Procedures (P) – The characteristics of this category concentrate on processes conducted 
by workers and management, i.e., policies, inspections, checks, documentation, methods, 
roles, definition, restrictions, audits, purchases, investigations, standards, trigger action 
response plans (TARP), duties, work orders, updates specifications, process 
requirements, etc.  
 
Personnel Skills and Training (PST) – The characteristics of this category center on 
training needs, personnel needs, required competency, testing, estimate consequences, 
reinforcing skills, mentoring, communication, expertise, behavior controls, operator 
errors, operator sensors, inspection quality, observation of conditions, introductions, 
clarification, etc. 
 
An MHRA risk assessment team should strive for the high end of the hierarchy of controls.  
Some attempt must be made to at least consider how the hazard might be eliminated.  This is 
often most easily accomplished in the early stages of a mining project’s life cycle.  Most often, 
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the controls identified during the MHRA attempt to mitigate the hazard or to tolerate the hazard 
by putting into place recovery measures that will minimize losses.  The team should be cautious 
of an over-reliance on warning devices that require manual readings, administrative procedures, 
and the personnel skills and training of the work force.  In general, an MHRA should strive to go 
beyond the standards and regulations requirements for mining. 
 
4.5 – Audit and Review 
 
After an MHRA, a re-assessment of the site’s hazards and an evaluation of the implemented risk 
mitigation program should be done on a regular basis by skilled and experienced personnel.  It is 
also appropriate to audit and review the MHRA when rapid changes occur in some relevant work 
process or operational factor, i.e. design, construction, etc.  In these cases, the audit and review 
can focus on the part or condition that is actually undergoing the change.  An audit and review 
should, at minimum, determine the status of the risk management plan and make 
recommendations for improving potential deficiencies in the plan.  Tools, such as a risk register, 
are sometimes used to help with auditing and reviewing important controls at a mining operation. 
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5.0 - MHRA Pilot Studies at US Underground Mining Operations 
 
Ten case studies were performed at a wide cross-section of underground mines (Table 12).  The 
mines make up important sectors of the US minerals industry, i.e. coal, metal, nonmetal and 
aggregate.  The sizes of the mines ranged from small (< 50 miners) to large (>450 miners).  
Important mining states were represented in the pilot project including Pennsylvania, Ohio, West 
Virginia, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico and Alaska. 
 
Table 12 - Characteristics of the 10 MHRA case study sites. 
ID Sec-
tion 
Size Duration, 
days 
Commodity Risk Assessment Topic 
A 5.1 Large 1.5 Metal Rock reinforcement process 
B 5.2 Small 0.3 Stone Unplanned detonation of a production blast 
C 5.3 Large 2 Coal Spontaneous combustion causing fire/explosion 
D 5.4 Large 2 Coal Underground workshop fire 
E 5.5 Small 1 Coal Water inundation 
F 5.6 Small 1 Stone Escapeway egress blockage 
G 5.7 Medium 2 Nonmetal Natural gas ingress 
H 5.8 Medium 3 Coal Conveyor belt fire 
I 5.9 Large 2 Coal Longwall gate entry track fire 
J 5.10 Large 4 Metal Captive cut and fill change of mining method 
 
These case studies document the MHRA performed at underground mines and discuss how risks 
for multiple fatality events were potentially reduced by reinforcing existing practices and 
processes and by adding new prevention controls and recovery measures.  The common 
objective of these MHRAs is to 1) identify potential hazards that could cause a multiple fatality 
event, 2) determine which unwanted events pose the greatest threat for the mine, and 3) identify 
a potential plan to prevent the threat or recover from the consequence of the event happening.  
The controls typically consist of a broad spectrum of prevention, monitoring, first response, and 
emergency response techniques and help to move an operation from a reactive to a proactive 
approach towards safety.   
 
Cooperating mining operations were typically selected after they first participated in a 3-day 
Workshop on Minerals Industry Risk Management.  This workshop was organized by NIOSH 
and taught by Professor Jim Joy of the University of Queensland, the primary MISHC participant 
in the pilot project.  Two workshops occurred, August 3-5, 2006, in Spokane, Washington, and 
December 18-20, 2006, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  In many cases, the cooperating mining 
operations selected the hazard to be examined during the case study during, or shortly after 
attending, the above workshops.   
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5.1 – Rock Reinforcement Process Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
Mine A is a relatively new operation located in a remote area.  This operation is using a 
mechanized cut-and-fill method to mine a vein deposit.  After the ore is blasted and mucked at 
underground faces, it is trucked to a surface processing facility for gold recovery using gravity, 
chemical and pyro-metallurgical processes. 
 
Representatives from the mine’s parent company attended a NIOSH-sponsored MHRA training 
course where two risk assessment scoping topics were identified. 
 
5.1.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
Two risk assessment scopes were originally proposed: 
• Mine Fire Risk Assessment - 1) review hazards associated with the potential for an 
equipment fire in the intake air stream, 2) evaluate strategies and techniques for early 
detection of the hazard, and 3) evaluate the escape and emergency response plan for a 
major fire at this mine. 
• Dissolved Oxygen Plant Risk Assessment - 1) review hazards associated with the 
dissolved oxygen plant, 2) evaluate strategies and techniques for early detection of the 
hazard, and 3) evaluate the escape and emergency response plan for the major hazard and 
impact on other site facilities. 
 
5.1.2 – Risk Assessment Team 
 
Two teams were formed by the cooperator and were designated to spend one day on each topic.  
The first team represented underground mine operations and included: 
 Mine manager 
 Mobile maintenance foreman 
 Miner 
 Mine operations trainer 
 Safety coordinator 
 Safety/human resources manager 
NIOSH observer 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
 
The second team included processing plant personnel: 
 Assistant mine manager 
 Processing plant safety trainer 
 Maintenance engineer 
 Maintenance foreman 
 Maintenance superintendent 
 Plant labourer 
 Mechanic 
 Electrician 
NIOSH observers 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
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Both teams had representatives from a wide cross-section of the mine.  Each team pursued an 
independent risk assessment. 
 
5.1.3 - Structure of the Risk Assessment: 
 
After the initial meeting of the mine’s appointed risk assessment team, it became apparent that 
the team lacked adequate training in fundamental risk management principles and were 
unfamiliar with risk assessment techniques and tools.  In addition, the risk assessment team did 
not have the necessary expertise to sufficiently analyze the process identified in the risk 
assessment scope.  Without an understanding of risk assessment techniques and tools and a lack 
of knowledge about the processes to be analyzed, it was decided that an MHRA could not be 
performed on the suggested topics.  The team decided instead to focus on a general hazard 
identification and job/process mapping discussion aimed at introducing risk assessment 
techniques to the operations. 
 
To maximize the training potential associated with this case study, half of each day was 
dedicated to instruction/training and the other half to developing a JSA for a key process.  The 
underground and surface teams were made up of management, front line supervisors, 
tradespersons, engineers and labor.  The development of JSAs reinforced the concepts of 
controlling energies through design of appropriate work processes. 
 
5.1.4 – New Risk Assessment Topics: 
 
After the instructional aspects of the risk assessment were completed, both teams identified a 
critical safety process that could be mapped and examined by the WRAC tool.  The underground 
operations team decided to examine the process associated with the selection and installation of 
rock reinforcement.  The process plant operations team selected repair of a frequently failing 
slurry pump.  Neither of these potential hazards represented a high-consequence event that might 
lead to a multiple fatality accident, but they did represent problems relevant and instructive to the 
case study participants. 
 
5.1.4.1 - Rock Reinforcement Process:  
 
Mine A uses an automated drill to install rock reinforcement (Figure 10).  The underground 
operations team was able to rapidly describe the steps in the selection and installation of rock 
reinforcement, as follows: 
1. Scale 
2. Select bolt size and type 
3. Select bolt pattern 
4. Stock machine with supplies 
5. Move machine into heading and set-up 
6. Drill back hole 
7. Insert bolt 
8. Anchor wire mesh screen (repeat steps 6, 7 and 8 until ring is complete) 
9. Advance to next ring (start at step 6) 
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Figure 10 - Drill used to install rock reinforcement. 
 
The team then attempted to identify the hazards for each step in the rock reinforcement process 
and rank the associated risks.  This was accomplished with a WRAC.  Every potential unwanted 
event was examined and their Maximum Reasonable Consequence (MRC) and likelihood of 
occurrence were determined.  Due to time constraints, only hazards associated with steps 1 
through 5 were examined during the exercise.  These steps included scaling (step 1), the 
selection of bolts and patterns by the miner (steps 2 and 3), and the set-up (steps 4 and 5) of the 
machine by the miner, i.e. choosing drill bit sizes, etc. (Table 13).  Risks were ranked using a 
5x5 matrix (Table 14).   
 
Table 13 - WRAC of the initial steps in the rock reinforcement process. 
Step in Process Unwanted Event MRC Likelihood Rank 
Person in poor position C 4 9 
Bar too heavy C 2 17 
Ground not scaled B 4 5 
1. Scale fresh ground 
Poor quality scaling B 4 5 
Wrong bolt selected for conditions B 4 5 
Correct bolt unavailable, substitute bolt 
inadequate for pattern 
A 4 2 
2. Select bolt type & size 
Short bolts installed intentionally B 4 5 
3. Select Pattern Wrong pattern selected for conditions B 4 5 
4. Stock Machine Improper lifting of materials C 3 13 
Incorrect bit size selected for bolt B 4 5 
Machine positioned too far forward B 3 8 
5. Machine Set-up 
Moving energized cable by hand B 1 16 
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Table 14 - A 5x5 risk matrix used to rank risk in the rock reinforcement process WRAC. 
 Likelihood of Occurrence 
Maximum 
Reasonable 
Consequence  
5-Common 
(>1/week) 
4-Likely 
(1/month) 
3-Moderate 
(1/year) 
2-Unlikely 
(1/several years) 
1-Very Unlikely 
(almost never) 
A-Multiple Fatality 1 2 4 7 11 
B-Fatality 3 5 8 12 16 
C-Lost-time Injury 6 9 13 17 20 
D-Reportable Injury 10 14 18 21 23 
E-First Aid Injury 15 19 22 24 25 
 
The results of this partial WRAC were then subjected to a Bow Tie Analysis (Figure 8).  The 
highest unwanted events from the WRAC (Table 13) formed the center of the bow tie.  The 
reliance on the judgement of the miner to manage these five critical steps was identified as a key 
vulnerability by the risk assessment team. 
 
The risk assessment team then identified existing and new controls to manage these top 
unwanted events, i.e. the left side of the BTA.  For example, the team identified the use of long 
(14-ft) scaling bars and the training and experience of the miners as the existing controls.  In 
addition, several new controls were suggested by the team to increase the training effort 
associated with the rock reinforcement process (Table 15).  In particular, the risk assessment 
team recommended that front line supervisors should monitor the rock reinforcement process by 
the miners on a daily basis. 
 
Table 15 - New ideas for preventing rock reinforcement selection and installation failures. 
NI1 Improve training and monitoring of miners in selection of bolts and patterns 
NI2 Improve training and monitoring of miners in proper set-up of machine 
NI3 Improve training of miners in use of scaling bars, only use 14-ft bars New prevention ideas 
NI4 Improve training in lifting and keep material storage area clean 
NI = New Ideas 
 
Time constraints prohibited a complete analysis of the remaining steps in the rock reinforcement 
cycle.  It was understood that the group would continue the risk assessment on their own, 
examining the other steps in the rock reinforcement process in a similar manner.  At the end of 
this process, a complete list of existing controls and recovery measures would be compiled and 
the new ideas examined to produce a Rock Reinforcement JSA.  This JSA would be used to 
support the training of those involved in the rock reinforcement process and monitor their 
performance. 
 
5.1.4.2 - Slurry Pump Repair Process:  
 
After the morning training session the surface operations team mapped the process for repairing 
the slurry pump: 
1. Notify control room 
2. Lockout pump valves 
3. Secure connecting values 
4. Bleed-off system pressure 
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5. Remove pump housing 
6. Replace failed components 
7. Reinstall housing 
8. Remove locks and open valves 
9. Restart 
 
The team struggled with identifying the steps in this process and it became clear there were 
multiple methods being used to secure the valves and drain the pressure from the pump systems.  
Once there was general agreement on the steps in the process, discussions on the hazards 
associated with steps 1 through 4 were initiated.  However, a continued lack of consensus 
concerning proper procedures to control the hazards in these steps limited progress within the 
allotted time.  The team recognized the repair process as an elevated risk activity because of its 
high likelihood of occurrence.  The team also agreed that the mine should develop an SOP for 
this reoccurring activity or investigate alternative equipment that would not require such frequent 
repairs.  Despite this recognition, the team did not feel empowered to effect this change without 
further approval from management. 
 
5.1.5 - Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues: 
 
The overall acceptance and understanding of the risk assessment process by the team at this mine 
was limited.  The team selected was energetic and eager to learn the subject but had limited 
exposure to risk assessment practices and as such does not utilize low level risk assessment tools, 
such as JSAs or SOPs, in their mining processes. 
 
The management team at Mine A was short on staff and expressed a reluctance to take on 
additional administrative burdens associated with the MHRA process.  The limited time 
available for the MHRA exercise was largely due to existing workload obstacles.  This is a new 
mining operation with a relatively high turnover rate where site-specific experience is in 
relatively short supply.  In its current state, it is difficult to see how management could supply 
the necessary guidance to implement, monitor and audit a formal risk management approach 
such as an MHRA.   
 
Lastly, it was not clear that labor and management were communicating at a level necessary to 
foster the exchange of ideas in a frank and productive fashion required for an MHRA.  While 
there was a cordial labor-management relationship and communication was good for day-to-day 
operational issues, there seemed to be a rigid separation between labor and management in the 
strategic decision-making processes.  Future involvement of the workforce in development of 
JSAs and SOPs may help to improve this relationship and better position the mine for effective 
major hazard management planning.
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5.2 – Unplanned Detonation of a Production Blast Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
Mine B is an underground limestone mine using the room-and-pillar mining method.  Rooms are 
typically 35 ft wide by 20 ft high.  The production faces are drilled with a V-cut pattern 13 ft 
deep and filled with ANFO.  Blasting caps and primers are inserted into each hole and connected 
to a specific timing delay.  Typically the faces are drilled and loaded early in the shift.  Faces 
prepared in this manner are barricaded and ready to connect to the blasters via prima cord at the 
shift’s end.  Leaving the face fully charged represents a hazard for miners working near these 
areas. 
 
A team of company and external personnel took part in a systematic discussion about the 
explosives hazards.  The team focused on work processes associated with blast hole loading and 
detonation and specific products used in the blasting process.  The cooperating company 
identified the unplanned detonation hazard after attending the previously discussed NIOSH 
sponsored workshop on Minerals Industry Risk Management. 
 
5.2.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The objective of the risk assessment was to 1) review hazards associated with unplanned 
blasthole detonations prior to scheduled face shots at Mine B, and 2) evaluate strategies and 
techniques to mitigate the risk.  
 
5.2.2 - Risk Assessment Team 
 
The team was made up of persons employed at the mine, technical representatives of the local 
explosives supplier, and an observer and facilitator.  More specifically, the team members 
included: 
 Two management representatives  
 One engineer  
 One miner 
 One underground mine foreman  
 Two external explosives experts 
 NIOSH observer 
 Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
 
5.2.3 – Risk Assessment 
 
A formal risk assessment method was not completed, nor was it needed to solve the unplanned 
detonation events.  The risk assessment was largely accomplished through focused discussions of 
the hazards and potential controls.  The entire process took approximately 2 hours.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, the various discussion segments were placed into the steps associated 
with the MHRA process (see below). 
 
5.2.3.1 – Step 1, Identify and Characterize Unplanned Detonation Mining Hazards 
 
The primary safety risk identified was the unplanned detonation of a production face while 
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mining personnel were present.  The risks were the greatest when the blast holes were loaded 
with explosives and all the blasting caps were connected together.  The risks were increased by 
the length of time the face sat in this condition.  At this mine site, that length of time ranged from 
4 to 6 hours.  The team agreed that the risks could be significantly reduced if the length of time 
between setting up the face for a blast and actually blasting the face was shortened. 
 
The discussions began with a representative of the mining operation describing the work 
processes used in setting up a development face for a production blast.  This was followed by a 
technical presentation from representatives of the explosive manufacturer.  The focus of this 
discussion was on the products used in the blasting process. 
 
5.2.3.2 – Step 2, Rank Potential Unwanted Events 
 
Numerous potential threats were identified capable of causing a spontaneous ignition event: 
1. Lightning strike on the surface above the underground mine – Understandably, blasts are 
not attempted in surface operations when lightning occurs.  However, in underground 
mines, blasting procedures are not generally altered when lightning exists on the surface.  
Recently, unplanned detonations have occurred when lightning strikes were observed 
near the blasting area (Anon, 2005).  Also, the association of lightning with the Sago 
Mine Disaster in January, 2006 (Gates et al., 2007), has provided a potential example 
where electrical currents may pass deep within the earth’s strata in conjunction with 
surface lightning strikes.  At Mine B, there were no procedures that altered the blasting 
practices during weather that produced lightning strikes. 
2. Rock fall hitting base charge detonator and the strike initiates an electric spark – A rock 
falling from the mine’s roof and directly impacting a base charge detonator could initiate 
an electric spark and cause an unwanted detonation of the explosives.  At Mine B, 
precautions are taken to remove all loose material from the roof prior to loading the blast 
holes.  Both mechanical and hand-scaling techniques are used. 
3. Shovel or other tools impacting the detonator – This is a similar problem to the roof 
rocks hitting the base charge detonator.  The potential for this type of impact detonation 
was considered to be very low. 
4. Static electric charge - Most electric detonators have protective systems built in at the 
manufacturing stage to eliminate unplanned detonations. However, when static electricity 
is known to be a severe problem, such as in dry or dusty conditions, then particular care 
is needed to prevent an accidental discharge to a circuit.  Sometimes mining operations 
require the miner to wear conducting footwear as a precaution.  No special gear was worn 
at the Mine B site. 
5. Snap and shoot – Several accidents have occurred in the last fifteen years related to snap 
and shoot4.  Holmberg and Salomonsson (2002) identified five accidents in which a 
shock tube might have been unintentionally stretched to breakage.  It was believed that in 
some instances this caused the tubes to initiate.  For example, if a vehicle ran over a blast 
hole with a shock tube, it is possible that the tube could be entangled in the vehicle and 
be caused to snap and shoot. 
 
The snap and shoot threat was considered to be the most likely scenario for an ignition of a 
                                                 
4 Snap and shoot is sometimes also called stretch and shoot; snap, slap and shoot; or whip, snap and shoot. 
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face loaded with explosives at the Mine B site.  Although the other four threats were all 
potentially possible, the team felt there were sufficient barriers and controls currently in place 
to minimize their likelihood.  Therefore, the focus of the team was to examine what might be 
done to reduce the snap and shot threat. 
 
5.2.3.3 – Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
The existing work process associated with the snap and shot threat was to: 
1. Place the blast caps and ANFO into the blast holes early in the shift 
2. Tie the blasting caps and shock cord (Figure 11) in place early in the shift, and 
3. Connect these items to the detonation system at the end of the shift, just prior to blasting. 
 
The time between 2 and 3 was between 4 and 6 hours.  During that time, there existed an 
opportunity for an unplanned detonation through the snap and shoot mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Photograph of shock cords similar to the ones used at the study site. 
 
5.2.3.4 - Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
The team discussed two options to reduce the risk for snap and shoot:  
1. Use the current work procedure to load and blast the face and attempt to decrease the 
likelihood of unplanned detonation through new prevention controls and recovery 
measures.  
2. Change the work procedure to tie on the caps just before the blast, thereby eliminating the 
threat of premature ignition (EH). 
 
As the team discussed the hazard in more detail, it became apparent that a formal risk analysis 
technique was not needed to identify an appropriate safety solution.  The team agreed to 
recommend altering work procedures so that final blast set-ups were done at the end of shift 
(option 2).  In many ways this process followed an informal fault tree analysis where the process 
was altered to eliminate paths to the top event. 
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5.2.3.5 – Step 5, Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
Finally, the changed steps were reviewed to identify any new risks.  No significant new risks 
were identified so the team agreed to recommend that the procedure be changed.  The entire 
process took less than 2 hours to complete. 
 
The team made a single effective recommendation, as follows: 
The blast caps should not be snapped in place when the face is loaded and tied in early in 
the shift.  During the morning blast setup work, the blast caps should be located near the 
face but at least 2 feet from the setup.  The shot firer should return at the end of shift, 
when he normally inspects the blast setup, and tie-in the caps at that point.  The shot firer 
should subsequently inspect the set-up and, if appropriate, proceed with the usual final 
blast setup and detonation.  This recommendation should be part of a Standard Operating 
Procedure for connecting the detonation systems to loaded blast holes at this operation. 
 
This case study did not apply a formal risk assessment method but rather undertook a structured 
discussion of the hazard.  In this case study, new controls were not needed since altering the 
work procedure eliminated the hazard and hence the risk.  This informal risk assessment process 
appeared to be an effective and valued process by the team members. 
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5.3 – Spontaneous Combustion Causing Fire/Explosion Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
Mine C is a deep longwall coal mine with the potential for spontaneous combustion.  The mine 
uses a bleederless ventilation system in its longwall panels to help reduce the potential for 
spontaneous combustion.  Spontaneous combustion can occur in coalbeds with physical and 
chemical characteristics that allow the coal to oxidize at relatively low temperatures.  This can 
set into motion a chain of events where additional oxidation causes temperatures to rise to a point 
where a flame will occur.  A primary ingredient for this reaction is oxygen.  If oxygen is not 
present, the oxidation process cannot occur.  Bleederless ventilation systems have been 
extensively used in many parts of the world as a spontaneous combustion control measure (Smith 
et al., 1994).  These systems are designed to reduce oxygen contents in areas where the coal has 
been extracted through isolation from a mine’s ventilation system.  Smith et al. (1994) reported 
the two areas that provided the most risk for spontaneous combustion are those around the seals 
and directly behind the longwall shield supports.  MSHA’s regulations covering bleederless 
ventilation systems are found in Federal Code of Regulations under Part 30, Section 75.334 (f). 
 
The bleederless ventilation system at Mine C uses seals at gate entry cross-cuts to separate 
ventilating air from the gob.  The mine’s greatest concern is the potential for spontaneous 
combustion in the gob area behind the active longwall face.  A risk assessment was performed to 
investigate major hazard potentials and evaluate controls to mitigate the potential for a 
spontaneous combustion event.   
 
5.3.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The scope of the risk assessment was originally designed to utilize a WRAC to review the 
hazards and a BTA to identify existing and new prevention controls and recovery measures from 
the spontaneous combustion hazard.  Mine management did not attend a NIOSH-sponsored 
MHRA training course prior to the site study.  At the start of the Risk Assessment, the team was 
briefed on risk management principles.  Reference materials on sources of spontaneous 
combustion were used to provide a detailed list of relevant energies in need of control.  
Unfortunately, the risk assessment was limited to a single day. 
 
5.3.2 - Risk Assessment Team 
 
The team consisted of mine site personnel directly involved in monitoring and responding to a 
spontaneous combustion event, a NIOSH observer, and a facilitator from MISHC.  One member 
of the general workforce was represented on the risk assessment team.  Team members were as 
follows: 
Mine operations manager 
Technical services manager 
General mine foreman 
Safety manager (partial) 
Fireboss (labor) 
NIOSH observer 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
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5.3.3 - Risk Assessment 
 
MSHA statistics show that spontaneous combustion accounted for 17% of the ignition sources 
for the 87 reportable fires occurring at underground coal mines between 1990 and 2000.  The 
potential for the spontaneous combustion hazard increasing the risk of fire and explosion was a 
primary concern at the case study mine.  In the past, the mine has routinely sealed gob areas.  No 
reportable fires have occurred at the mine according the MSHA database.  However, 
spontaneous combustion events have occurred at nearby mines operating in the same seam. 
 
Currently, Mine C uses a modified “U” ventilation system where the air is brought up the 
headgate entries, across the face, and down the tailgate entry (Figure 12).  In the future, the 
operator is planning to change the manner in which the gob will be sealed.  The plan is to 
temporarily retain bleeder headings around the gobs while development continues inby the panel.  
As a result of this change and the historical occurrence of this hazard in adjacent mines, the mine 
decided to examine risks related to spontaneous combustion in the active panel gob. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Bleederless ventilation system used at the study mine to control spontaneous 
combustion. 
 
Following a briefing on the principles of risk management and the tools to be used, the facilitator 
led the team through a structured process involving the following steps: 
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1. Recognizing and characterizing hazards 
2. Selecting top unwanted events (informal risk ranking) 
3. Identifying existing prevention controls and recovery measures with the BTA (partial list) 
4. Identifying new prevention controls and recovery measure ideas with the BTA (partial 
list) 
5. Implementation, monitoring and auditing issues. 
 
Because of the time constraints, it was not possible to formally risk rank the top unwanted events 
or to fully develop the list of existing or new prevention controls and recovery measures. 
 
5.3.3.1 – Step 1, Identify and Characterize Spontaneous Combustion Hazards in the Active Panel 
Gob 
 
Spontaneous combustion hazards within current and planned longwall panels are influenced by 
potential heat sources and conditions of the atmosphere in the gob (Table 16).  The type of heat 
sources in or near the gob in Mine C included oxidation of the broken coal, hot works in the gate 
entries or along the longwall face, sparks from roof bolts failing as the strata collapsed in the 
gob, and heating of an overlying coalbed from an igneous intrusion.  Conditions of the 
atmosphere in the gob needed to cause a fire or an explosion include availability of oxygen from 
the longwall face ventilation and hydrocarbons from the mined coalbed or from the overlying 
sandstone and coalbed. 
 
Table 16 – Potential heat sources and conditions of the atmosphere in the gob needed to cause a 
fire or an explosion. 
Heat Sources Gob Atmospheres 
Coal oxidation (spontaneous combustion) Oxygen available from face ventilation 
Welding/cutting (hot works) Hydrocarbon liberation from coal 
Roof bolt sparks during gob caving Gas migration from sandstone main roof 
Heat in upper coal due to igneous intrusions Gas migration from the upper coalbed as caving occurs 
  
5.3.3.2 – Step 2, Rank Potential Unwanted Events 
 
Time constraints prohibited the risk assessment team from a thorough discussion of all potential 
unwanted events that could lead to a fire or explosion.  The team identified three main categories 
of events that could potentially produce spontaneous combustion in the gob of an active longwall 
panel: 
1. Air (oxygen) flow into the gob through 
a. Headings / cross-cuts (including barometric pressure change effects) 
b. Gob boreholes 
c. Longwall shield supports 
d. Leaky seals 
2. Methane / hydrocarbon buildup in the gob to ignitable levels (5 to 15 %) through 
a. Gas migration from overlying coalbed into gob 
b. Gas migration from overlying sandstone into gob 
3. Heat source in gob where broken coal in gob from caving upper seam increases oxidation 
rates 
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The team selected these unwanted events based on the degree to which the most workers might 
be exposed and on the historical information concerning past spontaneous combustion episodes.  
In the absence of any formal risk ranking method such as the WRAC or the PHA, the risk 
assessment team informally agreed that all unwanted events were of high consequence to the 
mining operation. 
 
5.3.3.3 – Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
A BTA was performed on only the four events under the air flow into the gob category due to 
time limitations.  The risk assessment team discussed potential connections between the hazards 
listed in Table 16 and the mining operations.  The team then went on to identify 17 existing 
prevention controls (Table 17). 
 
Table 17 - Existing key prevention controls for the spontaneous combustion risk assessment. 
TOP EVENT  => Air (Oxygen) Flow into the Gob 
PC1 Forced Air Ventilation that causes positive pressure on gob (MH) 
PC2 High-quality seal design with ring grouting to improve seal effectiveness and 
reduce roof-to-floor convergence (PB) 
PC3 Location of seals to avoid leakage pathways (MH) 
PC4 Seals checked and maintained by fire boss weekly (P) 
PC5 Monitoring pressure balance across seals weekly (WD) 
PC6 Atmosphere behind seals tested weekly, gas tested by experienced person (WD) 
Through headings / 
cross-cuts (including 
barometric pressure 
change effects) 
 
PC7 Gob vent borehole gasses tested weekly, gas tested by experienced person (WD) 
PC8 Forced air ventilation causes vent holes to only breathe out (MH) 
PC9 Gob hole is sealed when panel is complete and sealed (PB) 
PC10 Gob holes can be shut in if oxygen >10% (P) 
Through gob boreholes 
(including barometric 
pressure effects) 
 PC11 Check valve & flame arrestors assure no flow down holes into the gob (MH) 
PC12 Curtains on shields at start up (PB) 
PC13 Monitoring of gob to verify it is tight (P) 
PC14 Real time gas monitoring at tailgate to detect heating (WD) 
Through longwall 
shield supports 
 
PC15 Seals installed in gates to reduce flow into gob area from gates (MH) 
PC16 Seals tested weekly with smoke tube and repaired as needed (P) 
PC17 Flexible foam packs used for construction and repair (MH) 
Through leaky seals 
 
As above:  see PC2 
TOP EVENT => Methane / hydrocarbon build up in the gob to ignitable levels (5 to 15 %) 
Gas migration from overlying 
coalbed into gob 
Not addressed due to time constraints 
Gas migration from overlying 
sandstone into gob 
Not addressed due to time constraints 
TOP EVENT => Heat source in gob 
Broken coal in gob from caving 
upper seam increasing 
oxidation rates 
Not addressed due to time constraints 
PC – Prevention Controls 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
The 17 prevention controls were distributed between the minimize hazards (MH), physical 
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barriers (PB), warning devices (WD), and procedures (P) control categories (Figure 13).  
Eliminating the hazard (EH) could only be done by not mining the coalbed with conventional 
mining techniques, since this coal is prone to spontaneous combustion.  Many of the controls 
were required by MSHA regulations while others were considered to be Best Practice at this 
mine site. 
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Figure 13 - Distribution of prevention controls and recovery measures for the spontaneous 
combustion causing fire/explosion risk assessments. 
 
The team identified 11 recovery measures designed to mitigate the consequence of a spontaneous 
combustion event (Table 18).  Discussions concentrated on monitoring and initial evacuation 
responses (Table 18).  These existing recovery measures are mostly aimed at complying with 
MSHA standards and regulations for coal mines with spontaneous combustion hazards.  Many 
should be documented in the mine’s ventilation plan.  A common theme of the discussions of 
these controls was the dependence on a few individuals to ensure compliance, where 72% of the 
recovery measures (Figure 13) were either warning devices (WD) or procedures (P).  Formal 
auditing methods were not always used for critical controls.  The mine management at Mine C 
has experience in reacting to heating events and seems to rely on leadership skills rather than 
formal procedures for directing response. 
 
Table 18 – Existing key recovery measures for the spontaneous combustion risk assessment. 
Early Detection 
RM1 Weekly bag sampling at seals every 1000 ft along seal line/perimeter (WD) 
RM2 An on-site Gas Chromatograph with backup at other mines in the valley (WD) 
Advancing 
spontaneous 
combustion in the 
gob 
 
RM3 Written Action Levels/Trigger Points; (WD) 
     Level 1: >5ppm H2 AND >100 ppm CO triggers 
   If O2 > 5% resample ASAP 
   If O2 <5% resample within 24 hrs 
    Level 2: >5ppm H2 AND >100 ppm CO on resample triggers 
   If O2 > 10% resample every 4 hrs 
   If O2 <10% resample within 8 hrs 
    Level 3: >5% H2 OR >350 ppm CO OR rising CO/CO2 ratio 
  AND if O2>10% resample every 3 hrs and notify MSHA 
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    Level 4: >1500 ppm CO OR HC>4% AND O2>10% then 
    evacuate all non-essential persons from mine and call MSHA 
RM4 Mine dispatch and shift foreman are instructed to evacuate mine by phone (P) 
RM5 Alarms at belt feeders and mine pager system that indicate need to egress in both this 
mine and the overlying seam (WD) 
RM6 Persons entering remote areas are required to notify dispatch prior to entering.  
Dispatch keeps written record of personnel locations and entry/exit time (P) 
Fire detected in 
the gob and initial 
response  
(communicate gob 
fire to miners and 
specify the correct 
egress path) 
RM7 Shift foreman aware of persons assigned to tasks in remote areas (P) 
Evacuation 
RM8 Regular Emergency Response training of all underground personnel (PST)  Rapid egress from 
the mine required RM9 Live training to practice egress during likely event scenarios (PST) 
Explosion Prevention 
RM10 Rock dusting of mine exceeds minimum standards (MH) Fire event 
escalates to 
explosion 
RM11 Pre-framing of fire seals across longwall gate roads and staging of materials nearby 
for rapid sealing of involved area (P) 
RM – Recovery Measures 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
5.3.3.4 - Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
As part of the BTA, new prevention control and recovery measure ideas were identified by the 
team.  However, the limited time available with the mine staff and the need to begin the process 
with basic training in the risk management process limited the extent to which the exercise could 
be completed.  The team identified one new prevention control and two new recovery measure 
ideas (Table 19).  Mine management agreed to review these new ideas and decide if they should 
be implemented. 
 
Table 19 - New ideas for mitigating risk of spontaneous combustion. 
Prevention Controls 
NI1 Improve rock dusting of gob perimeter such as bottom dusting (PB) 
Recovery Measures 
NI2 Investigate stench gas or other methods of increasing the likelihood that personnel in remote areas get the 
message to egress (WD) 
NI3 Develop a detailed vendor list for materials, equipment and expertise for use in a spontaneous combustion 
emergency response (P) 
NI – New Ideas 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
 
5.3.3.5 – Step 5, Discussion of  Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
The team identified 17 existing controls for prevention of spontaneous combustion in the gob; 
most (8) can be considered engineering controls (MH and PB), 4 are manual monitoring controls 
(WD), and 5 are process controls.  The 6 response measures are primarily administrative (P and 
PST) with 4 manual monitoring (WD) and one engineering control (MH).   
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Influencing the number and type of controls identified is the mine’s general avoidance of formal 
procedures other than those mandated by regulations.  Mine management expressed a preference 
for flexibility in actions taken based on information collected through the multiple manual 
monitoring controls and the experience of the staff.  
 
The overall acceptance and understanding of the risk assessment process by the team at Mine C 
was limited.  The team selected was energetic and knowledgeable in the subject hazard but had 
limited exposure to risk assessment practices.  The mine does not utilize informal risk 
assessment tools such as JSAs or SOPs in its  mining processes.  The management team at this 
mine carries multiple responsibilities and expressed a reluctance to take on more administrative 
burdens.  This existing workload obstacle was evident in the limited time available for the 
exercise. 
 
One issue with implementing the risk management principles is the willingness of the team to 
rely on manual monitoring of the hazard and to defer most actions to the judgment of a few staff 
members.  While these experienced staff members would likely act appropriately in monitoring 
for hazards, this system exposes the mine to delays should events begin when key staff are not 
accessible.    
 
One other aspect of risk management not completely addressed by the team was that the formal 
response plans end with evacuation of the mine and notification of MSHA.  While it was clear 
that the mine would indeed take actions to combat the fire and recover the mine, these response 
plans would be developed by key staff spontaneously in reaction to unfolding events.  In these 
respects the outcomes of this exercise may be the product of a cultural acceptance of relatively 
high levels of risk at Mine C.   
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5.4 – Underground Workshop Fire Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
Mine D is a large longwall coal mine with over 600 salaried and hourly employees.  The mine 
has an underground workshop located close to the bottom of the intake shaft (Figure 14).  The 
workshop is basically a heading containing a pit large enough to allow maintenance work under 
a locomotive.  Other workshop-related tasks are also performed in the immediate area such as 
battery charging.  An underground workshop fire is considered to be a major hazard since it 
could potentially disrupt normal escapeway egress routes via the intake air shaft. 
 
Intake 
Shaft
Maintenance Pit
Ventilation 
stoppings
Track haulage
 
Figure 14 - Map showing the location of the maintenance pit with respect to track haulage, 
ventilation stoppings, and intake shaft. 
 
The risk assessment project theme was identified at the NIOSH-sponsored workshop on Minerals 
Industry Risk Management and further developed through discussion between management 
personnel and NIOSH representatives. 
 
5.4.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The objective of this risk assessment was to 1) review fire hazards in the underground workshop 
located close to the mine’s intake shaft, and 2) evaluate strategies and techniques to mitigate the 
risks. 
 
5.4.2 - Risk Assessment Team 
 
The team was made up of persons employed at the mine and by the mine’s parent company, two 
external fire prevention experts, a NIOSH observer, and a facilitator from MISHC.  More 
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specifically, the team members included the following: 
 Four representatives from the company’s safety program  
A general maintenance mine foreman  
A continuous improvement coordinator 
A fire brigade supervisor 
Two external fire prevention experts (NIOSH / Insurance Company)  
NIOSH observer 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
 
5.4.3 – Risk Assessment 
 
The Risk Assessment involved facilitation of a team of personnel through a structured process of 
the following steps: 
1. Hazard descriptions 
2. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) method introduction and risk ranking 
3. Potential unwanted event identification using PHA 
4. Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) method introduction 
5. Causes and prevention controls discussion using BTA 
6. Consequences and loss reduction controls discussion using BTA 
7. Repeat of Steps 5 and 6 for all high ranked potential unwanted events identified in Step 3. 
 
5.4.3.1 – Step 1, Identify and Characterize Fire Hazards in the Underground Workshop at the 
Bottom of the Intake Shaft 
 
The first step in the risk assessment involved identifying and understanding the hazards related to 
a fire in the underground workshop.  The team brainstormed the potential heat and fuel sources 
that might be either available in the workshop or related to the maintenance functions performed 
in the workshop (Table 20). 
 
Table 20 - Fire hazards consisting of potential heat and fuel sources. 
Heat Sources Fuel sources 
Electrical power Oils/grease 
Welding/cutting (hot works) Paper/trash 
Grinding Coal 
Portable heaters Diesel fuel 
Batteries Solvents 
Hot engines/surfaces Plastic 
Exhaust/DPM Wood 
Spontaneous Combustion from oily rags Hoses 
Compressors Acetylene 
 Hydrogen (batteries) 
 
After discussing the above hazards, the team used its knowledge of the underground workshop 
design and operation to undertake a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA).  The PHA identified a 
list of fire-related hazards within and near the maintenance area and then prioritized these 
hazards through a risk ranking process. 
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5.4.3.2 – Step 2, Rank Potential Unwanted Events 
 
The risk assessment team identified 24 potential incidents/accidents related to an underground 
workshop fire (Table 21).  The PHA risk analysis tool was selected to risk rank the potential 
incidents/accidents.  A discussion of the PHA technique can be found in Section 3.2.2. 
 
Table 21 - Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA) form for the underground workshop fire risk 
assessment case study. 
 Potential incident/accident Exposure 
(Table 6) 
Overall 
Likeli-
hood 
(Table 7) 
Max. 
Reasonable 
Consequence 
(Table 3) 
Most Likely 
Conse-
quence 
(Table 8) 
Risk 
Rank 
(Table 
9) 
1 Pressurized/atomized hydraulic oil from 
equipment sprays on heat source causing fire 
A B B B 5 
2 Short circuit in battery cells leads to fire D C B B 8 
3 Fire in garbage storage A C C B 8 
4 Exhaust DPM filter fire when filter withdrawn 
from engine 
B B D C 9 
5 Hydrogen explosion during repairs leads to 
fire 
E E D A 11 
6 Auto battery fault when charging leads to 
fire/explosion 
D D D B 12 
7 Spontaneous from oil rags/trash A C D C 13 
8 Overheated compressor B C D C 13 
9 Welding methods cause fire D C C C 13 
10 Hot slag contacts combustible leads to fire C C C C 13 
11 New rescuers ignites when hit by/run over in a 
workshop 
A D B C 17 
12 Short circuit/fault on diesel equipment A D C C 17 
13 Diesel equipment overheats A D C C 17 
14 Diesel fuel is vaporized by heat and ignited by 
fault/short 
A E B C 20 
15 Damaged and worn electrical equipment leads 
to fire 
D C D E 22 
16 Extension cord/wire run over/damaged leads 
to a fire 
D C E E 22 
17 Overheated brakes on equipment B D E E 24 
18 Broken light fault A D E E 24 
19 Grinding sparks lead to fire D D D E 24 
20 Heater fault/circuit B D E E 24 
21 O2 problem leads to more susceptible 
conditions for fire 
C D B E 24 
22 Transformer fault leads to fire A D E E 24 
23 Contaminants onto electric heaters B D E E 24 
24 Arch welding cable short/fault leads to a fire C D D E 24 
 
The team decided to focus on the top four ranked risks from the PHA analysis.  These potential 
incidents/accidents are: 
1. Pressurized/atomized hydraulic oil from equipment sprays on heat source causing fire 
2. Short circuit in battery cell leads to fire 
3. Fire in garbage storage 
4. Exhaust DPM filter fire when filter withdrawn from engine. 
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In addition, once the team began to discuss existing prevention controls and recovery measures, a 
decision was made to add another potential incident/accident: 
 5.  Pool of oil from a failed pump ignites in the maintenance pit and leads to a mine fire. 
 
5.4.3.3 – Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
A BTA was performed on each of the four top ranked risks from the PHA with one additional 
risk added after the PHA by the team.  For many of the top ranked incidents, multiple potential 
causes were possible.  For example, the pressurized/atomized hydraulic oil from equipment 
sprays on heat source incident contained seven different potential causes: 
1. Worn hydraulic hose or coupler failure and pressure release 
2. Hot work damages hose 
3. Unknowing removal of the hose under pressure (towed in or running) 
4. Hose pinched during installation or wrong hose installed on equipment and pressure 
release 
5. Poor hose location exposes failures to heat sources on the equipment 
6. Overheated brakes ignite oil spray 
7. Lights fault when oil sprays and fire starts. 
 
In all, 14 unique, potential causes were identified and a BTA was performed on each.  These 14 
causes occupied the top event circle of the BTA (Figure 8).  From the 14 BTAs, 34 existing 
prevention controls were identified (Table 22).  
 
Table 22 – Existing key prevention controls for the underground workshop fire risk assessment. 
TOP EVENT => Hydraulic oil leak/spray and ignites 
PC1 Hydraulic hose and couplings are designed to Standard (MH) 
PC2 Hoses are to be run away from hot areas or a barrier is located between hoses 
and hot spots (PB) 
PC3 The mine has a standard for 4 braided hoses and fittings that is currently being 
put in place (P) 
PC4 There is a specification on preventive maintenance program done on 
equipment that checks hoses and couplings (P) 
PC5 Inspections of equipment are done before work that looks for damaged or 
badly located or worn hoses (PST) 
PC6 When locomotive is shut down, the hydraulic pressure bleeds from the system 
(MH) 
1. Worn hydraulic hose 
or coupler failure and 
pressure release 
PC7 Gage in the cab indicates pressure in hydraulics (WD) 
PC8 Procedures exist to do welding and cutting work in the workshop (P) 
PC9 Welding and cutting is not done on running (hydraulics are pressurized) 
equipment (P) 
PC10 In the rare case where welding and cutting works are done in proximity to 
hydraulic, the hydraulic lines are shielded (PB) 
2. Hot works damages 
hose 
PC11 Area of hot work and equipment is cooled by water hose after welding (P) 
PC12 Person should shut down and verify no hydraulic pressure before working on 
equipment (PST) 
PC13 Even if equipment is shut down, persons should check pressure gage before 
working on equipment (PST) 
3. Unknowing removal 
of the hose under 
pressure (towed in or 
running) 
PC14 Should be tag/note left on equipment if it has a problem (e.g. Needed to be 
towed in/pressurized) (WD) 
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PC15 Completed work is recorded on Work Orders (P) 
PC16 Persons clean and inspect work after completion to identify issues such as 
pinched/damaged hoses (PST) 
PC17 Mine hose sizes are standardized (MH) 
PC18 Mine also gives standard specification for hose lengths to minimize the 
numbers of hose lengths (MH) 
PC19 Hoses are available in workshop or warehouse (P) 
4. Hose pinched during 
installation or wrong 
hose installed on 
equipment and pressure 
release 
PC20 There is a follow-up process to address the need for an incorrect (too long) 
hose with Work Order (P) 
5. Poor hose location 
exposes failures to heat 
sources on equipment 
As Above:  See PC2 to PC5 
PC21 If brakes are locked, then machine is not dragged to workshop (P) 6. Overheated brakes 
ignite oil spray PC22 If partial brake fails (not locked), then machine is not dragged to workshop (P) 
7. Lights fault when oil 
sprays and fire starts 
PC23 Pit lights are designed to reduce hot surface/oil ignition exposure (MH) 
TOP EVENT => Short circuit in battery cell leads to fire 
PC24 Weekly inspection of equipment, check batteries and clean if required (P) 
PC25 Battery is also inspected by bottom attendants (P) 
8. Dirty battery, battery 
fatigue, low water 
PC26 Battery is also inspected in workshop before or after work and cleaned if 
required (P) 
9. Battery age PC27 Batteries are dated and replaced if date and cell status indicates (P) 
PC28 Operators park and charge loco batteries in station  (P) 
PC29 Battery attendees and mechanics also put locos at stations to charge (P) 
10. Improper charging 
PC30 Battery should be fully charge and cooled for 8 hours (P) 
TOP EVENT => Fire in garbage storage 
PC31 Garbage is changed out every 5 days at least (P) 
PC32 Hot items (>302 F) do not go into garbage (P) 
11. Spontaneous 
combustion in garbage 
storage PC33 Items are put into garbage in bags (PB) 
TOP EVENT => Exhaust DPM filter fire when withdraw from engine 
12. Hot materials enter 
DPM from catalyst, etc. 
PC34 Reduce excess idling to lower hot materials entering DPM from catalyst (P) 
TOP EVENT => Pool of oil from a failed pump ignites in the maintenance pit and leads to a fire 
13. Oil pump fails due to damage 
or seal failure 
No current controls 
14. Welding/cutting near pit 
ignites oil pool in pit 
No current controls 
PC – Prevention Controls 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
Based on the analysis that was done by the team, existing controls can be placed into one of the 
six categories described in Section 4.4.  Twenty-seven percent of the key existing prevention 
controls (Figure 15) involve the design of equipment, i.e. minimize hazards (MH) and physical 
barriers (PB).  For example, hydraulic hose and couplings are designed to standards with hoses 
located away from hot surfaces or barriers placed between hoses and hot spots.  The mine has 
standards for four braided hoses and the size and lengths of hoses.  In addition, pit lighting 
systems are designed to reduce hot surfaces and lower ignition potential.  The diesel particulate 
modules are designed to reduce hot material risks. 
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Figure 15 - Distribution of prevention controls and recovery measures for the underground 
workshop fire risk assessment. 
 
Six percent of the existing prevention controls were classified as warning devices (WD).  For 
example, each locomotive cab has a hydraulic pressure gauge to help identify that all pressure is 
bled from the system prior to maintenance activity (PM7).  Also, equipment needing repairs is 
tagged and the condition of the hydraulic system (pressurized) is noted (PM14). 
 
Sixty-eight percent of all existing prevention controls consist of procedures (P) and personnel 
skills and training (PST) that focused on maintenance and operational issues.  Preventive 
maintenance checks are regularly done on hoses and couplings and on the location of hoses with 
respect to hot surfaces.  Battery maintenance is also very important, with inspection and cleaning 
on a weekly basis.  In addition, the shaft bottom attendant is required to inspect batteries on a 
regular basis.  If equipment brakes are locked and cannot be released, the machine is hauled, not 
dragged, to the workshop.  Each locomotive operator is required to inspect equipment prior to 
operation.  They are trained to look for damaged, badly located or pinched hoses.  They are also 
required to tag equipment if a problem is found.  Maintenance personnel are required to shut 
down equipment and verify that no hydraulic pressure exists on the equipment prior to 
commencing work and to completing a work order.  Batteries are replaced when their expiration 
date is reached.  Locomotive operators park and charge batteries at designated stations and allow 
batteries to fully charge and cool for 8 hours. 
 
Welding/cutting/grinding (hot works) and housekeeping are recognized as extremely important 
key controls for preventing workshop fires.  SOPs exist for hot works in the workshop area.  Hot 
work areas are cooled with water and hot works are never attempted on running or pressurized 
equipment.  Housekeeping issues centered on placing oily rags in sealed bags prior to placing the 
bags in garbage storage areas.  Garbage is changed out at least every 5 days and hot surfaces 
(>300˚ F) do not go into garbage. 
 
Existing key recovery measures were also identified as part of the BTA.  In the case of the 
underground workshop fire, the recovery measure was essentially the same for all 13 potential 
causes.  Thirteen key recovery measures were identified for an underground workshop fire 
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(Table 23).  The distribution of the control categories is shown in Figure 15.  
 
Table 23 - Existing key recovery measures for the underground workshop fire risk assessment. 
TOP EVENT => Fire in the workshop area, i.e., on the locomotive in garbage retainer, in the pit  
RM1 Persons will try to shut off equipment in cab locations to stop hydraulic fluid 
spray (note: when equipment is in operation there must be an operator in the 
cab) (PST) 
RM2 Persons would used hand-held, readily accessible fire extinguishers to fight fire 
(20 lbs) (PST) 
RM3 Persons are trained to use hand-held fire equipment every year including 
hands-on exercises (PST) 
Fuel source comes in 
contact with heat source 
RM4 Fire suppression on a machine can be manually and automatically activated 
(will also shut down machine) (MH) 
RM5 Notify surface clerk of fire (P) Small fire starts 
RM6 Live water hoses are available for use (MH) 
RM7 Surface clerk gathers information and notifies state/federal regulatory agencies 
and shift management (minimum 5 min to take action) (P) 
RM8 Workshop has fire sprinklers activated by overhead fire sensors (MH) 
RM9 Mine has an underground and surface fire brigade (PST) 
RM10 Other fire fighting equipment is also located atop of shaft, as well as 8-10 
headings away (P) 
RM11 There are W65 CO units and SCSRs on the mobile equipment and at 
designated locations near the workshop to aid in emergency egress (PB) 
Fire persists or grows 
RM12 Firefighters have PS5100 and PA100, etc., to fight large fire (MH) 
Fire develops into major 
fire requiring 
emergency egress 
RM13 A major fire in the mine requires mine evacuation and the shift foreman will 
decide on the evacuation route considering fire location (P) 
RM – Recovery Measures 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
The key components to the existing recovery measures are fire fighting and emergency egress 
from the mine.  Hand-held fire extinguishers (20 lbs) are readily accessible on all equipment and 
within the workshop area (MH).  Miners are trained to use hand-held fire equipment every year 
including hands-on exercises (PST).  Most mobile equipment repaired in the workshop has 
automatic fire suppression capability (MH).  The workshop has been fitted with a sprinkler 
system, activated by overhead fire sensors.  Live water hoses are available for use in the 
workshop area.  Additional fire fighting equipment is located at the top of the nearby intake 
shaft, as well as 8-10 cross-cuts from the workshop (MH).  Large fires can be fought with 
PS5100, PA100, etc., fire fighting equipment. 
 
Workshop personnel are trained to immediately notify the surface clerk of fire (PST).  The 
surface clerk gathers information, notifies shift management, and calls federal and state 
regulatory officials (minimum 5 min to take action).  The mine has both an underground and 
surface fire brigade.  If an emergency egress is necessary, miners are trained to don W65s and 
SCSRs and escape from the mine through primary or alternate escapeways (PST). 
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5.4.3.4 - Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
As part of the BTA, 14 new prevention control and recovery measure ideas were identified by 
the team during the risk assessment to further reduce the workshop fire risks at the mine (Table 
24).  Nine of the ideas are prevention controls and five are recovery measures. 
 
Table 24 - New ideas for an underground workshop fire risk assessment. 
NI1 Reinforce the need to shut down equipment and inspect equipment prior to welding and 
cutting (P) 
NI2 Reinforce need to shield hydraulic systems near the source if hot work must be done on 
operating equipment (P) 
NI3 Remove all heat sources from the area of equipment to avoid ignition of any hydraulic 
pressure leaks (P) 
NI4 Investigate ways of being more systematic and thorough about equipment repair needs and 
status before or when equipment is taken to the workshop (P) 
NI5 Use the behavior controls in this risk assessment to focus the Safety Behavior Observations 
(SBO) program/activities in workshop (PST) 
NI6 Reinforce need to ensure that lights and covers in pit are in good condition (P) 
NI7 Add pit inspection to fire boss’s job duties and consider inspection/monitoring by workshop 
personnel too.  Make sure that these inspections examine for pooled oil in the pit.  Add the 
requirement to inspect pit for pooled oil to pre-welding/cutting/grinding (any hot work) job 
preparation (P) 
NI8 Investigate modifying motors designed so they will not operate in low voltage (thereby they 
should be fully charged) (MH) 
New 
prevention 
control 
ideas 
NI9 Investigate changes that will allow battery removal and installing only fully charged 
batteries (MH) 
NI10 Investigate adding a 150-lb wheeled dry chemical fire extinguisher (MH) 
NI11 Identify what the workshop personnel should do if hand-held fire extinguishers are not 
adequate (get other equipment or egress, breathing apparatuses, and include info in training) 
(PST) 
NI12 Decide whether doors in stoppings should be opened, allowing smoke into return (note that 
this would greatly increase airflow in workshop, note water line in return may be cut, note 
also idea to install water screen pipes in the return entry if doors are to be open) (PB) 
NI13 Consider the installation of a water source on the intake inside of the workshop (MH) 
New 
recovery 
measure 
ideas 
NI14 Investigate getting a suitable foam system for pit to put out oil pool fire (MH) 
NI – New Ideas 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
The 14 new ideas can be divided into design, operating procedures and fire/emergency response 
issues.  Two design ideas were identified.  The team recommended that management investigate 
1) modifying motor designs so they will not operate at low-voltage (MH) and 2) modify chargers 
to prohibit battery removal without a full charge (MH).  In both these situations, the low-voltage 
condition of the battery increases the likelihood of overheating which increases the potential for 
a fire.  Both of these new ideas would limit the potential use of low-voltage batteries. 
 
Numerous new ideas were presented that focus on operating procedures.  Two ideas focus on 
reinforcing the need to shut down equipment and inspect equipment prior to maintenance work 
and to ensure that lights and covers in the pit are in good condition (PST).  Prior to working on 
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equipment, workers should remove all heat sources from the area to avoid ignition of any 
hydraulic pressure leaks.  This could be accomplished with an SOP.  The team also 
recommended that some kind of notification system be investigated to systematically identify the 
repair needs and their status before, or when, equipment is taken into the workshop (P).  This 
could increase the workshop personnel’s awareness of potential hazardous conditions.  The team 
also suggested that the fire boss and workshop personnel inspect the pit regularly for oil and 
other flammable materials (P).  This inspection should also be done by the workshop personnel 
prior to hot work activity.  Lastly, the team recommended that a Safety Behavior Observation 
(SBO) program/activity be initiated for the workshop (PST).  The mine operator has personnel 
skilled in this approach. 
 
Several new ideas focused on emergency response issues.  The team recommended that 
workshop personnel understand emergency response procedures and discuss specific fire 
scenarios during the training exercise.  For example, workshop personnel should understand 
what impact opening the ventilation door in the return air stopping at the far end of the pit might 
have on a small fire (PB).  This could be an issue since a water line is located in the return 
airway and might be useful in fighting a maintenance pit fire.  Also, if hand-held extinguishers 
fail to put out a small fire, should workshop personnel obtain additional fire fighting equipment, 
don breathing apparatus, or evacuate the fire site and egress from the mine (PST)?  The team also 
suggested that fire fighting capabilities (MH) in the maintenance pit be increased by adding one 
or more of the following items: 1) a 150-lb wheeled dry chemical fire extinguisher, 2) a portable 
foam generator, or 3) a water source on the intake side of the maintenance pit. 
 
5.4.3.5 – Step 5, Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
The information provided in the risk assessment seemed accurate and the team functioned 
adequately, although the lack of participation from labor may have limited the team’s composite 
knowledge of the fire hazards in the maintenance pit.  However, the addition of outside fire 
experts helped to bolster the team’s knowledge of fire prevention issues.  The team had a strong 
focus on monitoring, administrative controls and training when identifying existing and new 
prevention controls and recovery measures (Figure 15).  This will require the mine to vigilantly 
monitor and audit these controls.  In this case study, the risk assessment did not recommend 
ways to eliminate the fire hazards from the workshop area.  For example, was it possible to 
relocate the shop to an area that would effectively eliminate hazards?  The exercise was 
successful in developing a range of new ideas that could produce quality barriers, controls and 
recovery measures that would further reduce the risk of a workshop fire. 
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5.5 – Water Inundation Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
Mines Ea and Eb are operating near an abandoned mine and adits that present a threat of 
inundation (Figure 16).  The abandoned mine and adits are in the same seam and their workings 
are partially flooded.  The abandoned mine flooded area is large with an estimated water head of 
approximately 30 ft at Mine Ea and 80 ft at Mine Eb.  The abandoned mine was extracted using 
the room-and-pillar method, creating a significant water reservoir.  The adits are to the east of 
Mine Eb and have two parallel entries, several hundred feet long and connected by cross-cuts.  
These potential water reservoirs are relatively small and may contain dangerous gases.   
 
All of these old mine workings are potentially filled with water and represent a significant 
hazard.  Inundation hazards present risks for the mining operation.  The mine has put into place 
many Best Practice controls to prevent an unwanted inundation event.  The hazard is 
complicated by potential inaccuracies of existing abandoned mine maps and the lack of maps for 
the adits. 
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Figure 16 - Location of Mines Ea and Eb and adjacent water-filled abandoned mine and 
water/gas filled adits. 
 
The two mines are underground room-and-pillar coal mines with entries less than 48 inches high 
by 18 feet wide.  These mines have been able to maintain a modest size footprint by periodically 
sealing mining sections as activity in the area ceases.  Each mine employs approximately 35 
miners and operates a single auger type continuous mining machine.  Current working faces are 
mostly located down-dip from the abandoned mine.  The operator attended the NIOSH-
sponsored workshop on Minerals Industry Risk Management and identified the mine inundation 
hazard as the most significant risk. 
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5.5.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The objective of this risk assessment was to 1) identify hazards associated with the potential for 
an inundation at Mines Ea and Eb, 2) evaluate strategies and techniques to lessen the risk 
associated with an inundation, and 3) develop an action plan for new ideas.  The mine operator 
was also interested in developing an inundation management plan.  The mine has examined the 
possibility of pumping out all water from the abandoned mine but deemed it to be impractical 
due to the size of the water body.  Elimination of the hazard was therefore not considered by the 
risk assessment team.  Numerous controls, both required and in addition to MSHA regulations, 
are currently used at both mines.  The mine was interested in examining additional controls to 
further lower the risk of inundation. 
 
5.5.2 - Risk Assessment Team 
 
The team was made up of persons employed at Mines Ea and Eb, as well as from the parent 
company and a NIOSH representative, as follows: 
  Two management representatives 
Two shift foremen 
One Miner 
One Engineer  
One Geologist 
NIOSH observer 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
 
5.5.3 – Risk Assessment 
 
All five steps of the MHRA approach were followed and are discussed in detail below. 
 
5.5.3.1 – Step 1, Identify and Characterize Inundation Mining Hazards 
 
The first step in the risk assessment involved identifying potential inundation issues around the 
current and planned mining operations.  Jobs (1987) identified seven inundation sources and the 
number of accidents associated with each source in British collieries during the period 1851 to 
1970: 
1. Contact with surface water – pond, river, canal or stream (9) 
2. Contact with surface unconsolidated deposits – glacial or organic (8) 
3. Strata water entering the mine workings (2) 
4. Shaft sinking (4) 
5. Clearing old shafts (14) 
6. Contact with abandoned old workings (162), and  
7. Failure of an underground dam, seal or leakage of a borehole (9). 
 
Significantly, 78% of the accidents were associated with contact with abandoned old workings.  
The team discussed the different sources of inundation and determined four potential hazards 
existing at Mines Ea and Eb: 
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1. Water from the up-dip abandoned mine, 
2. Water and gases from the adjacent adits, 
3. Water from surface creeks, and  
4. Water from surface drainage. 
 
Water from the abandoned mine is a potential hazard, with approximately 30 to 80 ft of water 
head. These flooded workings are in the same seam as Mines Ea and Eb and are generally at the 
same or higher elevations.  There are also small adits open to the surface along the coal seam 
outcrop containing either water and/or gases typically found in old mine openings.  These adits 
generally consist of two headings connected by cross-cuts and driven from the coalbed outcrop a 
few hundred feet into the hillside.  The maximum adit water head is estimated to be 5 ft.  There 
are no plans or maps in existence to help locate these entries in relation to Mine Eb. 
 
Surface creeks run over Mine Ea.  The streams have relatively low volumes of water and no 
water from the surface has been detected in the mine.  There is also intermittent drainage from 
surface water.  Recently a 100-year rainfall event entered the box-cut of Mine Eb and flooded its 
working faces.  Subsequently the box-cut design was changed to reduce the 100-year rain event 
impact.  The risk assessment team considered the surface creeks and surface drainage hazards to 
be minor and decided to focus on the water hazards from the abandoned mine and adjacent adits. 
 
The risk assessment geographic boundaries are defined by the outline of the current and future 
face developments adjacent to the abandoned mine and adits (Figure 17).  Three segments define 
these boundaries: 
Segment 1 represents Mine Ea’s current and future face developments close to the 
projected boundary of the abandoned mine, 
Segment 2 is for Mine Eb’s current and future face developments close to the boundary 
of the abandoned mine, 
Segment 3 is representative of the boundary between Mine Eb’s future face developments 
and the potential location of adits.   
These three segments are the geographic focus of the risk assessment team. 
 
Mine-Eb
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Abandon Mine
Adits
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Figure 17 - Location of geographic boundaries of the risk assessment.  Thick lines define the 
boundaries between the abandoned mines and the current projections for Mines Ea and Eb. 
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5.5.3.2 – Step 2, Rank Potential Unwanted Events 
 
With step 1 complete, the team determined six possible mechanisms for water to enter the active 
mines from the abandoned mine and adits (Table 25).  These possible mechanics were all 
examined for their ability to produce an inundation event with high consequence. 
• Two of the mechanisms are associated with the active mines penetrating the abandoned 
mine and adits.  The negative consequence of these events would be very high. 
• A third mechanism saw in-seam horizontal drilling activity as a means of creating a 
possible avenue for water and gas flow.  The consequence of this potential unwanted 
event is thought to be moderate since the drill hole is relatively small and the drills are 
fitted with packers and shut-off valves capable of isolating the borehole water from the 
mine. 
• A fourth mechanism has moderate volumes of water entering the active mines through 
isolated areas of excessive roof-to-floor convergence.  These areas are capable of locally 
increasing water flow rates.  Here again the consequence is considered to be moderate 
since the water volumes are not expected to be significant. 
• The final two mechanisms had relatively small quantities of water flowing along geologic 
structures within or adjacent to the mined coalbed.  A study by Moebs and Sames (1989) 
characterized the water flows rates along a potential geologic discontinuity that produced 
a connection between a water-filled abandoned mine and an active mine workings.  These 
water flow rates represented a concern for the mine operator, but were unlikely to result 
in a catastrophic release of water.  Therefore, the consequence of these events is 
considered to be low. 
 
Table 25 - Consequences of different inundation mechanisms. 
# Mechanism for inundation Consequence 
1 Water violently enters the mine under pressure through a relatively large opening caused by mining directly into the abandoned mine along Segment 1 High 
2 Water violently enters the mine under pressure through a relatively large opening caused by mining directly into the abandoned mine along Segment 2 High 
3 
Considerable quantity of water and/or mine gases enter the mine under relatively 
low pressure through an opening caused by mining directly into adits along 
Segment 3 
High 
4 High-pressure, low-volume water enters the mine through the in-seam horizontal drill holes  Moderate 
5 Moderate water volumes enter the mine through zones of fractured rocks caused by excessive roof-to-floor convergence 
Low 
6 Relatively small volumes of water enter the mine along permeable rock layers and geologic structures in the coal and its adjacent strata Low 
7 Relatively small volumes of water enter the mine through the cleat structures within the coal seam Low 
 
In this study, it was possible to ignore the likelihood of an inundation event because the 
consequences are indisputably significant.  Therefore the team decided to forego ranking the risk 
using a risk matrix.  Instead the risks were ranked solely on their consequence. 
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5.5.3.3 – Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
A BTA was used to determine important existing and new prevention controls and recovery 
measures.  The high-consequence events listed in Table 25 were combined to read “water 
inundation occurs from adjacent old mine workings” and placed within the central node of the 
BTA (Figure 18).  Three threats and three consequences were identified by the team and 
discussions of existing and new prevention controls and recovery measures followed.  The 
threats were: 1) didn’t know old mine workings were there; 2) dangerous gases in the adits; and 
3) mined into old workings due to mining error.  The consequence of mining into an old mine 
workings were: 1) increased water flow into active mining area; 2) minor water inrush; and 3) 
major inrush blocks normal egress routes.   
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Figure 18 - Graphical depiction of the BTA used in the inundation risk assessment. 
 
The mine operator is using several Best Practice techniques to aid in preventing the unwanted 
event.  The techniques are listed below and are used in many different scenarios, principally to 
help verify the location of old mine workings.  These techniques were often used as priority 
prevention controls during discussions of specific threats and consequences.  For the purposes of 
this study, the four techniques were combined into one prevention control aimed at verifying the 
location of old mine workings.   
 
• Technique 1 - Discussions with miners familiar with the abandoned mine in question:  
The abandoned mine was in operation until 1967.  There are miners available who have 
knowledge of this recently abandoned mine plan and are used to help verify the accuracy of 
existing mine maps.  On the other hand, adits were developed long ago and no records or miners 
exist with knowledge of these mines. 
• Technique 2 - Surface seismic reflections capable of detecting underground mine voids:  
Several surface seismic reflection lines have been run over areas that were relatively far from the 
active mine but where additional information about the location of the abandoned mine was 
desired (Figure 19). 
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• Technique 3 - Surface geophysical resistivity surveys capable of detecting water-filled 
mine entries:  Resistivity surveys have been completed, probing for water-filled entries along the 
boundaries of the abandoned mine (Figure 19). 
• Technique 4 - Surveyed boreholes both from the surface (vertical) and underground 
(horizontal) to pinpoint the location of old mine workings:  Boreholes are used to confirm the 
location of old mine workings.  Surface boreholes have helped to establish the elevation of the 
water pool in the abandoned mine and to find adits.  These holes are capable of removing water 
from the abandoned mine and present a safe way to ventilate gases from the adits.  Horizontal 
drill holes are a much more effective means of locating old works but require the underground 
mine to be in proximity to the old mine workings.  Both mines have used this technology (Figure 
19).  Typically, the boreholes are drilled from the inby end of a development section.  These 
boreholes either probe the coalbed ahead of the working faces or examine the coalbed to be 
mined by future development sections.  Typically, horizontal boreholes are used if further 
clarification is required or when mining occurs closer than 200 ft from a known old mine 
workings. 
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Figure 19 - Techniques used to find the location of water-filled old mine workings at Mine Ea. 
 
Besides the four techniques to verify the location of old mine workings (PC1), the team 
identified six other existing prevention controls (Table 26).  Five controls were aimed at 
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lessening the risk of mining into old workings because their locations were not known.  These 
controls focused on verifying the true location of the old mine workings (PC1), identifying a 
200-ft barrier around these old mine workings to account for inaccurate data or interpretations 
(PC2), in-seam probe drilling when faces were thought to be less than 200 ft away (PC3), 
ensuring communications to all necessary personnel (PC4), and observing unusual conditions 
that might signal that old mine workings were close by (PC5).  The sixth control was specific to 
adits, where vertical boreholes are sometimes used to ventilate potentially dangerous gases along 
Segment 3 (PC6).  The seventh control is used to lessen the chances of a mining error occurring 
by requiring mining crews to perform daily survey checks and compare them to mine projections 
(PC7). 
 
Table 26 - Summary of existing prevention controls and recovery measures for a potential mine 
inundation. 
Existing prevention controls 
PC1 Use the four identified techniques to assist in validating the location of old 
mine workings (MH) 
PC2 Identify a 200-ft barrier of solid coal around the known position of old mine 
workings, place its position on mine maps, and communicate this 
information to the workforce (PB) 
PC3 In-seam horizontal drilling is required if the active mining faces are within 
200 ft of the known location of old mine workings (MH) 
PC4 Communicate the information about efforts to validate the location of old 
mine workings and their known locations to miners (PST) 
Threat 1 – Didn’t 
know old mine 
workings were 
there 
PC5 Workers observe certain conditions that might indicate that a water-filled old 
mine workings is close, i.e. enhanced water making its way through the coal 
seam at the working face or the smell that standing water sometimes gives 
off, and communicate these conditions to their foremen and others (PST) 
Threat 2 – 
Dangerous gases 
in the adits 
PC6 Vertical boreholes are used to ventilate potentially dangerous gases from 
adits in Segment 3 (MH) 
Threat 3 – Mined 
into old workings 
due to error 
PC7 Mining crews are required to perform daily survey checks and compare to 
mine projections (P) 
Existing recovery measures 
Consequence 1 – 
Increased water 
flow into active 
mining area 
RM1 Operator will call others underground on hand-held radios to alert them of 
changing conditions and give evacuation instructions (P) 
Consequence 2 – 
minor inrush 
RM2 Follow existing Emergency Response Plan to evacuate the mine (PST) 
Consequence 3 – 
major inrush 
blocks normal 
egress routes 
RM3 Follow existing Emergency Response Plan to evacuate the mine; however, 
exception could occur, i.e. miners in Mine Ea may decide to move to the 
highest elevation, potentially north along the mains, to escape inrush as it 
moves from the faces down-dip to the portal; and miners in Mine Eb may 
need to alter egress routes as they escape up-dip toward the portals and away 
from the flooding faces. (PST) 
PC – Prevention Controls 
RM – Recovery Measures 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
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Three existing recovery measures were also identified.  If mining conditions noticeably change 
or an inundation occurs, workers communicate information and evacuation instructions through 
hand-held radios (RM1).  When water inrush conditions occur, the miners are to evacuate 
according to the Emergency Response Plan (RM2).  Finally, if a major inrush were to occur, it 
could possibly block normal egress routes.  Miners may consider alternate egress routes as 
outlined in RM3. 
 
5.5.3.4 – Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
Five new ideas were identified by the team to further reduce the inundation risks at the mine 
(Table 27).  These ideas were listed as part of an Action Plan with the ideas inserted and space 
left for derivation of specific actions, timing and resources.  Four of the five were potential 
recovery measures.  The only new prevention control formalizes the process of using water/smell 
conditions to look for or to identify potential inundation conditions (NI1).  The team thought it 
important to have calculations of potential flooding rates for both mines (NI2).  This information 
could be used to further evaluate the inundation hazards and could be used when considering NI4 
and 5.  The team believed that an important way to minimize losses was to restrict access to 
certain areas of the mine during key time intervals (NI3).  Restricted access should be considered 
when mining in areas near the abandoned mine and adits, i.e. along Segments 1, 2 and 3.  The 
team spent considerable time discussing how egress from the faces would be influenced by the 
size and location of the inrush event.  It was not possible to sufficiently analyze this issue during 
the risk assessment and make adjustments to the Emergency Response Plan (NI4).  For example, 
it may not be possible for the miners to use existing escapeways if the inundation event occurred 
along Segment 1.  In this case, water would enter the face and run down-dip along the main 
entries, forcing miners up-dip toward the working faces along the main entry.  Other scenarios 
were also discussed with some having the miners wait in less hazardous areas until the threat 
subsides or they are rescued.  The team thought it important that techniques be investigated (NI5) 
to communicate, locate and rescue trapped miners underground (e.g. tapping, signals, phones, 
surface access, emergency supply skid, etc.). 
 
Table 27 - New ideas proposed by the risk assessment team for preventing or recovery from an 
inundation at Mines Ea and Eb. 
New prevention control 
ideas 
NI1 Formalize water/smell conditions to look for or to identify possible inundation, 
as well as action to be taken in those conditions, and introduce to personnel (P) 
NI2 Calculate rates of flooding for both mines to estimate the consequences of an 
inundation on egress routes and communicate to the miners (PST) 
NI3 Restrict access to certain areas of the mine, i.e., no one in return entry when 
mining in areas near the abandoned mine and adits. ( Segments 1, 2 and 3) (P) 
NI4 Develop the Emergency Response Plan beyond MSHA requirements to address 
specific mine issues (P)  
New recovery measure 
ideas 
NI5 Investigate methods and actions that should be undertaken if persons are 
trapped underground due to flooding (e.g. tapping, signals, phones, surface 
access, emergency supply skid, etc.) (PST) 
NI – New Ideas 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
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5.5.3.5 – Step 5, Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
Assuming that the information provided in the risk assessment was accurate, completion of the 
Action Plan and an increased focus on monitoring and auditing of the key identified controls 
would appear to provide an opportunity to effectively reduce the risk of fatalities related to 
inundation at Mines Ea and Eb.  The risk assessment showed that the mine relied extensively on 
prevention controls (PC) that reduce the risk of water inundation from mining into the abandoned 
mine (Figure 20).  The figure also shows a somewhat limited number of existing recovery 
measures (RM) identified by the risk assessment team.  Four of the five new ideas addressed 
recovery measures, demonstrating the team’s interest in improving the way the mining operation 
should respond to an actual inundation event.  All of the new ideas were controls classified as 
procedures (P) and personnel skills and training (PST) (Figure 20). 
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Figure 20 - Distribution of prevention controls and recovery measures for the water inundation 
risk assessment. 
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5.6 – Escapeway Egress Blockage Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
Mine F is an underground limestone mine experiencing unstable ground conditions that 
potentially threaten the use of its alternate escapeways.  The general conditions found at the mine 
are shown in Figure 21.  The part of the mine relevant to this study was mined over 40 years ago 
using the room-and-pillar technique.  Large rooms were driven 45 ft wide and 30 ft high 
perpendicular to a highwall in an adjacent quarry and off-set cross-cuts of the same size were 
mined typically on 90-ft centers.  The parallel Primary and Alternate Escapeways run southeast 
from Portals No.1 and 2 to inby portions of the mine.  In January 1994, a roof collapse occurred 
in an area adjacent to the Alternate Escapeway about 250 ft from Portal No.2.  Between January 
1994 and December 2006, other roof falls have occurred to the southwest of the Alternate 
Escapeway, resulting in a large restricted area.  Management has responded to this roof 
instability hazard through Best Practice controls, including roof monitoring, supplemental 
standing support, and tensioned cable bolts in the Alternate Escapeway adjacent to the restricted 
area. 
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Figure 21 - Escapeways, roof falls and recent roof cracks found at the mine. 
 
Recently, roof conditions in the escapeways showed signs of deterioration.  Of particular concern 
are the January, 2007, roof fall and the January/February, 2007, appearance of intermittent, en 
echelon roof cracks (Figure 21).  One of these roof cracks is especially troublesome because it 
extends across the Alternate Escapeway and into the Primary Escapeway, signaling an elevated 
risk. 
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5.6.1 – Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The objective of this risk assessment is to 1) identify hazards that could affect egress through the 
mine’s escapeways, 2) determine what unwanted events pose the greatest threat to mine workers 
escaping from the mine, 3) review the existing prevention controls and recovery measures, and 
4) recommend new ideas to prevent, or recover from, potential disruption of escapeway egress.  
The initial MHRA steps consist of scoping document generation, scoping team selection, and 
assessment framework identification.   
 
The risk assessment team agreed to frame the assessment by limiting it to the Primary and 
Alternate Escapeways when egress was disrupted by a roof collapse or fire hazard.  Normal 
ventilation operating conditions were considered, which means the fan at the ventilation shaft is 
either exhausting or blowing into the mine.  During exhaust conditions both escapeways are in 
fresh air, while under blowing conditions the escapeways will be in return air.  Hazards and risks 
were considered in relation to their probability of occurring within five years. 
 
5.6.2 - Risk Assessment Team 
 
The scoping team consisted of the following persons: 
 Mine Supervisor 
 Mine Engineer 
 Rock Mechanics Engineer 
 Miner 
 Safety Officer 
 Subject matter experts (Strata Control, Ventilation, Mining Regulation and Mine Evacuation) 
 Facilitator – NIOSH 
 
5.6.3 – Risk Assessment 
 
First, major hazards associated with egress through Primary and Alternate Escapeways during an 
emergency at the mine were reviewed.  Consequences associated with the unwanted event were 
investigated and the likelihood of the event occurring was estimated.  Threats that disrupt egress 
through the escapeway were analyzed and ranked using a risk matrix technique.  Finally, existing 
and new controls and recovery measures were identified. 
 
5.6.3.1 – Step 1, Identify and Characterize Major Potential Mining Hazards 
 
Hazards that affect egress through the mine’s escapeways are identified by first dividing the 
escapeway system into logical segments and then analyzing the various types of hazards.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, the description of a metal/nonmetal escapeway follows from the 
definitions cited in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 30, Section 57.11050 (CFR, 2005).  
The escapeway system at the study mine can be subdivided into six segments (Figure 22).  
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Figure 22 - Six segments of the mine's escapeway system. 
 
The two kinds of hazards investigated in this study are fire and roof collapse.  Fire hazards are 
identified by considering potential fuel and ignition sources.  The results are summarized in 
Table 28.   
 
Table 28 – Fire hazards consisting of potential fuel and ignition sources. 
 
Roof instability hazards are considered only in terms of their potential to block egress through 
escapeways.  Small roof falls that can result in injuries were therefore excluded from the 
analysis, since they do not block egress.  A NIOSH-developed tool, called the Roof Fall Risk 
Index (RFRI), was used to systematically identify roof fall hazards in the escapeways.  The RFRI 
is a hazard assessment technique that maps the spatial distribution of stability conditions.  The 
RFRI focuses on the character and intensity of defects associated with specific roof conditions 
(Iannacchione et al., 2006; Iannacchione et al., 2007).  Ideally, values approaching 0 represent 
safer roof conditions, while an RFRI approaching 100 represents a serious roof fall hazard.  The 
RFRI values for the mine’s escapeway system are shown in Figure 23.  Higher values indicate 
increasing risk of roof collapse in the absence of additional roof stabilization efforts.  For 
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example, the relative roof fall risk in Segment 1 of the Primary Escapeway is potentially lower 
than in Section 2 because this section contains roof bolts, wire mesh and narrower entry spans. 
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Figure 23 - Roof Fall Risk Index (RFRI) measured in the mine's escapeways. 
 
5.6.3.2 – Step 2, Rank the Potential Unwanted Events 
 
As the team became familiar with the escapeway routes, current ground conditions, and 
ventilation and operational requirements, the risk for a potential unwanted event in each segment 
was determined.  The risks associated with unwanted events were rated using the WRAC method 
which considers the likelihood and consequences of each event. 
 
The scoping team identified 28 potential threats based on the defined list of hazards (Table 29).  
Each potential threat was risk ranked using a qualitative risk analysis method and a 4 by 5 risk 
matrix (Table 30).  Lower numbers indicate a higher risk.  The likelihood of an event was 
subjectively assessed by considering the probability of the event occurring in the next five years.  
The consequences of an event were assessed by considering its potential impact on the ability to 
evacuate the mine in case of an emergency.  This included consideration of blockage of 
escapeway routes and the spread of toxic fumes or smoke.  Both exhaust and blowing ventilation 
scenarios were considered.  The inability to use either escapeway for egress from the mine 
during an emergency was considered to be the highest impact consequence. 
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Table 29 - Risk ranking of potential threats grouped by escapeway segment. 
Escapeway 
Segment Potential Threats 
Consequence 
(impact) 
Likelihood (next 
5 years) 
Risk 
ranking 
Equipment fire – fan exhausting High Unlikely 7 
Equipment fire – fan blowing Moderate Unlikely 8 
Roof collapse High Very Unlikely 11 
Diesel storage fire – fan exhausting High Very Unlikely 11 
1 
Diesel storage fire – fan blowing Moderate Very Unlikely 16 
Roof collapse High Likely 4 
Equipment fire - fan exhausting High Very Unlikely 11 
Equipment fire – fan blowing High Very Unlikely 11 2 
Electrical cable fire Low Very Unlikely 18 
Equipment fire – fan exhausting High Unlikely 7 
Equipment fire – fan blowing Moderate Unlikely 12 
Charging station fire – fan exhausting High Likely 4 
Charging station fire – fan blowing Moderate Likely 8 
Transformer fire – fan exhausting Low Unlikely 16 
Transformer fire – fan blowing Low Unlikely 16 
Natural gas leak explosion High Very Unlikely 11 
Flammable storage cabinet catches fire Low Very Unlikely 20 
3 
Roof collapse High Very Likely 2 
Equipment fire – fan exhausting High Very Unlikely 11 
Equipment fire – fan blowing High Very Unlikely 11 4 
Roof collapse  Moderate Very Likely 5 
Equipment fire – fan exhausting High Unlikely 7 
Equipment fire – fan blowing Moderate Unlikely 12 
Roof collapse Moderate Unlikely 12 5 
Transformer catches fire Low Very Unlikely 20 
Equipment fire during travel – fan exhausting Low Very Unlikely 18 
Equipment fire during travel – fan blowing Low Very Unlikely 18 6 
Roof collapse Low Unlikely 16 
 
 
Table 30 - A 4 by 5 risk matrix for ranking the potential threats. 
Likelihood (event occurs in next 5 years) 
Consequence 
Certain Very Likely Likely Unlikely Very Unlikely 
High Impact 1 2 4 7 11 
Moderate impact 3 5 8 12 16 
Low impact 6 9 13 17 20 
No impact 10 14 18 21 23 
 
The top four potential threats identified through the WRAC are:  
1. Roof collapse in Primary Escapeway of Segment 3 
2. Charging station fire in Primary Escapeway of Segment 3 
3. Roof collapse in Alternate Escapeway of Segment 2 
4. Roof collapse in Alternate Escapeway of Segment 4 
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5.6.3.3 – Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
The team discussed the nature and quality of the prevention controls as part of the BTA.  The 
outcomes of the BTA are presented in Appendix B.  Eleven key prevention controls currently in 
place are identified and listed in Table 31.  Controls for roof collapse hazard used in portions of 
the Primary and Alternate Escapeways consisted of 6- and 8-ft grouted bolts placed on 5-ft 
centers (PC1).  This support occurs through most, but not all, of the Primary Escapeway and only 
within the first 200 ft of Portal 2 in the Alternate Escapeway.  Typically the mine is completely 
scaled every 3 to 6 months, but scaling of individual loose rock occurs as needed (PC2).  
Periodic observations of roof conditions are made by the mine supervisor, mine engineer and 
miners on a regular basis (PC3).  Both multipoint roof sag extensometers and roof-to-floor 
convergence sensors have been used in the Alternate Escapeway to assess stability conditions 
(PC5).  Over 100, 30-ft long, 60-ton capacity cable bolts have been installed and tensioned to 20 
tons as a means of adding support to a section of Alternate Escapeway roof near the restricted 
area (PC6).  These cables were installed at a 30˚ angle from vertical to help prevent roof 
instabilities associated with prominent joints.  Finally, three massive breaker wall standing 
supports, 45 ft wide by 30 ft high, were installed in cross-cuts between the Alternate Escapeway 
and the restricted area (PC7).  Fire hazard controls consist of weekly battery checks (PC4).   
 
Table 31 - Existing prevention controls and recovery measures for a loss of emergency 
escapeway at Mine F. 
Existing prevention controls 
PC1 Primary support – 6- and 8-ft grouted bolts (PB) 
PC2 Scale roof and ribs every 3 to 6 months, or as needed (P) 
Threat 1 – Roof collapse in 
Primary Escapeway Segment 3 
PC3 Periodic observation of roof conditions (PST) 
Threat 2 – Charging station fire in 
Primary Escapeway Segment 3 
PC4 Battery water levels and terminals are checked weekly (P) 
PC5 Monitoring with multipoint extensometers (WD) 
PC6 Cable bolt support with steel screen (PB) 
PC7 Breaker wall standing support (PB) 
Threat 3: Roof collapse in 
Alternate Escapeway Segment 2 
As above: see PC3 
PC8 Monitor microseismic emissions from the mine (just begun) WD) Threat 4 – Roof collapse in 
Alternate Escapeway Segment 4 As above: see PC2 & PC3 
Existing recovery measures 
Consequence 1 – Roof collapse 
blocks the Primary Escapeway 
RM1 Escapeway must be cleared and re-supported or a new escapeway 
designated (PB) 
RM2 Station partially enclosed by a block wall & metal roof (PB) 
RM3 Scoop has fire suppression system (MH) 
RM4 Fire extinguishers are present, although current policy is to 
evacuate rather than fight fire (PST) 
RM5 Main office coordinates communication via radio (P) 
RM6 Use radios to communicate fire alarm to all underground (WD) 
RM7 Sound the siren (WD) 
Consequence 2 – Charging Station 
Fire in Primary Escapeway 
RM8 Lifelines exist in part of the Primary Escapeway (PST) 
Consequences 3 and 4 - Roof fall 
blocks Alternate Escapeway 
As above: see RM1 
PC – Prevention Controls 
RM – Recovery Measures 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
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The team identified nine existing recovery measures.  The only recovery measure for a large roof 
collapse capable of blocking the Primary or Alternate Escapeways is to clean up the fall material 
and re-support the entry or develop a new Primary or Alternate Escapeway (RM1).  Seven 
recovery measures for a fire in the charging station area were identified.  A cinder block wall and 
metal roof have been built and could partially contain a charging station fire (RM2).  Several 
pieces of diesel equipment have fire suppression systems (RM3).  Fire extinguishers are present 
in this area, although current policy is to evacuate rather than fight the fire (RM4).  In the event 
of an evacuation, radio communication, directed by the mine office, would be used to 
communicate a fire alarm (RM5).  All miners and persons accompanying visitors are issued 
radios that can be used to communicate a fire alarm (RM6).  A site-wide siren is also available at 
the main office that can be heard by all personnel outside the mine (RM7).  Lastly, lifelines exist 
in part of the Primary Escapeway (RM8). 
 
5.6.3.4 – Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
Fifteen new ideas were identified by the team (Table 32).  New prevention controls are aimed at 
either the roof collapse or fire hazard.  For the roof collapse hazards, new controls are divided 
into three groups: administrative, monitoring and engineering.  An administrative control in the 
form of a policy could restrict personnel access to the Alternate Escapeway except in an 
emergency situation (NI1).  A number of monitoring controls were discussed including: a 
regularly scheduled visual observation plan of roof conditions (NI2); installation of additional 
roof and crack monitors (NI3); repair and replacement of 12-year-old multipoint sag 
extensometer (NI4); and a trigger action response plan (TARP) for monitors (NI5).  New ideas 
for preventing roof collapse hazards include a supplemental rock reinforcement program for 
Segment 3 of the Primary Escapeway (NI6).  This should be done after additional monitoring has 
gathered sufficient information.  A design should also be considered for stabilizing Segment 4 of 
the Alternate Escapeway (NI7).  The purpose of this design would be to protect the growth of 
roof falls in the restricted area from weakening the roof in the Alternate Escapeway.  The new 
control for the fire hazard was to place the charging station outside the mine (NI8). 
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Table 32 - New ideas proposed for preventing or recovery from a loss of emergency escapeway 
at Mine F. 
NI1 Develop a policy to restrict access except in an emergency situation (P) 
NI2 Immediately implement a regularly scheduled roof conditions visual 
observation plan (P) 
NI3 Design and install a monitoring system for roof crack and roof sag detection 
(WD) 
NI4 Repair/replace existing multipoint extensometers (WD) 
NI5 Develop a trigger action response plan (TARP) for roof movement that will 
initiate additional rock reinforcement installation (P) 
NI6 Design a method of stabilizing the roof within Segment 3 of the Primary 
Escapeway based on the information gathered from the roof monitoring 
program (PB) 
NI7 Consider stabilizing the adjacent Alternate Escapeway (Segment 4) to act as 
a buffer for securing this area (PB) 
New prevention 
control ideas 
NI8 Place charging station outside mine (EH) 
NI9 Consider using the ventilation shaft as an Alternate Escape route (P) 
NI10 Consider installing refuge chambers in the active work areas (PB) 
NI11 Install backup generator for communication system (MH) 
NI12 Install fire detection/suppression systems on large diesel equipment (MH) 
NI13 All personnel and visitors to wear SCSRs (training needed) (PST) 
NI14 Close down charging station when the general public is underground (P) 
New recovery 
measure ideas 
NI15 Finish installing lifeline in all escapeways (PST) 
NI – New Ideas 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
Several new recovery measure ideas were identified by the team.  To mitigate the impact of a 
roof collapse, the existing ventilation shaft could be used as an Alternate Escapeway (NI9).  
Also, a rescue chamber could be installed in active work areas (NI10).  New ideas to help 
recover from the fire hazard included using a backup generator for the communication system 
(NI11).  It was also suggested that additional fire detection/suppression systems be installed on 
large diesel equipment (NI12).  Elevated Personal Protective Equipment requirements were 
discussed with the goal of all personnel and visitors carrying SCSRs underground and receiving 
training on their use (NI13).  Finally, the team suggested limiting the use of the charging station 
(NI14) and installing lifelines throughout all the escapeways (NI15). 
 
5.6.3.5 – Step 5, Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
The mine’s existing prevention controls and recovery measures were identified and should be 
monitored and audited.  New potential control and recovery measures were produced in the form 
of an Action Plan for consideration by management.  The Action Plan, with the ideas inserted, 
contained spaces for resources and timing of each idea.  The plan was delivered to management 
for prioritization and implementation.  Some of the new ideas are somewhat vague in that they 
broadly called for new designs.  No attempt was made by the team to prioritize the new ideas, 
with the team deciding that it was inappropriate to select a specific design as part of the MHRA 
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process.  Detailed designs are not easily accomplished in an MHRA exercise.  Management will 
need to weigh the various ideas and determine what activities are best suited for their particular 
circumstances. 
 
The team seemed to agree that it was not possible to eliminate the roof fall hazard at this site.  
The only recourse was to decide to mitigate or tolerate the hazard.  Activities to control the 
escapeway fire hazard were handled with well-defined actions, while activities to control roof 
falls relied on designs or actions that were not easily defined.  Most of the new control ideas 
were classified as procedures (P), although new ideas were proposed in all control categories 
(Figure 24).  The one control that eliminated the hazard (EH) was associated with the new idea 
to move the battery charging station out of the underground environment. 
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Figure 24 - Distribution of prevention controls and recovery measures for the escapeway egress 
blockage fire risk assessment. 
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5.7 – Natural Gas Ingress Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
This case study involves two mines (Mines Ga and Gb) operating in an evaporate deposit at 
depths ranging from 400 to 1,500 ft using continuous miners to develop a room-and-pillar 
mining layout.  Figure 25  shows one level within Mine Ga, depicting main entries and 
production panels.  The panels are mined with a higher extraction ratio. After initial crushing, the 
mined ore is moved to shafts by conveyors and hoisted to the surface.  Several thousand feet 
below the mining levels lies a widespread nature gas and oil producing formation.  This 
formation has been extensively drilled within and in proximity to the study mines for many 
decades to recover the natural gas and oil.  The mine is aware of the current and past drilling.  
Significant precautions have been undertaken to reduce the likelihood that gas or oil from the 
reservoir below the mine does not enter the mine workings.  However, because the consequences 
could be so significant, this mining operation has decided to review issues related to natural gas 
ingress using a systematic risk assessment method. 
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Panels
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faces
 
Figure 25 - Mine Ga layout showing the location of active faces, the slope and panels within one 
active level. 
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5.7.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The objective of this risk assessment was to: 
1. Review hazards associated with the potential for a natural gas inundation of the active 
mining area, 
2. Evaluate strategies and techniques for management of the hazards, and  
3. Provide information to help develop an inundation risk management plan for this mine. 
 
The risk assessment project was scoped during discussion with the study mine’s management 
and NIOSH personnel.  The mine’s personnel did not attend the NIOSH-sponsored Minerals 
Industry Risk Management Seminar. 
 
5.7.2 - Risk Assessment Team 
 
The risk assessment team was made up of persons familiar with the mine’s operation and work at 
the mine in various capacities, as well as an external facilitator and two NIOSH observers, as 
follows: 
Manager of mines 
Chief mine engineer 
Manager of engineering 
Manager of safety 
Manager of operations 
Relief electrical supervisor 
Two NIOSH Observers 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
 
No representatives from labor participated in the risk assessment. 
 
5.7.3 – Risk Assessment 
 
The Risk Assessment involved facilitation of a team of personnel through a structured process 
involving the following steps: 
1. Hazard description 
2. Pathways identification 
3. Potential unwanted event identification 
4. Bow Tie Analysis method introduction 
5. Causes and prevention controls discussion 
6. Consequences and loss reduction controls discussion 
7. Repeat of Steps 5 and 6 for all the unwanted events identified in Step 3. 
 
Two days were dedicated to the risk assessment. 
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5.7.3.1 – Step 1, Identify and Characterize Major Potential Mining Hazards 
 
The first step in the risk assessment involved identifying and understanding the hazard related to 
natural gas and oil around the current and planned mining operations.  The primary inundation 
hazard was seen to be the natural gas reservoir located approximately 10,000 feet below the 
surface, as well as the gas in any natural or man-made conduits from below.  There was also a 
hazard related to gas being piped on the surface or in proximity to the mines. 
 
Pathways from the gas reservoir and gas wells into the mine were identified by the team (Figure 
26) as follows: 
• Up the inside of the drill pipe 
• Up the drill hole but outside the casing 
• Up/along faults 
• Up/along igneous intrusions such as dikes 
• Up through permeable ground along fractures or cleats 
• Up collapsed breccia pipes 
• Down to mine workings from wells damaged by subsidence 
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Figure 26 - The risk assessment team created this schematic to illustrate the hazards and 
pathways related to the study mines. 
 
 
The team noted that the strata at the study mines can produce sparks during production with the 
cutting machine.  Also, there is no intrinsically safe mining equipment at either mine.  The mines 
are currently classified by MSHA as Class IV.  Therefore, should natural gas enter the mine, heat 
sources could be readily available to cause an ignition. 
 
The mine has protocols for different gas methane levels detected by hand-held units:   
At 0.5% ventilate and retest; requires notification of supervisor. 
At 1.0% ventilate, shut down equipment, notify supervisor, power off in the panel. 
At 2.0% ventilate, shut down equipment, remove personnel, and notify supervisor.  
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The monitors are intended for methane but will respond to natural gas, though it was not clear 
whether the monitors have been calibrated to the natural gas.  If an explosion occurred, the 
related over-pressure conditions would probably destroy the brattice (cloth) stoppings.  This 
could disrupt the mine’s ventilation and hinder egress from the mines.  Both mines have series 
ventilation where the exhaust from one panel becomes the intake air to the next panel.  Figure 27 
shows the nature of Mine Ga’s ventilation system where air travels in one long circuit through all 
the active advancing faces and production panels.  If a gas ingress event occurs, the fresh air 
intake downstream from the gas entry point could be compromised and adversely affect egress 
from the mine.  In addition, barricading may not work for this type of event, since miners will 
need to get out of the mine quickly due to the explosive potential of released gas. 
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Figure 27 - Detailed view of the ventilation circuit used at Mine Ga. 
 
The team identified that ingress of natural gas into the mine workings could have all or some of 
the following consequences: 
• Oxygen displacement 
• 2–15% hydrocarbon (methane mostly) explosive range atmospheres 
• Large prolonged ignition 
• Multiple fatalities 
• Major mine damage 
• Classification of mine to an MSHA gassy mine, which could potentially result in the 
closure of the mine due to higher operating cost for permissible equipment. 
 
5.7.3.2 – Step 2, Rank the Potential Unwanted Events 
 
The risk assessment team identified that any ingress event could be catastrophic to the mine and, 
potentially, mine personnel.  It was therefore necessary to analyze all potential unwanted events 
and not to attempt to rank these events since all of them could potentially produce catastrophic 
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consequences.  In this case study, it was not necessary to perform a WRAC or a PHA to rank the 
unwanted events. 
 
The team identified a list of potential unwanted events for further consideration where natural 
gas ingress was caused by: 
1. Mining into an existing oil/gas well  
2. Mining into old workings that contain gas from pathways or another source 
3. Mining into fault / dike / breccia pipe which contains gas 
4. Surface drillers accidentally fracturing a well in a way that creates a pathway for gas into 
mine workings 
5. A sudden collapse in an old mined area leading to a puff or blast of gas into mine 
workings 
6. Gas leaks into mine workings from an oil/gas well through strata 
7. Gas leaks into mine workings from faults or dikes 
8. Gas leaks into mine workings from breccia pipes 
9. Gas leaks into mine workings through permeable ground 
10. Gas leaks into mine workings from subsidence around well area 
11. A gas line on the surface rupturing and the gas being sucked into mine surface ventilation  
intake (note that the fans are underground). 
 
5.7.3.3 – Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
The BTA approach was used to consider each of the above events.  For example, the No. 1 
potential unwanted event “Mining into an existing oil/gas well” forms the top event in the center 
of the bow tie of Figure 28.  For each potential cause on the left side of the bow tie, the risk 
assessment team identifies both existing and new key prevention controls.  Next, the right side of 
the bow tie is acted on and existing and new potential recovery measures are identified.  This 
process is repeated for each of the potential unwanted events. 
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Figure 28 - BTA for mining into an existing oil/gas well top event.  Potential causes are listed on 
the left side of the bow tie with potential recovery measures on the right. 
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Based on the analysis that was done by the team, 33 key existing controls were identified as 
being in place throughout relevant phases of the mining operations (Table 33).  As such, these 
controls should be reinforced, monitored and audited with priority.  Controls focused on 
reducing potential well misidentification, reducing operator errors, developing more accurate 
geologic information of discontinuities that could transmit oil and gas, and ventilating abandoned 
areas of the mine that might contain oil and gas.  BTAs were needed for only the first four 
potential unwanted events.  Previously identified controls adequately covered the remaining 
potential unwanted events. 
 
Table 33 – Existing key prevention controls for the natural gas ingress risk assessment (left side 
of the BTA). 
Top Event => (1) Mining into an existing oil/gas well 
Cause  Existing controls to prevent the unwanted event 
PC1 Physically checks surface well location, i.e. topographic, aerial, recon, etc. (P) 
PC2 Check well location against well location supplied by the State (P) 
PC3 Monitor for new application for drilling (APD) (P) 
PC4 Check on the ground for old well location by locating old bricks, oil seeps, etc (P) 
Unmapped 
well 
PC5 Develop and update oil and gas map database (P) 
PC6 Draw a 1,320-ft circle around oil wells and a 2,640-ft circle around gas wells (PB) 
PC7 Resurvey all locations on mine property (GPS survey) and compare to mine survey to 
reduce likelihood of wrong location on map. (P) 
PC8 Quality Software (CAD and Geographic) check to compare each answer (P) 
Well mapped 
but location 
wrong 
 
PC9 Third party check of data and map location (P) 
PC10 Check ongoing surveys (P) 
PC11 Keep elevation of all mine workings in mine panels (P) 
Mapped but 
plotted wrong 
PC12 Use of best technology and survey every shot with triple flop of scope (P) 
PC13 Plot oil and gas locations in critical mining areas on escape maps located in dinner hole 
(P) 
PC14 Locate oil and gas wells with plot lease boundaries on foreman regular work area maps 
(P) 
PC15 Panels are surveyed every 125 feet to fix locations (P) 
PC16 Updated maps are given every work day to foremen and operators (P) 
PC17 Work expectations are discussed and clarified every day (P) 
PC18 Shift bosses have access to maps underground (P) 
PC19 Foreman gives each operator his personal map on surface at start of shift (P) 
PC20 Operator error would be identified by shift foremen monitoring mine work to ensure that 
well location is known and operator is following mine plan and matches survey location 
(PST) 
PC21 Operator error (depending on the nature of the inappropriate behavior) would be dealt 
with by known disciplinary procedure (verbal, written communication, days off, fired) 
(PST) 
Operator error 
As above: see PC6 
Top Event => (2) Mining into old workings 
PC22 Old mines in area are naturally ventilated (MH) 
PC23 Existing operations are unsealed (MH) 
PC24 The mine uses the information from BLM data on closed mines and also maintains good 
data on its own captive old mines (PB) 
PC25 The mine uses a 100-ft buffer between old and new mines included in all plans (PB) 
 
PC26 There is positive air pressure from ventilation for active mining areas causing gas to 
migrate toward old workings, unless old workings have a higher pressure (MH)  
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Top Event => (3) Mining into a fault / dyke or breccia pipe 
PC27 Breccia pipes and dikes have been mapped and located but all faults have not.  The area is 
geologically stable so there are not too many faults.  The ore horizon is some twelve 
different horizons over a 400-foot depth.  Some horizons are economic but some are not 
(P) 
PC28 Gas inrush hazard would be considered to be a slow leak type of event and not a major 
inrush of gas (MH) 
 
PC29 The mine has past experience with mining into breccias area with an active oil seep (PST)  
Top Event => (4) Drillers accidentally hydra-fracturing a well in a way that creates a pathway from gas into 
mine workings 
PC30 Some drillers notify State Oil Conservation District (OCD) and some companies call the 
mine (PST) 
PC31 Some events are mandated to be reported by the OCD (State) but that requirement only 
affects ~ ten % of the land.  Most land is owned by BLM.  (P) 
 
PC32 A permit to drill is required which allows the mine to publicly comment on the drilling 
application (P) 
PC – Prevention Controls 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
Based on the analysis that was done by the team, 15 key recovery measures controls were 
identified (Table 34).  These recovery measures fit into three categories: early detection, 
explosive prevention, and evacuation.  Early detection relies on supervisors monitoring the 
working environment.  Explosion prevention requires numerous actions to de-energize the mine 
or alter ventilation.  Evacuation is focused on communicating instructions to the workforce and 
assisting in the movement of workers out of the mine with breathing equipment.  A BTA was 
only needed for the first potential unwanted events.  All other unwanted events produced the 
same set of recovery measures. 
 
Table 34 – Existing key recovery measures for the natural gas ingress risk assessment (right side 
of the bow tie). 
Top Event => gas inrush occurs 
Early 
detection 
RM1 The mine has ongoing gas detection for O2 and CH4 for operators and O2, CO and CH4 for all 
supervisors (WD) 
RM2 If major inrush of gas occurs the expectation is that all equipment power will be shut off 
(miner can trip power to transformer from mining machine), supervisors are notified and all 
other equipment would be shut down (P) 
RM3 Power can be shut off to rest of mine except hoist by the electrical power supplier (P) 
RM4 Mine power can be shut down by surface personnel (P) 
Explosion 
prevention 
RM5 Ventilation fans are underground and can be shut off or reversed (MH) 
RM6 Current evacuation plans call for mine workers to utilize diesel equipment to get to shaft 
through the intake auxiliary escape route (PST) 
RM7 Escape and emergency egress is practiced every six months (PST) 
RM8 Other U/G personnel not in the immediate vicinity of gas inrush would be notified by one of 
three ways:  page phone system, word of mouth, or flashing lights on belts (WD) 
RM9 The hoistman is the key communication person (P) 
Evacuation 
RM10 Workers when they call in are directed to which egress pathway to take (P) 
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RM11 The person calls his supervisor who may or may not know which way to escape.  Supervisor 
may or may not be in communication with hoistman (P) 
RM12 At both mines power of hoist is totally isolated from mine power (MH) 
RM13 There are refuge chambers at each mine fed by compressed air from surface with enough 
food, water and air for 80 people (PB) 
RM14 There are caches of SCSR breathing apparatuses located at each mine (one hour units) (PB) 
RM15 Miners carry the ten-minute Ocenco oxygen in addition the W65 CO units (PB) 
RM – Recovery Measures 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
5.7.3.4 – Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
New ideas were identified by the team during the risk assessment to further reduce the ingress 
risks at the mine (Table 35).  Three new prevention controls were focused on identifying well 
location (NI1 to NI3).  Three ideas dealt with the potential for natural gas to be retained in 
abandoned panels (NI4 to NI6).  Management will need to weigh the advantages of sealing old 
works as recommended in NI6 against the current conflicting prevention controls (PC22 and 23) 
where the old works are not sealed.  Three other ideas attempt to influence the practices of future 
drilling operations near the mines (NI7 to NI9).  Seven new recovery measure ideas were 
developed by the risk assessment team.  Three ideas focused on improving early detection of 
natural gas ingress (NI10 to NI12).  Two ideas dealt with explosion prevention (NI13 and NI14) 
and two with evacuation issues (NI15 and NI16). 
 
Table 35 - New ideas for mitigating risk of natural gas ingress. 
Prevention Controls 
NI1 Check the mine survey every 2000–3000 feet of advance (P) 
NI2 Reinforce the need to turn on the AutoCAD layers to show well locations (PST) 
NI3 Identify well locations before any new panel is planned or mined (P) 
NI4 Consider drilling from either surface or underground to classify, locate and determine gas pressure of old 
mines suspected to be in the area of active mining.  There is a possibility that some existing extracted panels 
ventilated by the mines might have some accumulation of gas.  The critical panels are the panels which are 
20 to 30 years old. (MH) 
NI5 Consider drilling and investigating existing extracted panels which are greater than some value in time (to be 
established by mine personnel based upon experience) (MH) 
NI6 Seal old mine workings to keep any accumulated gas in the old workings area even if a fall of ground 
occurred in the old workings (PB) 
NI7 Increase efforts to eliminate drilling from surface mine property in close proximity of mine and get drillers 
to utilize directional drilling (EH) 
NI8 Influence the drillers or third parties to get drillers to utilize better drilling methodologies (MH) 
NI9 Increase mine awareness of any drilling problems by either a cooperative effort with drilling companies, 
OCD (State), BLM (Federal), or combination of all the above.  This needs to include gathering and 
communicating vital information on drill location, well type, and all other relevant data (P) 
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Recovery Measures 
NI10 Use new communication system to add selected gas monitoring locations at various places in the mine (WD) 
NI11 Add new monitoring sensor to new communication system at all intake shafts or all shafts to shut down fans 
if gas leak detected.  (Mine personnel will determine gas trips applying experience, consequences, and all 
possibilities to determine trigger values on all gas monitors at the location that must be monitored.  Trigger 
values may be different depending on location and impact to and possible consequence) (WD) 
NI12 Investigate the use of sampling pump technology to test atmosphere closer to face than the current 
continuous miner operator by placing sensor technology on CM cutter head. Same preset values are present 
for triggering action items for the gas values at 0.5%, 1% and 2% gas (WD) 
NI13 Examine the use of blast doors or isolation doors underground to reduce ignition consequences and isolate 
any event to that section of the mine (PB) 
NI14 Consider methods for automatically dropping power in the section where gas inrush occurs (MH) 
NI15 Consider the role of the initial event communicator and that person’s capability and critical decision-
making, and include in the Emergency Response Plan (ERP).  At one of the mines, there is an additional 
need because there is no cager, just a hoistman (P) 
NI16 Consider all the factors and develop understanding of all tradeoffs of egress options for series ventilation 
and the inexperience of the new mine workers.  At the present time, even though both mines are connected, 
the company has not practiced egress from one mine to another (PST) 
NI – New Ideas 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
These ideas for new potential prevention controls and recovery measures should be addressed 
through the development of an Action Plan.  Assuming that the information provided in the risk 
assessment was accurate, completion of the Action Plan and an increased focus on monitoring 
and auditing of the key identified controls would appear to provide an opportunity to effectively 
reduce the risk of fatalities related to gas ingress at the case study mines. 
 
5.7.3.5 – Step 5, Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
The risk assessment team had a wide range of expertise familiar with the natural gas ingress 
hazards and the associated risks to the mining operation and underground workforce.  The team 
was well-represented by key management personnel who had the authority, responsibility and 
experience necessary to support an MHRA.  The team acted as a cohesive unit who cared deeply 
about all the employees at the mine but also as visionary people who could think outside the 
normal everyday existence at the mine.  All scenarios were evaluated and completely discussed 
by all mine personnel until everyone involved in the exercise felt the matter had been completely 
evaluated.  However, the team lacked representation from labor and outside expertise.  
 
The list of key existing prevention controls and recovery measures demonstrates that the mining 
operation has spent considerable energies thinking about this major hazard.  But it is equally 
apparent from the large number of solid new ideas that more could be done.  Some of the ideas 
were very practical and had a high potential for being implemented.  Others seemed more 
difficult and involved the actions of outside government agencies.  While it is less likely that 
these ideas could be implemented by the local mining operations, it is possible that others agents 
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in the company could help.  This could be an example where units lower in an organization’s 
structure influence the actions of units higher in the organization’s structure through the MHRA 
process. 
 
At Mine G, there is a strong reliance on prevention controls (PC) classified as procedures (P) 
(Figure 29).  The high reliance on procedures increases the potential for human error to play an 
important role.  The new ideas were more evenly spread over the different control categories. 
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Figure 29 - Distribution of prevention controls and recovery measures for the natural gas 
inundation risk assessment. 
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5.8 – Conveyor Belt Fire Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
Mine H is an underground room and pillar coal mine with rooms 48 to 54 inches high by 18 feet 
wide.  The mine employs approximately 100 miners and operates three mining units with typical 
equipment such as continuous miners, shuttle cars and a conveyor belt system extending from 
three different working faces to the surface (Figure 30).  The operator did attend a NIOSH-
sponsored training class but had expressed a desire to participate in the pilot project.   
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Figure 30 - Mine H layout showing the location of the conveyor belt and working faces. 
 
5.8.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The objective of this risk assessment is to 1) review major hazards associated with fire potential 
on underground conveyor belts at the mine, 2) evaluate fire prevention strategies, early detection 
techniques, primary fire suppression systems, fire fighting techniques, and mine evacuation 
procedures in the context of these hazards, and 3) develop a major hazard management plan for 
this mine site.  The mine uses belt air to partially ventilate the working faces.  Some controls 
required by MSHA regulations are: 1) intake air monitor at the outby end of each section, 2) 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) monitors at specific intervals along the belt, and 3) a fixed fire 
protection, water deluge system at each drive set to trigger at 165° F.  The mine was interested in 
examining additional controls to lower the risk of fire on its underground conveyor belt system. 
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5.8.2 - The Risk Assessment Team 
 
The risk assessment team was made up of persons employed at Mine H as well as from its parent 
company.  The team members included: 
Mine superintendent 
Shift foreman 
Two miners - underground and outside supply 
Engineer 
Electrician 
Director of Safety 
Two subject matter experts 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
 
5.8.3 - Risk Assessment 
 
This risk assessment case study followed the MHRA approach as outlined earlier but used a 
three-dimensional risk matrix instead of the more common 5 x 5 risk matrix. 
 
5.8.3.1 - Step 1, Identify and Characterize Major Potential Mining Hazards 
 
This exercise began by establishing the current design of the mine’s conveyor system and 
identifying risks that should be considered related to belt fire hazards. The conveyor belt system 
was broken down into segments for individual consideration.  The considered segments 
consisted of individual section belts and their associated feeders and drive units (Figure 31).   
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Figure 31 - Segments of the conveyor belt system. 
 
Eight individual conveyor belt segments were identified with the following characteristics (Table 
36). 
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Table 36 - Characteristics of eight conveyor belt segments. 
Segments Characteristics 
1 3,100 ft of 42-inch-wide belt from portal to drive D1 with an air velocity of 490 ft/s, 
2 5,375 ft of 36-inch-wide belt from drive D1 to drive D2 and containing cribbed area with an air velocity of 170 ft/s, 
3 900 ft of 36-inch-wide belt from drive D2 to drive D3, 
4 700 ft of 36-inch-wide belt from drive D3 to drive D4, 
5 1,200 ft of 36-inch-wide belt from drive D4 to feeder F1 with an air velocity of 120 ft/s, 
6 4,580 ft of 36-inch-wide belt from drive D1 to drive D7 and containing drives D5 and D6 with an air velocity of 220 ft/s, 
7 1,820 ft of 36-inch-wide belt from drive D6 to feeder F2 and containing drive D8 with an air velocity of 90 ft/s, 
8 910 ft of 36-inch-wide belt from drive D7 to feeder F3 with an air velocity of 220 ft/s. 
 
The team then listed the types of related hazards that should be considered in the assessment.  
Fuel and heat sources are identified in Table 37. 
 
Table 37 - Fuel and heat sources along the conveyor belt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8.3.2 - Step 2, Rank Potential Unwanted Events 
 
Once the conveyor segments and hazards had been listed, the team was ready to identify the 
potential unwanted events for the entire conveyor belt system.  The list of potential unwanted 
events was ranked for risk using a WRAC.  The team considered each conveyor segment and 
each fire threat individually in order to systematically identify potential unwanted events.  Forty-
one different potential unwanted events were identified Table 38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fuels Heat sources 
Coal dust Electricity 
Timber Friction (rollers, belt, bearings, etc.) 
Grease Welding 
Paper  
Rubber (belt)  
Hydraulic Fluid  
Insulation on wires  
Plastic pipe  
Canvas  
Methane (at conveyor dump points)  
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Table 38 – Potential unwanted events for the entire conveyor belt system 
# Location Unwanted Event 
1 Feeder Bearing failure causes fire in coal dust 
2 Feeder Electrical short causes fire in coal dust 
3 Feeder Friction, hot motors that are above normal operating temperature set fire to wood cribs 
4 Feeder Drive chain heat sets fire to oil/grease/coal build-up and sets fire to the drive chain 
5 Feeder Rocks/metal bits in feeder cause sparks leading to a fire 
6 Feeder Rescuer contents exposed to air when broken in feeder, starting an exothermic fire 
7 Section Belt Tail roller failure (back from face) generates heat and ignites coal dust/grease 
8 Section Belt Misaligned belt generates friction (when it stops) and starts fire 
9 Section Belt Belt clearance problems cause rubbing and fire 
10 Section Belt Structure (e.g. tail piece) rub on belt causing fire 
11 Section Belt Structure/metal (e.g. rollers and structure) friction causes fire 
12 Section Belt Belt causes electricity fault on belt, (Jabcos) 110V causes fire 
13 Section Belt Electrical fault on HV crossovers for various purposes causing fire 
14 Section Belt Belt box failure /fault causes fire 
15 Section Belt Welding on belt structure leads to fire 
16 Section Belt Improper installation of main belt structure (hangers) leads to friction and fire 
17 Section Belt Structural failure (hung belt failure) leads to spillage/damage/friction and fire 
18 Drive Electrical fault in drive causing heat and fire 
19 Drive Scrapers wear to a point where they are metal-to-metal causing friction and fire 
20 Drive Misalignment of scraper causes build-up that leads to friction, heat and fire 
21 Drive Misalignment of belt causes “strings” that get heated up and catch fire 
22 Drive Welding at drive causes fire 
23 Drive Floor heave misaligns drive causing friction, heat and fire 
24 Drive Malfunction on the slip (belt control error) unit causes heat and fire 
25 Drive Batteries fault while driving a mantrip and catch fire 
26 Drive Bearing faults at drive generate heat and fire 
27 Drive HV box fault on belt cause fire 
28 Drive Rock from roof falls into drive area causing friction and fire 
29 Drive Hydraulic brake slip generates heat and if fluid leak then fire 
30 Special Fire starts in cribbed area of Segment #2 due to typical belt fire reasons (more spillage, harder to inspect, harder to clean) 
31 Special Float dust/trash around air locks on belt leads to fire or NOT hot spots 
32 Special Belt fire in Segment #1 has major impact on inby ventilation 
33 Special Belt fire in Segment #6 affects ventilation intake undercasts, compromising supply inby 
34 Special Section #7 transfer point roof conditions leads to rock/friction/fire 
35 Special Fire at undercast, Section #1 changes ventilation 
36 Special Fire at overcast, Section #1 changes ventilation 
Unusual Fuel sources 
37 Feeder Greasy rags, paper, housekeeping problems cause fire 
38 Section Belt Unnecessary fuels (greasy rag/poor housekeeping leads, coal, timber, etc.) to fire 
39 Drive Housekeeping problems lead to fire  
40 Drive Canvas fire starts 
41 Drive Oil sump for chain catches fire on drive 
 
The team applied a three-dimensional, subjective risk matrix (Table 39) to identify priority 
unwanted conveyor fire events for further consideration.  This method involved selecting, for 
each identified unwanted event, the possible Maximum Reasonable Consequence (MRC) of that 
event, the Most Likely Consequences (MLC) of that event, and the likelihood of that event  
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occurring.  The subjective ranks for each event were then defined.  Table 40 shows the 12 
highest risk unwanted events.  
 
Table 39 – Three-dimensional risk ranking method used at Mine H. 
CONSEQUENCE 
MATRIX Most Likely Consequence (MLC) 
Maximum 
Reasonable 
Consequence (MCR) 
MFF** Almost MFF Serious Fire Minor Fire No Fire 
MFF A A B C D 
Single fatality fire A A B C D 
Serious LTI* A B C D E 
Avg LTI B C D E E 
Minor LTI C D E E E 
RISK RANK 
MATRIX Likelihood of Occurrence 
From the above 
Consequence Matrix 
5 - Common 
(>1 per 
week) 
4 - Likely (1 
per month) 
3 – Moderate 
(1 per year) 
2 - 
Unlikely (1 
per several 
years) 
1 - Very 
Unlikely 
(almost 
never) 
A 1 2 4 7 11 
B 3 5 8 12 16 
C 6 9 13 17 20 
D 10 14 18 21 23 
E 15 19 22 24 25 
LTI* = lost-time injury 
MFF** = multiple fatality fire 
 
Table 40 – The highest priority risks identified by the WRAC. 
# Unwanted Event MRC MLC C L R 
1 Fire starts in cribbed area of Segment #2 due to typical belt fire reasons (more spillage, harder to inspect, harder to clean) 5 4 A 4 2 
2 Float dust/trash around air locks on belt leads to fire or NOT hot spots 5 3 B 4 5 
3 Belt fire in Segment #1 has major impact on inby ventilation 5 3 B 4 5 
4 Fire at overcast, Section #1 changes ventilation 5 3 B 4 5 
5 Electrical fault on HV crossovers for various purposes causing fire 5 3 B 3 8 
6 Large structural belt failure leads to spillage/damage/friction and fire 5 3 B 3 8 
7 Floor heave misaligns drive causing friction, heat and fire 5 3 B 3 8 
8 Malfunction on the slip (belt control error) unit causes heat and fire 5 3 B 3 8 
9 Belt fire in Segment #6 affects ventilation intake undercasts, compromising supply inby 5 3 B 3 8 
10 Fire at undercast, Section #1 changes ventilation 5 3 B 3 8 
11 Structure (e.g. tail piece) rub on belt causing fire 5 2 C 4 9 
12 Structure/metal (e.g. rollers and structure) friction causes fire 5 2 C 4 9 
 
The highest ranked risk from the WRAC was a fire starting in the cribbed area of conveyor belt 
Segment No. 2 (Figure 32).  Because a fire at this location represents the highest risk to the 
mine, more time was dedicated to discussing controls for this unwanted event.   
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Figure 32 - Conditions within the cribbed area of conveyor belt Segment #2. 
 
The cribs were placed in this area to help prevent the convergence of the roof and floor.  Several 
roof falls had occurred in adjacent entries and a relatively large area was being subjected to 
excessive pressure that was attempting to force the entry closed.  Under these conditions, a 
standard control practice is to support the entry with standing structures to resist the roof-to-floor 
closure.  Wood cribs are often used for this purpose.   Drawbacks for this control include: 1) 
reduced access to the area, 2) increased air velocity as the cross-sectional area of the entry is 
effectively reduced, and 3) elevated sources of fuel (wood) to the area. 
 
5.8.3.3 - Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
The highest risk unwanted events (top events) identified by the WRAC were selected for a much 
more detailed analysis using the BTA.  The BTA analyzed the control measures intended to 
prevent the unwanted event and all consequences leading to the unwanted initiating event.  The 
results of the Mine H BTA are provided in Appendix B. 
 
The key controls identified by the process as currently in place throughout the underground belt 
conveyor system are listed in Table 41.  Fourteen existing prevention controls were identified 
and grouped into two categories.  The conveyor construction controls are required by mining 
regulations or are considered Best Practices.  The conveyor maintenance controls focus on 
preventive maintenance issues and good housekeeping. 
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Table 41 - Summary of existing prevention controls and recovery measures from a potential 
conveyor belt fire. 
Existing prevention controls 
PC1 The conveyor is designed for the load, speed, etc. (MH) 
PC2 The conveyor is hung straight/correctly (MH) 
PC3 High-voltage cable crossovers are hung high over the conveyor (P) 
PC4 High-voltage cables run in a pipe to protect cable (PB) 
PC5 Drives are set to put dripping onto the outby belt (MH) 
PC6 Skirting and bins at transfer points that decrease spillage (PB) 
PC7 “Land mines, mouse traps, rabbit holes” that shut down the belt if excessive spillage 
is detected at transfer points (WD) 
Conveyor 
construction 
PC8 Canvas at drives designed to hang clear of the machinery (P) 
PC9 Mechanics inspect/repair each drive every day (P) 
PC10 Belt maintenance personnel keep all belts tracking correctly (PST) 
PC11 If a problem is found (drive seals, rollers, etc.) repairs are done (PST) 
PC12 Spills are cleaned up on back shifts (P) 
PC13 A designated person is assigned to fill drives with oil (P) 
Conveyor 
maintenance 
PC14 All oil spills are cleaned up (P) 
Existing recovery measures 
RM1 Persons in the area should detect fire at feeder and other points (PST) 
RM2 CO monitors around feeders and other points are set at 5 ppm alert and 10 ppm alarm 
with audio that warns surface of possible fire (tested weekly) WD 
RM3 Persons are trained to contact the control room person if there is a suspected or actual 
fire (PST) 
RM4 If a fire is suspected, the control room person shuts off the belt and starts calling the 
sections to alert all miners (P) 
RM5 Persons in sections would notice the stationary belts or hear the phone warning 
and/or alarm (PST) 
RM6 Persons are trained to contact supervisor(s) and surface attendant(s) to clarify the 
problem (PST) 
RM7 Persons would fight the smaller fire outby (intake side) (PST) 
RM8 Persons fighting the fire would let surface attendant know if fire is beyond fighting 
(P) 
RM9 Surface attendant would let all underground know if it is time to evacuate (P) 
Fire 
identification 
and 
communication 
RM10 New employees are introduced to the mine and emergency procedures and persons 
understand procedures (PST) 
RM11 Fixed fire suppression and fire hoses are available at the feeder and drives (MH) Fire fighting 
capacity RM12 Every section and belt drive has a fire hose cart for quick delivery of hoses to fire location (every 15 water pipe joints there is a tap) (MH) 
RM13 All persons have self-rescuers (1-hr maximum) to help them get to fresh air and ride 
out (PB) 
RM14 All persons know how to get to fresh air (PST) 
RM15 More than one intake egress is available for escape (MH) 
Emergency 
escape 
RM16 Mine practices escapeway drill and fire fighting drill regularly (mock drill) (P) 
PC – Prevention Controls 
RM – Recovery Measures 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
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Sixteen existing recovery measures focused on fire identification and communication, fire 
fighting capacity, and emergency escape controls were identified.  Here again these controls 
represent a combination of complying with mining regulations and Best Practices.   
 
5.8.3.4 - Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
As the risk assessment team identified existing prevention controls and recovery measures 
associated with a conveyor belt fire, new ideas were proposed to help further reduce risk.  
Thirteen new ideas were identified, six related to prevention control and seven related to 
recovery measures (Table 42).   
 
Two new prevention control ideas (1 and 2) focused on the #1 ranked risk – fire along the 
conveyor belt in the cribbed section of Segment #2.  The combination of using infra-red cameras 
and thermometers to detect hot spots and better control of coal fines were viewed as significant 
controls to further mitigate risk.  New idea 3 focused on eliminating the wood fuel supply from 
future sites where roof-to-floor convergence might occur.  The NIOSH program STOP (Support 
Technology Optimization Program) is a design tool that can be used to help investigate different 
supplemental support options (http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/products/product99.htm).  New 
idea 4 focused on future conveyor construction, proposing to eliminate many of the hazards 
through better construction techniques.  New idea 5 relies on an SOP to ensure that cable splices 
are done to standards.  New idea 6 deals with a relatively rare phenomenon – an SCSR 
mistakenly entering the conveyor belt feeder.  This has happened only once at this mine, but the 
incident resulted in a hot fire that lasted for many minutes. 
 
Table 42 – New ideas proposed by the risk assessment team for preventing or recovery from a 
conveyor belt fire at Mine H. 
NI1 Conveyor Monitoring / Inspection - combine the role of examining and cleaning 
the belt (P) 
NI2 Investigate infra-red cameras and thermometers to detect hot spots (WD) 
NI3 Conveyor Cleaning – install a water valve outby the cribbed area, have weekly 
wash downs (P) 
NI4 Install a knee wall to deflect water and collect fines (MH) 
NI5 Use hydraulic jacks rather than wooden cribs as supplemental support when roof-
to-floor convergence is a problem.  Consult NIOSH “STOP” program for 
assistance (MH) 
NI6 Conveyor Construction – survey and mark drives for conveyor hanging, plan HV 
crossovers, and cut bottoms in new drive areas (MH) 
NI7 Conveyor maintenance - ensure splices are square, complete an SOP for splice 
inspection (P) 
New prevention 
control ideas 
NI8 Self-Rescuers – communicate the related fire source risk and provide locations 
on equipment for rescuers (PST) 
NI9 Fire Fighting Plan – review the fire fighting plan to ensure the key actions are 
understood, developing a control room check list for actions; define the MSHA 
interaction and consider an emergency info “sticker” for personnel (P) 
NI10 Fire Identification - supplement CO monitoring with smoke monitoring in belt 
headings (WD) 
NI11 Fire Communication - investigate technology to notify persons to leave the mine 
(WD) 
New recovery 
measure ideas 
NI12 Fire Fighting Capacity - analyze fire fighting capability and hang ribbons on belt 
line for fire taps and hose locations (P) 
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NI13 Fire Escape – train all to use optional alternate (3rd emergency egress) (PST) 
NI14 Specific to the Cribbed Area in Segment #2- install additional phone and fire 
suppression over the conveyor belt in this area (MH) 
NI15 Fire Event Simulation - use event simulation to test response to fire (MH) 
NI – New Ideas 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
The seven new recovery measure ideas covered a range of emergency response issues associated 
with detecting a fire (NI8), communicating its occurrence and location (NI9), fighting the fire 
(NI10), and escaping safely from the mine (NI11).  The team had one new idea (NI12) specific 
to the cribbed area in Segment #2.  New ideas 7 and 13 focused on improving the existing fire 
fighting plan through a control room checklist and event simulations. 
 
5.8.3.5 - Step 5, Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
The existing prevention controls and recovery measures are obviously keys to reducing the risk 
of a conveyor belt fire and, therefore, should be reinforced, monitored and audited with priority.  
The new ideas were compiled into an Action Plan with the recommendation that each item be 
evaluated within a specific time frame and a decision made by management as to which would 
be implemented by the mine.  Lastly, a presentation was made by the risk assessment team to 
mine management stressing the above points. 
 
The existing and new prevention control and recovery measures identified with the BTA fell 
largely within the mitigation and tolerance range of hierarchy responses to the identified hazards.  
The team did not identify any controls that would have eliminated the hazard entirely.  If this 
mining process were not used at this mine, many of the risks analyzed would have been 
diminished; as one example, using belt air to ventilate the working faces is responsible for many 
of the mine’s conveyor belt fire high-consequence events.  It is difficult for an MHRA to 
consider hazard elimination when the mine is mature and the action of hazard elimination might 
produce other unfavorable mining conditions.  The high-voltage power cables crossing the 
conveyor belt line is another example of the difficulty in hazard elimination actions.  Here 
actions focused on ways of mitigating or tolerating the risks associated with this hazard.  
 
A number of the existing controls discussed by this risk assessment team identified mitigation 
techniques (MH and PB, see Figure 33).  Also, five new ideas were classified as controls to 
minimize hazards (MH), where some technology would independently aid in preventing a fire or 
minimizing the resultant losses if a fire were to occur.  If a fire occurred and recovery measures 
(RM) were needed, there was a high reliance on procedures (P) and personnel skills and training 
(PST) (Figure 33). 
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Figure 33 - Distribution of prevention controls and recovery measures for the conveyor belt fire 
risk assessment. 
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5.9 – Longwall Gate Entry Track Fire Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
Mine I is a large underground longwall coal mine.  The mine employs over 400 miners and 
operates three longwall and six continuous miner sections.  The mine has track transportation 
throughout main headings and into development panels (Figure 34).  The three-heading longwall 
development panel has one entry that has rails installed to the face area.  This heading is also an 
intake for the fresh air ventilation to the working face and is the primary escapeway for miners.  
The belt entry contains the conveyor belt with a neutral split of air.  The return entry contains the 
exhausted air from the working face and is this section’s secondary escapeway.  The major 
hazard evaluated at this site is a fire on the track entry of a longwall development panel, where 
smoke from the face travels to the working face obstructing egress through the primary 
escapeway. 
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Figure 34 - Site conditions at Mine I showing the 3-entry development panel with direction of air 
flow. 
 
5.9.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The mine decided to review the risk related to fire hazards in the track entry of a longwall 
development panel considering the operation of relevant equipment and other variables.  The 
operator did attend a NIOSH-sponsored training class and had expressed a desire to participate in 
the pilot project.  The project objectives were scoped at the training session.   
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5.9.2 - The Risk Assessment Team 
 
The team was made up of persons employed at Mine I as well as from the parent company and 
contained the following representatives from the workforce: 
  Assistant mine superintendent 
Master mechanic 
Safety supervisor 
Fire prevention manager 
Corporate manager of fire prevention and mine rescue 
Motorman (labor) 
Miner operator (labor) 
Two subject matter experts 
NIOSH Observer 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
 
5.9.3 - Risk Assessment 
 
The longwall track entry fire risk assessment did not use all five steps of the MHRA.  A formal 
risk ranking of all potential unwanted events was not performed.  This is partly due to the short 
time frame allotted for this activity and the desire to focus on a robust examination of prevention 
controls and recovery measures.  It is also likely due to the potential difficulty in determining 
difference in the likelihood of occurrence of identified unwanted events. 
 
5.9.3.1 - Step 1, Identify and Characterize Major Potential Mining Hazards 
 
The first step in the risk assessment involved identifying and understanding the hazards related to 
a fire in the track heading.  The team brainstormed the potential heat sources and fuel sources 
that might be available mid-panel to create a fire (Table 43). 
 
Table 43 - Fuel and heat sources found within a longwall track entry. 
Fuel sources  Heat sources  
Materials on flat cars Locomotive and mantrip motors 
Some flammables on the locomotive, 
paint, coal dust, grease, oil, hoses, 
batteries, garbage 
Locomotive Batteries 
Stores in cross-cuts High-voltage equipment, power cables 
Coal Welding and cutting 
 Compressors 
 Rock dusters 
 
The team then decided to review risks related to a fire due to any source listed in Table 43  and 
located mid-panel within a track entry (intake air) in a development panel.  It also agreed to the 
potential important characteristics listed in Table 44. 
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Table 44 - Important longwall track entry characteristics to be considered in the risk assessment. 
 Track entry characteristics 
1 Any variables or variations in development panel, e.g. dips 
2 Equipment, primarily battery operated locomotives, portal buses (mantrips), rock dusters and compressors 
3 Smoke conditions at the face would be dependent on the location of the fire, i.e. fire outby the face and 
near the main entry would fill both the fresh air intake and the track entry intakes with smoke, while a fire 
close to the face and far from the mains would only fill the track entry intake with smoke 
4 Welding/cutting (hot work) activities sometimes occurred in the track entry intake 
5 High-voltage cables were located in the track entry intake 
 
5.9.3.2 - Step 2, Rank Potential Unwanted Events 
 
After discussing and ensuring understanding of the above hazards, the team decided it did not 
have sufficient time or information to explore a risk ranking exercise with the WRAC tool.  
Instead, the team focused on identifying a list of ten consequences of a longwall track fire (Table 
45). 
 
Table 45 - List of acceptable and unacceptable consequences from a longwall track fire. 
 Consequence Risk rank 
1 Loss of power to panel and face ventilation lost 
2 Communication line is lost 
3 Roof fall in heading due to heat 
4 Discharge water line cut 
5 Compressed air line lost 
Acceptable 
6 A small fire becomes a big fire 
7 Persons affected by smoke at face 
8 Person trapped by smoke 
9 Persons trapped or overcome (can’t escape) 
10 Fire ignites gas in panel 
Unacceptable 
 
The team decided to combine the important characteristics of a longwall development track entry 
(Table 44) with the list of high-consequence unwanted events (Table 45) to rank the risk of a 
longwall track entry fire.  The four highest risks are listed below: 
1. Fire on a locomotive or portal bus (mantrips) 
2. Electrical high-voltage fire 
3. Welding or cutting fire (hot works) 
4. Rock duster battery vehicle / compressor fire 
 
5.9.3.3 - Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
The BTA method was used by the team to review and discuss the current controls in place to 
reduce risks related to the four high-consequence hypothetical fire events listed above.  The 
complete BTA analysis is shown in Appendix A.  This risk assessment compiled an extensive list 
of priority existing controls for event prevention and consequence minimization.  Fifty-five 
existing key prevention controls (PC) and thirty-four existing key recovery measures are listed. 
Over 60% of the existing prevention controls were directed at the fire on a locomotive or portal 
bus potential unwanted event, demonstrating the mine’s high concern with this risk. 
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An analysis of the 89 existing prevention controls and recovery measures provides a unique 
opportunity to examine the characteristics of the controls used by this mining operation.  The 
character and effectiveness of controls was discussed under the topic of the hierarchy of effective 
controls (Section 4.4).  The hazards unique to this risk assessment were associated with the use 
of a three-entry longwall gate entry design.  The track entry was a designated fresh air entry.  If a 
fire occurred in this entry, smoke would eventually make its way to the working face.  The 
hazards associated with using track air to ventilate the working faces are the key component of 
this risk assessment.  Therefore, if the need to use the track air current to ventilate the working 
face is eliminated then the hazard (EH) is eliminated.  The most effective control, hazard 
elimination, was not discussed during this risk assessment.   
 
All of the 89 controls fall in the other control categories: minimize hazards (MH), physical 
barriers (PB), warning devices (WD), procedures (P), and personnel skills and training (PST) 
(Figure 35).  At this mining operation, there is a reliance on procedures (P) to mitigate the risks 
associated with the longwall gate entry track fires.  Fifty-four percent of the existing prevention 
controls and recovery measures were classified as procedures (P).  The rest of the controls were 
distributed, somewhat evenly, among the remaining categories.  Most of the prevention controls 
that were categorized as minimizing the hazard (MH) are focused on the machines being 
designed and built to specifications that incorporate distinct safety features, i.e. enclosed 
compartments, fuses, breakers, de-energizing capabilities, etc.  Also, more warning devices 
(WD) are used as recovery measures than prevention controls. 
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Figure 35 - Distribution of prevention controls and recovery measures for the longwall gate 
entry track fire risk assessment. 
 
Many of the existing controls could be grouped by the issues they addressed.  For example, the 
controls associated with the locomotives and portal buses can be grouped by design issues, 
maintenance issues and operational issues, as detailed below. 
 
Locomotive and Portal Bus Design Issues:  The locomotives and portal buses are 
designed to standards with fuses, breakers and resistors.  Many locomotive cables are 
protected in conduits.  Radio-controlled communication is available on the locomotive to 
obtain assistance/advice about abnormal operations.  Battery charging issues are 
minimized because the locomotives are always charging the batteries when in contact 
with a trolley wire in main headings.  Also a gage indicating charge level is located in 
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operator compartments.  Resistors are closed-in, blocking trash and other fuels from these 
heat sources.  Fans are installed on some locomotives aiding in additional cooling.  A red 
light indicator tells the operator when the brakes are on.  Normal braking is electrical so 
overheating of the other brake is unlikely.  All locos are fitted with heat sensors and 
manually initiated fixed fire suppression and hand-helds (20 lbs).  Fire extinguishers are 
located within easy reach of the locomotive operator. 
 
Locomotive and Portal Bus Maintenance Issues:  All locomotive and portal buses are 
subjected to weekly maintenance checks.  Mine personnel inspect new equipment and 
rebuilds before they are used.  In addition, a state electrical inspector certifies that all 
major rebuilds are completed to standards.  Battery maintenance includes cleaning, 
watering, checking for dead cells, etc. and all battery rebuilds are done to a mine 
specification.  Fixed and hand-held fire equipment used on this equipment are checked 
regularly.  Weekly inspections are completed to check for faults or discharge in the fire 
alarm system.  Finally, a certified contractor does the maintenance inspection on fire 
suppression system every six months. 
 
Locomotive and Portal Bus Operations Issues:  Locomotive loads are always at least 10 
ft from heat sources and only hydraulic oil and wood fuel sources are transported.  Load 
guidelines are applied at the mine to avoid oversized/shifting loads that might derail the 
locomotive.  Any explosives are hauled separate from all other supplies and transported 
in specialized containers.  Operators receive special training and are required to perform 
pre-operation checks, i.e. test brakes, tram, check batteries and fire extinguishers.  Safe 
Work Instruction and Best Practice teams sometimes observe pre-operations inspections.  
Operators are trained to open breakers and take plugs off batteries if there is a short, and 
if that does not work then the main lead is disconnected.  Operators are aware of hot 
resistors and will stop operations and let resistors cool if overheated.  Operators will 
smell for brake heat and look for abnormal operation, e.g. low power.  Abnormal 
operation is reported to the supervisor and the maintenance shop.  Supervisors know the 
capability of individual motor operators and they select competent operators for 
heavy/difficult loads.  Operators are trained in the use of hand-held fire extinguishers 
every 2 years. 
 
The rock duster and air compressor also had specific existing controls.   
 
Rock dusters and air compressor issues:  the Rock dusters and air compressor are 
designed to standard and inspected before underground use.  Dedicated crews take care of 
charging and inspecting this equipment, including an operator being in the area during 
operation.  There is a weekly electrical check of the equipment by the maintenance 
department.  The rock dusters and air compressors have fixed, automatic and manually 
operated fire suppression systems directed at the battery areas.  There are weekly 
inspections to see if the fire suppression system is faulted and if an alarm occurs, does it 
discharged.  A certified contractor does the maintenance inspection on the fire 
suppression system every 6 months.  All rock dusters and air compressors have a 
mounted hand-held fire extinguisher.  Locomotive operators check the oil level in 
compressors. 
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Within the longwall gate entry environment, several other important issues are highlighted by the 
quality of the existing controls applied to them, as follows. 
 
Track Issues:  Rail maintenance program requires a given area of track to be inspected 
every shift.  All tracks are installed and maintained to standards.  The mine examiner 
examines the track during the pre-shift examination.  Locomotive operators report any 
track issues to their supervisor. 
 
High-Voltage Electrical Apparatus Issues:  High-voltage cables are shielded and some 
are guarded and are located in rib/roof corner, reducing likelihood of damage.  Circuit 
breakers/GFCI/pilot circuits are installed to protect the system form overload and fault 
fires.  Monthly tests are done and recorded on these devices and on the jackets and 
insulation.  Cabling is hung to regulatory requirements.  The high-voltage system is 
designed to de-energize quickly (GFCI, etc.). 
 
Housekeeping Issues:  Each shift is responsible for cleaning up trash in their area.  Trash 
is bagged and put on empty car.  The locomotive operators pick up trash in outby areas 
around tracks. 
 
Cutting and Welding:  The mine has strict procedures for cutting and welding 
underground.  Qualified persons must be present when cutting or welding to make 
methane gas checks and checking the area before they leave.  Hand-held detectors are 
part of welding equipment used underground.  Fire protection and rock dust is included in 
the welding and cutting procedure.  Where possible a charged water line is also taken to 
the cutting or welding area. 
 
Several important issues related to existing recovery measure were identified by the risk 
assessment team. 
 
Gas Monitoring Issues:  There is a real time continuously monitoring system that detects 
carbon monoxide (CO).  Measurement points are located every 2500 feet in track 
heading.  This system is linked to the underground bunker and outside surface hoist 
house where it is continuously monitored by a designated person.  The system alarms at 5 
ppm CO (alert) + 10 ppm CO (alarm).  In addition, the system has a malfunction alarm.  
A designated person reacts to the alarms by 1) notifying shift foreman and other persons 
in affected area with both underground radios and telephones, and 2) checking CO 
detector.  Also, there is a CO alarm at the conveyor tail (10 ppm CO) in the panel. 
 
Fire Fighting Training Issues:  Locomotive operators are trained in fire fighting every 
two years.  Persons are trained that an air line can be charged to a two-inch water line to 
provide fire fighting water to the track heading.  There is also a return water line that can 
supply water to fight a fire until air pressure to the face is lost.  The mine has a designated 
Responsible Person (RP) who is notified when a fire occurs.  All persons evacuate the 
mine if a big fire is identified.  RP makes decisions about actions to be taken 
underground to fight fire, change ventilation, etc. 
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Emergency Egress Issues:  Persons on face are trained to put on M20 self-rescuers, leave 
the panel if dense smoke is in the intake and meet at the power center, grab an extra 
SCSR, tag together, go to return, and use lifeline in return to egress the section.  The M20 
has a 20-minute supply of oxygen.  There is a cache of 1-hour SCSRs at the load center 
and on mobile equipment, and caches are located 5700 feet in the intake track entry and 
5700 feet in the return but staggered every 2850 feet down panel (staggered).  Lifelines 
lead to caches and there are two cones on line to alert that a door or SCSR cache is 
present.  There is a practice egress using the escapeways every quarter (alternating 
between the intake and return entries).  Caches are located in cross-cuts with doors in 
stoppings.  Persons are trained to take an extra SCSR.  Per MSHA requirements 
barricading materials have been located in panels and persons have been made familiar 
with methods of building barricades.  There are trained and qualified mines rescue teams 
available to attempt underground rescue.  The Mine Emergency Response Plan includes 
external and internal communication, external medical services, family notification, 
security, etc. 
 
5.9.3.4 - Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
Fourteen new ideas were identified by the team during the risk assessment to further reduce the 
longwall track fire risks at the mine (Table 46).  The particular BTA that was responsible for 
each new idea is provided in Appendix A (Table 56 and Table 57).  Seven new ideas address 
prevention control measures and seven recovery measures.  The hierarchy control categories for 
the new ideas are also dominated by procedure (P) controls (Figure 35). 
 
Table 46 - New prevention control and recovery measure ideas for the longwall track fire event 
organized by category.  NOTE that the new idea numbers (NI) correspond to the new ideas listed 
in the BTA for the risk assessment (Table 56 and Table 57). 
NI7 Investigate changing or modifying loco resistors to perform under load without 
overheating (MH) 
NI9 Investigate whether fixed fire suppression can be located over/at compressor (PB) 
Design 
NI10 Put one joint of fire hose on loco to be carried on the track jeep at all times (P) 
NI1 Reinforce and follow the requirements of the maintenance program for batteries, consider 
checklists/verification that it is being followed (P) 
Maintenance 
NI3 Add checking gauge accuracy in the battery maintenance program (WD) 
NI2 Investigate defining a specific percentage battery charge that is minimum to enter panel 
(P) 
NI4 Investigate whether there is an identifiable level of complexity/experience for major 
loads, thereby creating a list of heavy load operators (P) 
NI5 Reinforce the need, during pre-operation inspection, to remove any baking soda that has 
been used to absorb water on batteries so that it doesn’t become a conductor (P) 
NI6 Add checking inside the loco resistor area (lift lid) for any combustibles to pre-operation 
inspections (NOTE that dust can get into resister compartment) (P) 
Operations 
NI8 Make operators aware that, if possible, when there is a small fire or smoke from a 
loco/mantrip/rock duster there may be an opportunity to reduce/stop smoke to the face by 
putting equipment into a switch/spur track and open man-door into the return heading to 
short circuit into the return (P) 
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NI11 Add clarification to ER training, re: egress in light smoke – i.e. if light smoke in intake 
use transportation to exit as far as possible* then cross to return to egress [* smoke is too 
dense to see ahead] (P) 
NI12 Make sure the caches are located in cross-cuts with doors in stoppings (P) 
NI13 Reinforce the need to put self-rescuer or, if closer by, don SCSR as soon as any smoke is 
detected (issue:  may get worse and easier/safer to don the SCSR now) (PST) 
Fire and 
Emergency 
Response 
NI14 A method should be developed to access stopping doors at caches to check if intake is 
fresh air so that a person can remain attached to lifeline and/or team.  The method should 
be included in 90-day ER training. (P) 
NI – New Ideas 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
5.9.3.5 - Step 5, Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
Assuming that the information provided in the risk assessment is accurate, an increased focus on 
monitoring and auditing of the key identified controls would appear to provide an opportunity to 
effectively reduce the risk of fatalities related to underground fire in the track entry at Mine I.  
The risk assessment team identified 89 existing controls and 14 new ideas.  Procedures dominate 
both the existing and new prevention controls and recovery measures for this mine site.  
Procedures are known to have a potential for human error.  This requires a thorough examination 
and audit effort.  This mining operation will address these needs through a Safe Work Instruction 
program and Best Practice teams that periodically observe the quality of many existing controls. 
 
At the end of the risk assessment, the 14 ideas for new potential controls and recovery measures 
were submitted to mine management in the form of an Action Plan (Appendix B).  The Action 
Plan lists each new idea and contains additional columns to identify who will investigate the 
idea, when the investigation will be completed, and what specific action will be required. 
95 
5.10 –Change of Mining Method Risk Assessment Case Study 
 
A risk assessment was performed at an underground metal mine (Mine J) to investigate major 
hazard potentials associated with the management of change.  Mine J operates in a steep, near 
vertical, ore body with the captive (raise access) cut-and-fill stoping method (Figure 36).  In this 
method, the ore is mined by successive flat slices, working upward.  After each slice is blasted 
down, all broken ore is removed, and the stope is filled with waste up to within a few feet of the 
back (roof) before the next slice is taken out.  The term captive implies that access to the stope is 
solely through vertical access raises that are confined to that stope.  During production, one of 
these raises can contain ore.  This method requires three miners per stope. 
 
The scope of the risk assessment was limited to those events that would have the potential to 
fatally injure the miners working in the captive stopes.  The primary change related to the move 
from mechanized (drift access) cut-and-fill to captive stoping is considered to be 1) the 
occasional limitations on escape from the work area to a single ladder-way in the access raise, 
and 2) the occasional requirement of miners to work under unsupported brows.  Also, the captive 
cut-and-fill stoping method relies more on miner hand-work and less on mechanized equipment 
than the previous mining method.  Members of the mine staff attended a NIOSH-sponsored 
MHRA training course and expressed an interest in participating in the study. 
 
Breast-down brow
Entrance  to 
ore raise
Stope access 
development
Cribbing
Entrance to 
access raise
Raise-up 
slot
Access 
raise
Stope
Backfill 
production 
drifts
Ore raise
Production drift 
development
 
Figure 36 - Diagram of Captive Cut-and-Fill mining method. 
 
The captive cut-and-fill stoping method is a complex practice that has been widely used around 
the world to skillfully respond to changing conditions within the ore body.  The widths of the 
mining space can shrink and expand in concert with the ore thickness.  In the last few decades 
some mining operations have used a more mechanized stoping method with tire-mounted jumbo-
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boom style face drills to blast the mine opening and load-haul-dump (LHD) vehicles to 
efficiently move the muck (broken ore) out of the production stope.  The design of the stope is 
highly dependent on the size and maneuverability of the mobile equipment.  When the ore body 
falls below a certain thickness, mechanized stoping can become inefficient.  This is the case with 
Mine J. 
 
While the captive cut-and-fill stoping method lacks large mobile mechanized equipment, there is 
still a strong reliance on a wide range of mining equipment.  Every stope has a complement of 
electric slushers5, air tugger6, jackleg drill and a mucker.7  There is also a wide range of electric 
fans, tools, lights, and phones that require a transformer and hundreds of feet of wire.  
Compressed air and water are also brought into the stope.  In addition, each stope is serviced by 
diesel haul trucks and tractors and an explosives magazine. 
 
5.10.1 - Risk Assessment Scope 
 
The scope of this risk assessment is to identify the major hazards and risk potential associated 
with the change of mining method to captive cut-and-fill stoping and to evaluate existing 
prevention controls and recovery measures for adequacy in controlling identified risks.  A 
change of mining method risk assessment represents the most complex MHRA because it can 
consist of a number of smaller related risk assessments.  Each hazard examined identified 
existing prevention and response actions that were considered as important to maintain.  Further 
discussions of what other actions might be undertaken to further reduce the likelihood of the 
subject event occurring and to improve response should it occur were also documented for 
management review of the concepts developed.  In some cases a work process flow chart of the 
specific portion of the mining cycle being examined was developed so that the group could 
consider where prevention and early response actions could best be placed.  A significant amount 
of time must be spent considering the new mining process, and the composition of the risk 
assessment team will change as different hazards require specialized knowledge bases.  The 
output is information to assist Mine J in the development of the approach to captive cut-and-fill 
mining so that risks are managed to a level that is acceptable. 
 
5.10.2 - The Risk Assessment Team 
 
The risk assessment team was made up of persons employed at Mine J, as well as from its parent 
company.  The initial team members included: 
Maintenance superintendent 
Maintenance foreman 
General foreman 
Shift foreman 
                                                 
5 A slusher is a blade or bucket that drags the broken ore within the production drift to the dump point at the top of 
the ore raise. 
 
6 A tugger is a small, semi-portable hoist, powered by compressed air or electricity, to raise supplies and equipment 
within the access raise. 
 
7 A mucker is the device that loads the broken rock out of the ore raise and into haul trucks for transportation out of 
the mine.   
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Two captive stope miners 
Rock mechanics engineer 
Safety coordinator 
Director of safety 
NIOSH matter experts 
NIOSH observer 
Facilitator – MISHC (University of Queensland) 
 
The risk assessment team composition changed as the team focused on additional hazards or 
different work processes.  
 
5.10.3 - Risk Assessment 
 
The structure of the risk assessment methods used was a multiple layered approach beginning 
with a semi-quantitative risk ranking exercise, using a WRAC, to prioritize hazards for further 
examination.  The eight highest priority risks were then examined in more detail utilizing the 
BTA and work process flow chart methods.  This risk assessment required that any hazard 
suspected to be associated with the new mining method needed to be evaluated. 
 
5.10.3.1 - Step 1, Identify and Characterize Major Potential Mining Hazards 
 
For a change of mining method risk assessment, there is a potential for numerous major hazards.  
Some of these hazards exist within the current mining method, others are specific to the new 
mining method and, as such, may be new to the mine.  In this case, the hazards can only be 
identified and characterized after the mining process has been segmented into distinct phases.  
This first operation was completed by the first team over the course of one day where the captive 
cut-and-fill stoping method was broken down into 11 phases with an internal loop for the 
repetitive portions of the cycle (Phase 6 to 10). 
1. Stope access development 
2. Vertical raise preparation (two raises per stope) 
3. Vertical raise-up slot (locally referred to as a beanhole) 
a. Jackleg raise mining 
b. Longhole raise 
4. Preparation for ore production by lining the vertical raise with wood cribbing 
5. Production drift development 
a. First connecting vertical raises (I-drift) 
b. Develop drift to its full horizontal length of ~ 200 ft (sill drift) 
6. Raise-up a slot in the production drift 
7. Place and decant sand fill in production drift, and relocate equipment 
8. Breast-down the brow along the production drift  
9. Extend cribbing in vertical raises in preparation of placing sand fill in the 
production drift 
10. Reset equipment for next raise-up of the production drift [return to Phase 6 to 
repeat 6 to 10 for 200 ft vertically (~20 cuts)] 
11. Remove equipment from stope. 
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Next the team listed the types of related hazards that should be considered (Table 47). 
 
Table 47 - Hazards associated with captive cut-and-fill mining. 
 Potential hazards Where When 
1 Ground fall Production drift Production from drift, raise-up slot, 
breast-down 
2 Inrush of previously 
place sand fill 
Production drift, access raise, 
stope access drift 
Placing and decanting sand fill and 
relocating equipment 
3 Electrocution Stope and stope access drift Energizing, splicing, moving, etc. 
electric wires 
4 Air pressure Stope access drift, access raise 
and production drift 
Connecting air lines, pumping sand 
fill and operating drills 
5 Water pressure Stope access drift, access raise 
and production drift 
Connecting water lines, pumping 
sand fill and operating drills 
6 Diesel / hydraulics Stope access drift Hydraulic failure leads to fire on 
diesel equipment 
7 Explosives Production drift, breast-down, 
raise-up slot, dynamite magazine, 
transporting in access raise  
Transportation, placing in blastholes, 
pre-detonation and explosives that 
failed to detonate. 
8 Falls (drawpoints 
gravity) 
Ore raise and access raise 
openings 
When moving through or 
approaching access or ore raises 
9 Equipment temperature Stope and stope access drift Overheating of diesel engines or 
electric motors  
10 Slusher or tugger cable 
tension 
Production drift Overstressed or over worn cables 
used during slusher or tugger 
activities 
11 Slusher setup and 
anchor 
Production drift Production from drift, raise-up slot, 
breast-down 
12 Mechanical energy of 
equipment 
Stope and stope access drift When operation or preparing to 
operate diesel, electric, hydraulic or 
compressed air equipment 
13 Dangerous gasses  Raise-up slot, production drift Formation gases released during 
drilling or blasting or dangerous 
gases associated with diesel 
particulate, blasting or fires 
14 Slip / trip Stope and stope access drift Moving over uneven and rocky 
surfaces or tripping over equipment 
 
Once the mining phases and hazards were identified, the team was ready to apply risk analysis 
methods. 
 
5.10.3.2 - Step 2, Rank Potential Unwanted Events 
 
The team considered each mining phase and each hazard individually in order to systematically 
identify potential unwanted events.  The WRAC produces information about the mining phases 
and specific unwanted events.  Eighty-three potential unwanted events were identified (Table 
48).  Every mining phase contained at least one and most had many events.  The number and 
significance of these events attest to both the complexity of the problem and the collective 
knowledge of the team.  
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Table 48 - Priority listing of potential unwanted events associated with phases in the captive cut-
and-fill stoping method at Mine J. 
Mining phases Potential Unwanted Event 
Methane due to drilling into pocket 
Cable bolts come out before grouting 
Loss of long hole steel causes impalement 
Drilling into a miss hole with explosives causes explosion 
Major fall of ground while bolting 
Blast into diamond drill hole 
Manual handling of electric cables 
Mucking into a misfire causes explosion 
Fall of ground between supports 
Equipment fire 
Crushed by mobile equipment 
Stope access 
development (1) 
Explosion occurs from manually handling explosives 
Raise preparation (2) Improper location under roof causes fall 
Drill into water / gas source causes falls 
Miss hole hit by drilling in bean hole causes explosion 
Initial raise 
development - jackleg 
(3a) Rockfall in bean hole w / jackleg 
Longhole breaks through into lower level where people are working Initial raise 
development - long 
hole (3b) Longhole blasting breaks through into where people are working 
Welding chutes (truck) 
Electrocution occurs when welding due to water exposure 
Rigging failure causes release of tension 
Timber failure occurs 
Person crushed against ribs when positioning equipment 
Person with less than adequate familiarity accesses stope area 
Person hit by material falling down skip shaft 
Lining the vertical 
raises with wood 
cribbing (4) 
Fire in the intake sends smoke into stope 
Miss holes in I drift explode when drilling 
Electrical shock due to damage during blasting 
Gasses encountered re-entering area after blast 
Fall of ground during first couple rounds 
Person falls into chute when mining nearby 
Person knocked back into chute by blow pipe 
Equipment fire in the intake while person is in I drift / sill 
Person hit by rock fall while accessing unsupported ground to set up slusher 
Persons not familiar with jacklegs operate that equipment 
Production drift 
development - I drift 
(5a) 
Person falls into holes due to incorrect covers 
Electrical fault occurs when plugged into wrong power source 
Person hit by parts of mucker if hits rib 
Equipment fire at face 
Production drift 
development - sill 
drift (5b) 
Protruding ground support when operating mucker 
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Hang-ups cause cave-in or drill injuries 
Rock bursts (strain bursting) during raise development 
Gasses cause exposure to bad air after access to raise-up 
Water air pressure release hits person 
Loss of floor (muck / staging) pulls person in 
Loss of floor occurs in new raise-up due bulkhead or mucking out 
poor location of eye leads allows equipment to fall in raise 
Fall from height 
Person injured due to skip problems having impact on man access 
Miss holes after raise-up causes unsupported ground 
Persons exposed to unsupported ground in crossing over muck pile 
Damage to ground support while slabbing 
Raise-up slot (6) 
Person hit by roof fall when trying to support raise-up 
Failure to decant causes crib failure later in mining 
Person gets stuck, sinks or asphyxiates while accessing fill area to repair line 
Release of pressure when line plugs 
Miner filling sand fill falls into raise when cribbing fails 
Decant into ore pass causes muck to blow out 
Person working alone when sand filling 
Decant water causes failure in another area as it runs out of stope 
Place and decant sand 
fill (7) 
Person falls off timber while filling down manway or into fill 
Loss of control of timbers causes crushing 
Person falls into chute 
Person hit by timber when dropped down man access / bean hole 
Rigging failure occurs when relocating equipment and persons hit 
Person falls off timber >10'  
Lining the raise-up 
with wood cribbing 
(8) 
Person falls into beanholes when installing timber sets 
Early initiation of blast occurs when person in manway due to safety fuse 
Brow rounds blows rock onto manway 
Unexpected geologic structure causes ground problem 
Offset / jogs in stope causes stresses and other problems 
Mistimed blast in reef causes impact in other area of mine through to another level 
People in other level when mining blasts / accesses area 
Survey error leads to mining out in another level not as planned 
Hanging walls burst / slab out 
High stress occurs in pillars affecting stope ground / access 
Access sand filled stope and collapse occurs 
Breast-down the brow 
(9) 
Inadequate crown pillar size leads to collapse when another level accessed 
Electric shock occurs in set equipment when setting up 
Equipment not set in right location and / or set insecurely Reset equipment for next stope (10) Persons injured relocating slusher under its own power (not hooked up correctly) 
Cable failure lowering equipment causes accident Remove equipment 
from stope (11) Failure of chain fall causes persons to be hit by equipment 
 
Once all phases of captive cut-and-fill stoping are considered, each unwanted event is risk 
ranked using the cooperating company’s risk matrix (Table 49). 
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Table 49 - Risk Matrix used by cooperating mining company. 
Likelihood of Occurrence  
1 – Highly 
unlikely 
2 – Not 
expected 
3 – Slight 
potential 
4- Moderate 
potential 
5 – Highly 
likely 
1 - Immaterial (I) I-1 I-2 I-3 I-4 I-5 
2 - Low consequence (LC) LC-1 LC-2 LC-3 LC-4 LC-5 
3 - Moderate consequence (MC) MC-1 MC-2 MC-3 MC-4 MC-5 
4 – High consequence (HC) HC-1 HC-2 HC-3 HC-4 HC-5 C
on
se
-
qu
en
ce
 
5 - Disaster (D) D-1 D-2 D-3 D-4 D-5 
 
The risks are calculated by the product of the likelihood times the consequence, and they range 
from a high of 20 to a low of 3.  The highest priority risks identified by the WRAC process are 
listed in Table 50. 
 
Table 50 - Highest ranked risks potential unwanted events associated with captive cut-and-fill 
stoping. 
Potential unwanted event L C R 
Explosion occurs manually handling explosives 5 HC 20 
Person hit by roof fall when trying to support raise-up 5 HC 20 
Crushed by mobile equipment 4 HC 16 
Person falls into holes due to incorrect covers 4 HC 16 
Person falls into beanholes when installing timber sets 4 HC 16 
Person falls off timber while filling down manway or into fill 4 HC 16 
Fall of ground between supports 5 MC 15 
Equipment fire 3 D 15 
Damage to ground support while slabbing 5 MC 15 
Improper location under roof causes fall 3 D 15 
Rockfall in beanhole w / jackleg 5 MC 15 
Person with less than adequate familiarity accesses stope area 5 MC 15 
Equipment fire in the intake while person is in I drift / sill 3 D 15 
Person hit by rock fall while accessing unsupported ground to set up slusher 5 MC 15 
Persons not familiar with jacklegs operate that equipment 5 MC 15 
Equipment fire at face 3 D 15 
Mucker operator hit by protruding ground support 5 MC 15 
Person hit by material falling down skip shaft 5 MC 15 
Fire in the intake sends smoke into stope 3 D 15 
Decant water causes failure in another area as it runs out of stope 5 MC 15 
Hanging walls burst / slab out 3 D 15 
High stress occurs in pillars affecting stope ground / access 3 D 15 
Access sand filled stope and collapse occurs 3 D 15 
Inadequate crown pillar size leads to collapse when another level is accessed 3 D 15 
L = Likelihood 
C = Consequence 
R = Ranking 
 
Many of these events had similarities and the facilitator recognized that the list of events, 
requiring detailed analysis, needed to be reduced.  Therefore, the group agreed to use maximum 
likely consequence and set the highest risk level at a multiple fatality potential (consequence = 
disaster, Table 49 and Table 50).  A decision was then made to group the highest ranked 
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potential unwanted events into smaller, more generalized, events.  Table 51 lists the four highest 
priority risks identified by the team that could result in a multiple-fatality event.   
 
Table 51 - Highest priority risks capable of producing a multiple-fatality event. 
Detailed analysis using the BTA 
1 Equipment fire in intake airway with persons in the stope at the face 
Detailed analysis using the work process flow chart 
2 Unfavorable location of the footwall lateral drift causes unstable ground condition in the access drifts 
3 Stope geometry is poorly defined by diamond drilling causing mining into sand fill drifts 
4 High stress conditions are poorly defined by geotechnical modeling causing rock bursts 
 
5.10.3.3 - Step 3, Determine Important Existing Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
One of the risks was analyzed with the BTA and three with a work process flow chart.  The 
process took about 5 hours for a large, diverse group after 2 hrs of training in the principles of 
risk assessment and management.  Through these approaches, the team identified an extensive 
list of existing prevention controls and recovery measures.  Most of the controls listed represent 
the mines internal Best Practices.  A common theme of discussions of these controls was the 
dependence on a few individuals to ensure compliance, with no formal auditing methods for 
some critical controls. 
 
Potential Unwanted Event 1 - Equipment fire in intake airway with persons in the stope at the 
face:  The team identified the locomotive in the intake drift of the mine and haul trucks operating 
in the stope area and muckers operating in the stope area as the three primary sources of a fire 
with the potential for major consequences.  The team identified 49 existing equipment fire 
prevention controls (Table 52).  Thirty-one apply to all existing equipment, 12 are specific to 
locomotives, and 6 pertain to haul trucks and muckers.  A total of 8 hours was spent examining 
the equipment fire hazards and controls. 
 
Table 52 - Priority existing prevention controls and recovery measures for equipment fires in the 
stope and stope access drift. 
PC1 Scheduled preventative maintenance on equipment is done every 250 hours, including hose 
inspection and change out (P) 
PC2 All work is done by mechanics (P) 
PC3 Hoses are four-braid, higher standard on locomotives, haul trucks and muckers (PB) 
PC4 Hose routing issues, such as damage that is found in inspection or maintenance, should 
lead to rerouting of hoses to correct the problem. Corrections should occur such as 
relocation, shielding, guarding, etc. (PB) 
PC5 The supply fuel lines are hard over the engine area, secured and located in a low location 
so any minor fuel leaks will not drip on hot surfaces (MH) 
PC6 Any return fuel lines are soft but four-braid hoses are used and located away from heat 
sources (MH) 
PC7 Heat wraps are located on hot surfaces of locomotives, haul trucks and muckers (PB) 
PC8 Wires are in looms to keep them in place and protect them from damage (PB) 
PC9 The electrics are maintained by trained personnel ( 2 levels) (PST) 
PC10 Locomotives, haul trucks and muckers should have circuit breakers (MH) 
PC11 New locomotives, all haul trucks and muckers should have wet brakes (MH) 
G
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PC12 Mobile equipment operators are trained to the SOPs and other levels of operator are trained 
too (PST) 
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PC13 Daily operator inspections are made on locomotives, haul trucks and muckers to identify 
damage, leaks, flammable materials, etc. Operators are trained in the use of a Yellow Card 
for inspection. (P) 
PC14 Vehicles should have hydraulic pressure and temperature indicators that tell the operator 
about operating conditions and abnormalities (WD) 
PC15 Vehicles should shut down if they are overheated (MH) 
PC16 Preventative maintenance should include a power wash (P) 
PC17 Speed is controlled on all equipment by a hard barrier blocking the use of 4th gear (MH) 
RM1 Fire suppression systems are on all locomotives, haul trucks and muckers, activated by 
operator in the cab (MH) 
RM2 5-lb hand-held fire extinguishers are located in equipment cabs, with operators trained 
annually (P) 
RM3 A fire in the intake should require immediate evacuation of the mine (P) 
RM4 Fire emergency procedures should cover dispatch activating a computerized warning 
system (stench), using the radio and phone system to warn miners in the stopes about the 
fire (WD) 
RM5 All persons are trained in fire emergency procedures. Persons are trained to, on receipt of a 
fire warning, 1. Get out of the mine 2. If not possible go to refuge and stay in refuge until 
released, and 3. If cannot access refuge then barricade. (PST) 
RM6 All persons should have a CO chemical self-rescuer that can operate for an hour at 1% CO 
to help facilitate escape or access to the refuge (PB) 
RM7 There is a refuge chamber installed within 10 to 15 minutes travel from the stope, marked 
well (including air supply, communications, water, etc. for several people) (PB) 
RM8 Any required barricading in the stope is done with material and compressed air supply is 
available if not damaged (PB) 
RM9 Water supply in the stope is used to provide some protection in a fire (MH) 
RM10 There is a reliable (24/7) air compressor operating on the surface that can replace 
underground compressed air, activated by a manual control on the surface (MH) 
RM11 There is a brass-in and brass-out system to ensure that persons underground are accounted 
for (P) 
RM12 The mine has a looped leaky feeder system designed so that if it has a break due to a fire it 
still works (MH) 
RM13 There is a trained mines rescue team (MH) 
 
RM14 There is an ambulance and paramedics available in the surrounding area (MH) 
PC18 The locomotive should shut down if it overheats (MH) 
PC19 Pressure failure should lead to total brake application on the locomotives (MH) 
PC20 Hydrostatic braking should provide an opportunity to use retard braking as an alternative to 
mechanical braking (MH) 
PC21 The locomotive, haul trucks and muckers have an air pressure gauge that tells the operator 
about operating conditions and abnormalities (WD)  
PC22 The locomotive is fuelled only on the surface unless there is a breakdown / fuel problem 
underground (MH) 
PC23 Engines are shielded from “blow in” materials / debris (PB) 
PC24 The fuel rail car is double walled (PB) 
RM15 There is fire suppression on the fuel rail car (MH) 
PC25 The cab should always separate the fuel rail car from the diesel engine (P) 
PC26 Special operational controls are in place when fuel is transported into the mine, including 
two specialized locomotive operators (P) 
PC27 There is a master switch on the locomotive to shut it off in an emergency but it is not easy 
to access (MH) 
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RM16 Vehicle operators are trained to communicate a fire problem to the surface using a personal 
radio (PST) 
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PC28 Supervisors should check two pieces of equipment per shift to ensure daily operator 
inspections have been done (P) 
PC29 Fuelling is done underground with quick disconnects for fuelling to decrease risk of 
vehicles driving away with hose in fuelling location (MH) 
PC30 Back pressure is indicated in the cab to tell the operator when the DPM is blocked by 
indicating pressure in the “red” sector of the gauge.  The operator is trained to call 
maintenance in this situation (PST) 
PC31 A hot work8 system is in place (P) 
PC32 
 
There is a phone near where the two-yard mucker operates so that absence on the mucker is 
acceptable (WD) H
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As above: see PC35 & RM43 
PC – Prevention Controls 
RM – Recovery Measures 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
Potential Unwanted Events 2, 3 and 4 – Major ground failure due to inadequate mine design 
with crew working in the stope trapped or fatally injured:  Three of the high-risk events 
(numbers 2, 3 and 4, Table 51) were determined to be primarily related to failures in the stope 
design process.  At this mine, a stope proposal is produced for every proposed stope prior to 
mining.  The stope proposal contains detailed mining and operational information.  The team 
decided to evaluate the stope design process.  The team also determined that it needed to be 
reorganized to contain more staff with mine planning experience.   
 
The existing stope planning process was mapped in detail, noting the points where decisions 
affecting the high-risk events occur and promoting an orderly discussion of the hazards.  The 
primary output of the exercise was to recommend that a new step (Figure 37, step 3B) be 
inserted in the planning process to evaluate geo-mechanical issues in the Long Term Planning 
process (LTP).  In addition, points of failure in the execution of the existing process steps were 
examined and, when the impact of failure was an increased risk of the subject event occurring, 
solutions and means of monitoring for compliance were developed as potential new controls.   
 
 
                                                 
8 Hot works = welding, cutting, grinding, etc. 
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Output
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• Assay
• Ore body structures
Output
3D image of the ore body
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Figure 37 – A flow chart of the basic stope proposal and mine planning process. 
 
5.10.3.4 - Step 4, Identify New Prevention Controls and Recovery Measures 
 
Potential Unwanted Event 1 - Equipment fire in intake airway with persons in the stope at the 
face:  After considering these existing controls the team identified additional steps to both 
prevent a fire from occurring and increase the likelihood that miners in the captive stopes will 
survive.  These additional controls suggested by the team are identified in the following list 
(Table 53), again as either general or equipment-specific precautions.   
 
 
Table 53 - New prevention control and recovery measure ideas for the equipment fire in the 
intake drift event. 
NI1 Document the locomotive, haul truck and mucker hose specification (four-braid) and 
locations standards so they continue to be applied consistently (P) 
NI2 Check to ensure that that the improvements on hose routing on all mobile equipment and 
other modifications resulting from found damage are gathered to apply to other equipment 
when they are maintained (P) 
NI3 Add a final inspection by maintenance after preventative or other maintenance to ensure 
engine / brake area is clear of debris (P) 
NI4 Consider the use of a heat gun to check the operating temperature of the brakes (P) 
NI5 Document the locomotive, haul truck and mucker fuel hose specifications (hard and soft) 
and locations standards so they continue to be applied (P) 
NI6 Check to make sure the positive lead is protected with a fuse and master switch (P) 
NI7 Document the locomotive, haul truck and mucker electrical cable / wire specifications and 
locations standards so they continue to be applied (P) 
NI8 Ensure that work done on under 25V, and related training, does not compromise fire 
exposure (P) 
NI9 Add a final inspection by maintenance after preventative or other maintenance to ensure 
engine / brake area is clear of debris (P) 
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NI10 Check Diesel Particulate Matter (DPM) filters to clearly identify design and maintenance 
requirements (P) 
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NI11 A hot work system should be set up at the mine (P) 
NI12 Review the welding / cutting SOP at other mines and apply to this mine (audit current 
situation versus new SOP) (P) 
NI13 Define the required welding competency and train / “ticket” welders / cutters (PST) 
NI14 Make sure all persons have been appropriately fire trained (PST) 
NI15 Test whether the refuges can be found in a smoky situation and consider ideas such as 
lanyards and lasers to help miners find the refuge (note that muck bays may be 
inadvertently accessed too) (PST) 
NI16 Put CO shut off, PED shut off, or an E stop in the stope to shut down the section ventilation 
fan in a fire situation (WD) 
NI17 Investigate automation of surface compressor supply to underground should underground 
compressor fail or be compromised (MH) 
NI18 Investigate ways to effectively barricade in the stope (PST) 
NI19 Investigate ways to supply more air into the stope (MH) 
NI20 Investigate a second top egress to improve survivability if fire traps people in the stope 
(MH) 
NI21 Add the use of stope water supply for fire events as a part of training for dealing with a fire 
if trapped in the stope to Emergency Training (PST) 
NI22 Make sure inspection checks are done on locomotives as well as rubber tired equipment (P) 
NI23 Reinforce the need to review the risks related to underground fuel bays located in intakes 
entries (PST) 
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NI24 Check to ensure that there is automatic fire suppression on all locomotives (P) 
NI25 Investigate the application of Wiggins fuelling hardware in underground fuelling locations 
(MH) 
NI26 Reinforce the need to shut down muckers when the operator is not on the machine (P) 
NI27 Investigate the ability to isolate a vehicle fire in the lateral footwall area (MH) 
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NI28 Vehicle operators in the lateral footwall / stope access area should be made familiar with 
the refuge location and related actions required during a fire (where to go to barricade) 
(PST) 
NI – New Ideas 
EH – Eliminate Hazard 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
 
It is worth noting that most of the 25 new control measures are either directed to improve 
response to a fire to mitigate consequences or they increase the likelihood that existing good 
practices are followed uniformly through more rigorous audit systems and documenting of 
practices.  Five of the new controls concern improving the ability of miners to secure refuge 
from smoke and maintain a reliable supply of emergency air.  While the mine has refuge 
chambers and well-developed emergency plans, this exercise was the first detailed examination 
by the miners as to how they would secure a refuge from smoke should they find themselves 
trapped within the stope.  Part of this detailed examination was a hard look at the vulnerability of 
the existing measures to damage from the event and formulation of a “plan B.”  The value of the 
process was achieved by having the miners mentally work through what steps they could take to 
react to problems.  Innovative solutions were suggested and the gaps in protections needing 
further effort by mine staff were identified. 
 
Also of note is the relative rank of the controls with regard to the typical hierarchy.  Existing 
controls are a mix of engineering, 41%, administrative, 57% and monitoring, 2%, with none 
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directed at eliminating the hazard of combustible fuel and oils due to the mining method’s 
dependence on diesel equipment.  In the new controls the mix is engineering, 24%, 
administrative, 52%, and monitoring, 24%.  One new response control is directed at eliminating 
the primary hazard of a single egress from the stope by suggesting a second egress out the top of 
the stope to an independent airway. 
 
Potential Unwanted Events 2, 3 and 4 – Major ground failure due to inadequate mine design 
with crew working in the stope trapped or fatally injured:  The left-half of the BTA was 
performed, concentrating on modifications to the mine planning and design process to prevent an 
occurrence of a major ground failure.  The consequences side of these high-hazard events was 
not examined due to time constraints and the low likelihood that response actions would alter the 
outcome of these rapidly developing catastrophic events.  Twenty-four new prevention controls 
were identified (Table 54) that spanned the four distinct planning phases identified in Figure 37.   
 
Table 54 - New prevention control ideas for stope design and mine planning. 
NI29 Make Long Range Planning (LRP) more systems oriented, i.e. ventilation, utilities, mine 
method, service life, egress, etc. (MH) 
NI30 Purchase additional survey equipment (P) 
NI31 Audit that survey is being done (P) 
1 – Improving 
Mine Planning  
Footwall 
Lateral 
Locations NI32 Communicate that job isn't done until surveyed (P) 
NI33 Draft formal policy with exception requirements (P) 
NI34 Support concept that more development and probing provides more information and 
flexibility to this stage and increases chance of success (P) 
NI35 Receive timely Vulcan input in order for geologists to see changes in 3D model (P) 
NI36 Cross-train and temp hire for high logging demand periods (PST) 
NI37 Log info at hole when drilling bad ground (P) 
NI38 Increase amount of information collected from directional drill core near ore zone (P) 
2 – Definition 
by Diamond 
Drilling (DD) 
 
NI39 Audit that layout design is followed (P) 
NI40 Improve retention of technical expertise including mine site experience (P) 
NI41 Investigate use of survey-based volume reconciliation (P) 
3a – Geo 
Modeling  
 NI42 Continue focus on reconciliation process between face and mill (P) 
NI43 Ground stress considerations need to be incorporated into long range and life of mine 
planning as well as stope proposal (P) 
NI44 Investigate and apply methods that gather useful ground stress information during mining 
for mapping (P) 
NI45 Gather stress info from instrumentation and map to aid planning (P) 
3b – Stress 
Control 
Planning (new 
in the model)  
 
NI46 Look at other similar mining operations re: overall ground stress potentials (P) 
NI47 Consider stope proposal and face mine planning system at other operations to help 
develop their approach (P) 
NI48 Mentor new miners after stope school by placing with experienced miners in stope to learn 
plan (PST) 
NI49 Develop a standard that requires mining to minimum width to ore before widening for 
raise access (P) 
NI50 Establish expert captive stope prep and development crew (PST) 
NI51 Use 3D design images to introduce production people to the new mine method and area 
(PST) 
NI52 Use input from production to walk through 3D info and develop final plan with detail by 
step of mining process (P) 
4 – Stope 
Proposal 
Development  
 
NI53 Reinforce importance of scheduling services and equipment (P) 
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The 24 newly identified controls are made up of administrative, 64%, engineering ,24%, and 
monitoring, 12%.  The newly added step in the planning process emphasizes engineering 
controls.  The end product of the proposed changes would be to put in place a mechanism to 
remove the potential for exposure to the high-risk hazards. 
 
5.10.3.5 - Step 5, Discuss Implementation, Monitoring and Auditing Issues 
 
The overall acceptance and understanding of the risk assessment process by the teams at this 
mine was very good.  The teams selected were energetic and knowledgeable in the subjects.  
Communication between team members during the process was thorough and members actively 
challenged each other’s paradigms.  All of these factors had a positive effect on the outcome of 
the process which developed a large number of suggestions for improvement embraced by 
management.   
 
One issue encountered was the amount of time necessary to educate team members on the 
process.  In this group, none had any exposure to formal risk management practices.  As a result 
a half-day was required to train the team members.  As risk management is applied to more areas 
of the mine operations, a significant training burden will occur. 
 
A second issue encountered was the tendency of the team to try to solve every issue that arose 
rather than identify issues and move on.  A skilled facilitator was required to keep the team on 
task.  The facilitator was also challenged with recognizing team members who had difficulty 
expressing their thoughts and assisting them in better describing their ideas for consideration by 
the team.   Without a skilled facilitator the productivity of the exercises would have been 
severely limited. 
 
Perhaps the greatest issue was the tendency of the team to seek out procedures (P) and personnel 
skills and training (PST) or low level engineering controls rather than beginning with controls 
that could eliminate the hazard (Figure 38).  In this respect the outcomes of these exercises may 
not be true Best Practices but the product of a cultural acceptance of relatively high levels of risk.  
The facilitator expressed that he intruded further into the process than he normally would in 
attempts to move the group up the hierarchy of control.  A commonly repeated phrase “that’s just 
part of mining” was not challenged by the question “why does it have to be?” from the group.  In 
this aspect of risk management it may take some time before the industry learns the relative 
importance of the hierarchy of control. 
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Figure 38 - Distribution of prevention controls and recovery measures for the captive cut-and-
fill change of mining method risk assessment. 
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6.0 – Lessons Leaned 
 
In general, the ten case studies showed that the MHRA process provided information considered 
beneficial for a safer work environment.  The MHRA process can be used to enhance the safety 
requirements that exist in current regulations or standard operating procedures.  This report is not 
intended to be nor should it be misconstrued as advocating more stringent regulations.  It does 
demonstrate that portions of the mining industry are capable of utilizing the MHRA process and 
could benefit from its application. 
 
The ten case study examples provide insight as to how the MHRA approach might be used to 
mitigate the risk from major hazards in US underground mines.  Significant threats were 
identified as well as an inventory of existing controls and recovery measures specific to each 
threat.  Generally new ideas were presented in the form of an action plan (Appendix B) or a risk 
register (Appendix C) for management consideration.  All this was accomplished in a structured, 
group-oriented activity designed to produce a written report.  
 
6.1 - The Scoping Document 
 
The risk design or scoping document needs to identify an issue of great importance to the mine.  
These issues were often referred to by the mining personnel as “issues that keep me up at night.”  
As this comment indicates, the risk assessment team should be aware that a frank and open 
discussion of the hazards is necessary.  In the 10 case studies, significant issues were identified 
and analyzed.  However, in one case study (Mine A) the risk assessment team did not feel 
empowered to address the hazard identified in the scoping document.  At case study Mine C, the 
risk assessment team did not see a compelling need to address the spontaneous combustion threat 
more than had already occurred at the mine.  It is possible that both these issues could have been 
addressed if the management of the mining operations had clearly identified the hazards under 
consideration as major threats and communicated its desire to the risk assessment team to find 
ways to lower the risks associated with these hazards. 
 
6.2 - The Risk Assessment Team 
 
The mines selected their own personnel to participate in their respective MHRA.  The makeup 
and size of each mine’s MHRA team was based upon the type and size of the risk assessment 
topic as shown in Table 12.  Some teams were quite large as in the case of Mines J and D and 
some teams were relatively small as in the case of Mine B.  The risk assessment team needed the 
following important characteristics to function effectively: knowledge, diversity, a skilled 
facilitator, outside experts, training and time.  
 
Knowledge - The case studies demonstrated the need for the risk assessment team to contain key 
mining operation personnel knowledgeable of the hazard under consideration and familiar with 
all aspects of the operation.  This knowledge should go beyond current regulations and mine 
practices and should focus on comprehending the root cause of hazards.  Innovative solutions 
depend on this level of knowledge. 
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Diversity - The diversity of the risk assessment team increased its breath of knowledge and 
operational perspective.  In some cases, the miner familiar with the work process under 
discussion had a unique perspective that was not always apparent to the professional or 
management team members.  Case study Mines G, H, I and J were observed to have excellent 
diversity which may have helped the team identify such extensive lists of controls. 
 
A Skilled Facilitator - The facilitator must be well-trained and skilled in the MHRA process.  
The facilitator is required to always know where the risk assessment team is heading and keeping 
it on task, and must also deal with dominant personalities and make sure that all voices are heard.  
It is important for the risk assessment team to have knowledge of the hierarchy of controls 
concept.  It is the facilitator’s responsibility to make sure the team has this knowledge. 
 
Outside Experts - The risk assessment team should contain outside experts that have expertise 
beyond that contained at the mine site concerning the hazard under consideration.  Typically 
outside experts are external to the normal decision-making group at the mining operation.  They 
can consist of technical representatives from manufacturers, consultants familiar with the mining 
operation, or content experts from academia and government. 
 
Training - The risk assessment team must have a working knowledge of risk assessment tools 
and techniques.  This can be accomplished prior to or during the actual risk assessment.  
However, time used for training should not limit the time needed to conduct the MHRA. 
 
Time - The risk assessment team must have sufficient time to adequately address its tasks.  Case 
study Mines A and C did not have sufficient time to adequately perform the MHRA exercise.  
Part of this was due to the need to provide the risk assessment team members with some 
fundamental training in the basic concepts of risk management. 
 
6.3 – Important Risk Assessment Tools and Techniques 
 
Risk assessment tools and techniques were used during several steps in the MHRA exercise.  
During Step 1, when the major potential hazards were being identified and characterized, flow 
charts were often used.  These flow charts were especially useful in dissecting work processes.  
In other cases, when examining operational issues covering the mine site, it was necessary to 
segment the mine in a logical manner. 
 
During Step 2 of the MHRA exercise, when risks were ranked, the WRAC and PHA were used.  
If the consequences of a potential unwanted event are high, it may not be necessary to risk rank 
the potential unwanted events using a WRAC or PHA.  Regardless of the method used, it was 
critical for the risk assessment team to develop a complete list of potential unwanted events 
associated with the major hazard under consideration and determine which deserved the effort of 
an MHRA. 
 
After the risk ranking process, the team focused on determining important existing prevention 
controls and recovery measures (Step 3) and identifying new prevention controls and recovery 
measures (Step 4).  In all case studies with the exception of Mine B, a BTA was used.  A BTA 
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was required for each potential threat.  The BTA was the most used risk assessment technique 
during this pilot project. 
 
6.4 - The Risk Assessment Team Outputs (Identified Controls) 
 
The main output of the risk assessment team is the existing and new prevention controls and 
recovery measures that lower the risk associated with the hazards under consideration.  In total, 
451 controls were listed during the ten case studies.  The minimum was 1 (Mine B) and 
maximum was 103 (Mine I).  There is no correlation between the number of controls and the 
success of the MHRA.  At Mine B, one new idea was identified and it eliminated the hazard.  No 
other controls were needed.  In general, procedure (P) controls (44% of total) were used the most 
by the 10 risk assessment teams and hazard elimination (EH) the least (less than 1% of the total 
controls) (Figure 39).  The other control categories ranged from 19% for minimize hazards (MH) 
to 9% for warning devices (WD). 
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Figure 39 - Percentage of the total controls by category. 
 
The MHRA process requires that hazard elimination be considered as a primary means to reduce 
risks.  In practice, it is often difficult for the risk assessment teams to discuss whether to accept 
or eliminate the hazard under consideration.  This may be partly caused by the team’s lack of 
participants responsible for making these kinds of decisions or partly due to the perceived 
MHRA objectives.  Once a mine is operational, hazard elimination becomes more difficult and is 
best considered when management specifically requests it and this request is included in the 
scoping document.  A total of three new ideas from three different case studies were classified as 
hazards elimination.  Therefore, seven of the case studies did not consider hazards elimination as 
a potential control. 
 
MHRA controls rely extensively on the use of regulated standards and company Best Practices.  
In some cases it was difficult to determine if the risk assessment teams were aware of the 
differences between existing practices and Best Practice.  Outside experts were helpful in 
identifying controls, barriers or work processes that represented leading industry practices. 
 
6.5 – Documentation 
 
A written document is critical to the MHRA process and, at a minimum, should contain 1) a list 
of existing prevention controls and recovery measures that can be monitored and audited, and 2) 
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a lists of new ideas for further consideration by management.  Management must assign persons 
to be accountable for existing and newly adopted controls and respond to the team with the 
reasons for their actions, especially if the assigned persons decide not to act on any 
recommendation.  It is not known if the existing controls were being monitored or audited at the 
case study mines or if the new ideas were evaluated by management.  There was one occasion 
when management, after reviewing the list of new ideas, asked the risk assessment team to rank 
their new ideas.  The team did not feel that it had enough data or enough time to adequately 
accomplish this task.  There is also a possibility that a consensus would have been difficult to 
achieve. 
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7.0 – Success of Risk Assessment Case Studies 
 
A number of key points were recognized from the ten case studies.  These key points help to 
define the degree of success each case study realized in performing an MHRA and provided an 
opportunity to understand its strength and weaknesses.  To help evaluate the degree of success, 
the MHRA case study exercises were divided into six categories.  Each category represents an 
important aspect of the MHRA exercises.  The NIOSH observers compiled information on each 
case study and made a determination as to how each performed.  The six categories are: existing 
risk management culture, risk assessment design, risk assessment team, risk assessment process, 
quantity of existing controls, and quality of new ideas.  For each of the ten case studies, the 
demonstrated degree of success was defined in a relative sense as more-than-adequate, adequate, 
or less-than-adequate (Table 55).  This evaluation was based on an analysis of the risk 
assessments team performance and the quality and character of the identified and proposed 
controls.  Three of the ten case studies are rated as performing a more-than-adequate risk 
assessment, five as adequate, and two as less-than-adequate.  A method for self-assessment of 
mining operations risk management culture is provided in Appendix D. 
 
Table 55 - An assessment of the adequacy / success of the ten MHRA case studies. 
Case 
study 
mine 
Existing risk 
management 
culture 
Risk 
assessment 
design 
Risk 
assessment 
team 
Risk 
assessment 
process 
Extent of 
existing 
controls 
Quality 
of new 
ideas 
Overall 
Mine A L L A NA NA NA L 
Mine B L A M NA NA M A 
Mine C L A A L L L L 
Mine D  A A A A A A A 
Mine E L A A A M A A 
Mine F L A M A A A A 
Mine G A A A A M A A 
Mine H A A M M M M M 
Mine I A A M M M M M 
Mine J  M A M M M M M 
A – Adequate 
M – More-than-adequate 
L – Less-than-adequate 
NA – Not available or did not occur 
 
7.1 – Existing Risk Management Culture 
 
The existing risk management culture of a mining operation impacts the potential for a 
successful MHRA.  One way to measure the suitability of an operational culture for MHRA is to 
identify the degree to which risk assessment techniques have been previously embraced by the 
mine.  Risk assessment techniques are discussed in Section 3.1 and can be summarized in the 
order of increasing complexity as 1) informal, 2) basic-formal, and 3) high-level formal.   
 
Informal risk assessment techniques, i.e. multiple step approaches where workers are 
asked to look for hazards, determine the significance of the hazard, and take some action 
to mitigate the risk.  Examples include SLAM, Take-Two for Safety, etc.  At the case 
study mines, informal risk assessment techniques were already in use at some mines and 
not evident at others. 
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Basic-formal risk assessment techniques, such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
and Job Safety Analysis (JSA), establish official procedures and practices for important 
work practices at the mining operation. 
 
High-level formal risk assessment techniques are structured approaches that incorporate 
risk analysis tools, such as the HAZOP, FTA, etc., and produce a document that assesses 
risks.  Several mines indicated that these techniques may have been used by the company 
in the past.  Most of the case study mines were not using high-level formal risk 
assessment techniques. 
 
It is assumed that mines already using informal and basic-formal risk assessment techniques 
appeared to be in a better position to successfully undertake an MHRA.  Undertaking an MHRA 
could represent a significant change in the way the organization functions.  Therefore, it may be 
more appropriate for mining operations to first begin to implement informal or basic-formal risk 
assessments before attempting an MHRA.  Most case study operations had indicated some use of 
basic-formal risk assessments techniques in the past, but the quality of these applications was 
difficult to determine.  One clue to recognizing an operation’s reliance on these tools was to 
determine if there was an SOP that defined how other SOPs would be developed, recorded and 
managed.  One case study operation had such an SOP.  Of the ten case study mines, five were 
observed to have either an adequate or more-than-adequate risk assessment operation culture.  
The other five were assessed as less-than-adequate in that no risk assessment techniques were 
evident. 
 
7.2 – Risk Assessment Design 
 
The risk assessment design was best executed when the mining operation representatives took 
MHRA training and prior to the actual MHRA exercise.  If training was not possible, extra effort 
was placed on making sure that as many persons as possible had an opportunity to comment on 
the risk assessment design document prior to the actual MHRA.  The key here is feedback.  
Remember, the hazard the risk assessment design addresses should be of great importance to the 
mining organization.  The phase “this is the issue that keeps us up at night” was often used by 
participants to describe the hazard under consideration by the MHRA.  
  
In all but one of the case studies, the risk assessment design was considered adequate.  The case 
study classified as having a less-than-adequate risk assessment design was based on the need to 
change the design once the MHRA began.   
 
7.3 – Risk Assessment Team 
 
Team selection is a critical component of a successful MHRA.  Members of a risk assessment 
team should be picked carefully, making sure that they are 1) knowledgeable about the hazards 
under consideration, 2) not overly committed to a particular way of business or work process, 
and (3) able to express their opinions within a group setting and in the presence of supervisors.  
All of case study risk assessments were staffed with members that fit these characteristics.  
However, because most teams struggled with hazards elimination as a potential control, these 
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teams might have benefited from additional persons with the authority and responsibility to 
address the significant issues associated with hazard elimination.   
 
Diversity is an important aspect of a successful risk assessment team.  Solutions to major hazards 
can come from persons at all levels within a mining operation.  This is why labor should be 
represented as equal participants within the risk assessment team.  Both management and labor 
representatives should be 1) knowledgeable about the hazard under consideration, and 2) familiar 
with the associated work processes.  Team members from labor were usually active in group 
discussions and very aware of work process details that only come from actually performing the 
tasks.  In several of the case studies, members of the general workforce were key components of 
the risk assessment team.  They also can help to communicate the findings of the MHRA to the 
general workforce.  This was observed to be a powerful tool for implementing the outcomes of 
the MHRA. 
 
Another desired aspect of a risk assessment team is the use of outside experts, i.e. outside the 
mining operation.  These experts should have special knowledge about the major hazard under 
consideration that is not currently available on the company’s team.  This expertise can come 
from government, academia, manufacturing or consulting agents.  These outside experts will 
help to eliminate attitudes like, “this is the way we have always done it.”  Five of the risk 
assessment teams were viewed as more-than-adequate because they used outside experts on their 
team. 
 
Lastly, training is essential for the risk assessment team members.  This can be accomplished 
prior to the MHRA or it can occur during the MHRA.  In fact, every MHRA exercise 
incorporated training.  This must be factored into time needed to complete the MHRA. 
 
7.4 - The Risk Assessment Process 
 
When designing an MHRA, it is important to recognize that the team has flexibility in deviating 
from the general structure.  Very few of the case studies followed every step in the MHRA 
process (see Section 4.0 for more details).  In several cases, the consequence of the event was 
viewed as significant and no further discussions of event likelihood were warranted (Mines F, H 
and I).  In one case, a thoughtful discussion of an existing work process revealed that a relatively 
simple change to the process effectively eliminated the hazard (Mine B).  This MHRA reached 
its objective during the first step in its process.  In another case, the risk assessment process 
could not be adequately addressed because the risk assessment design had been altered and there 
was insufficient time to complete the MHRA (Mine A).  In a third case, the one classified as 
less-than-adequate (Table 55), the risk assessment process was abandoned by the risk assessment 
team (Mine C).  Of course, flexibility within the procedure has the potential to produce a wide 
range of responses.  Deviation from a formal risk assessment plan should be under the guidance 
of a skilled facilitator without a stake in the outcome of the process. 
 
7.5 – The Extent of Existing Controls 
 
An MHRA is undertaken when a mining operation seeks to move beyond simply reacting to 
standards and regulations and desires to develop a more proactive approach to dealing with its 
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major hazards.  The extent of the controls for a particular hazard can be viewed as a measure of 
the successful application of an MHRA.  If the list of controls mirrors that which is required by 
standards or regulations, then the outcome of the MHRA should be considered less-than-
adequate.  The list of controls is defined in two ways: those prevention controls and recovery 
measures currently in place within the mining operation, and the new ideas that help to further 
mitigate the risks associated with the hazards.  The existing controls are the subject of this 
section, while the new controls are covered in Section 7.6.   
 
The extent of existing prevention controls and recovery measures for the ten case study mines 
varied widely.  Two case studies did not sufficiently analyze to determine their adequacy.  One 
case study was viewed as less-than-adequate from a risk management perspective since the 
existing controls were completely defined by those required by MSHA regulations.  The other 
seven case studies had either adequate or more-than-adequate existing prevention controls and 
recovery measures.  The more-than-adequate classification was defined by the depth and breath 
of the controls listed by the risk assessment team.   
 
7.6 – The Quality of New Ideas 
 
One of the most important outputs from an MHRA is the new ideas generated by the team to 
further mitigate the risk associated with the major hazard under consideration.  A risk assessment 
team should always be expected to produce additional prevention controls and recovery 
measures beyond the existing mandated standards.  That is the main purpose for conducting the 
MHRA.  Failure to produce such results indicates problems with the team composition or the 
scope of the task.  When a team does not search for new ideas, it will fail to suggest actions that 
will lower risks.  Two case studies were unable to produce new ideas – one because it was 
unable to complete the risk assessment process; the other because it did not feel a need.  The 
other eight case studies produced new ideas that seemed to have merit and deserved to be 
investigated further by the mining operation. 
 
Distinguishing between an adequate versus more-than-adequate quality of new ideas was 
accomplished by an assessment of their quantity and character.  One way to assess the character 
of new ideas is to determine their place in the hierarchy of the control (Section 4.4).  The most 
effective controls eliminate or minimize the hazards.  Mine B produced one new idea during the 
initial discussion period that effectively eliminated the hazard.  This is without question the most 
effective form of control.  Next, physical barriers are used to separate the worker from the 
hazard.  Less effective controls rely on warning devices requiring manual response and 
administrative procedures.  The least effective controls rely on personnel skills and training that 
contain many opportunities for human error.  The most successful controls emphasize hazard 
elimination, as was the case for Mine B.  An effective MHRA contains a balanced collection of 
controls.  The case studies listed as more-than-adequate (Mines H, I and J) had this balance, 
while those viewed as adequate relied more on the less effective hierarchy controls. 
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8.0 – Future Use of the MHRA Process in Mining 
 
In this report, an MHRA methodology was investigated through a NIOSH pilot project that 
conducted field trials at ten case study mines.  The tools and techniques used in the Australian 
Minerals Industry to conduct an MHRA were reviewed and summarized.  Detailed information 
from the ten case study mines was reported and analyzed.  The lessons learned from the case 
study were examined and the relative success of the MHRA process for mitigating risks was 
determined. 
 
While this concept is relatively new to the US mining community, it is not new to other US 
industries with major hazards, i.e., nuclear, petrochemical, aerospace, etc. – nor is it new to many 
other major mining countries where legislation mandates that sound risk management principles 
be utilized.  Certainly considerable national and international expertise exists today to help those 
that are interested in becoming more proactive in dealing with their major hazards.  These efforts 
could be strengthened with an accepted framework for conducting an MHRA and facilitated with 
appropriate training and instructional guidelines and resources.    
 
All mines have the potential for major hazards that can fatally injure miners and threaten the 
well-being of the mining operations.  It therefore seems prudent for all mines to consider MHRA 
as a means to proactively address safety threats to their mining operations.  This is seen as a 
means of going beyond merely complying with existing mining regulations, by systematically 
examining hazards capable of producing significant consequences.  MHRA is also needed where 
a significant change is planned to equipment, machinery, procedures, or manner of working. 
 
Mine management needs to lead the planning, organizing, controlling and motivating efforts in 
support of the MHRA approach.  Management must understand that an MHRA can produce a 
design recommendation but should not attempt to produce the actual engineering design.  In 
most cases, the teams did not have the right make-up for engineering design work.  Suppliers of 
goods and services and regulatory agencies are also an important partner and can assist in the 
risk assessment team.  Labor should be given the opportunity to participate in the process and 
take an active role in implementing change.  One means of evaluating if an organization and its 
management are ready for the MHRA process is through a self-assessment of its current 
management practices.  Appendix D provides a means for an organization to identify how it 
addresses risk and hazards in a qualitative format.  MHRA is best applied in organizations that 
have moved beyond reactive management of hazards and have mastered basic-formal risk 
assessment processes. 
 
An MHRA can be very effective if used early in a project’s life cycle, when systems and work 
processes are being designed, and should be considered in conjunction with other risk assessment 
activities, i.e. financial, environmental, etc.  Treating a hazard early in the life cycle, when 
systems are being designed and equipment specified, can be done more efficiently and 
effectively than later in the cycle, when most work processes revolve around maintaining 
existing designs. 
 
It is critical that the risk assessment be designed to exploit the strengths of the MHRA approach 
and to avoid its weaknesses.  The strengths of the MHRA approach are its ability to  
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1. set clear direction to solve specific high-risk problems, 
2. focus on priority concerns, 
3. get involvement and commitment from a wide cross-section of the mine’s work force, 
4. decrease potential losses for a mining operations, 
5. help to build teams to solve major mining issues, 
6. go beyond merely complying with existing mining standards and regulations, and 
7. focus upper management attention on issues existing at the operational level (this is 
where the written documentation can be very helpful). 
 
The weaknesses or threats of the MHRA approach are its need to 
1. focus on changes within the existing way the mine conducts business, 
2. take time away from activities directly related to production, 
3. put additional time constraints on a mining operation’s “best people,” 
4. introduce the cost of implementing new prevention controls and recovery measures,  
5. potentially alter a mining operation’s priorities, 
6. need for there to be an existing risk management structure to build upon, and  
7. need for an openness in management / labor communications. 
 
In general, the ten case studies demonstrate that most US mines have the capability to 
successfully implement an MHRA and that the MHRA methodology produced additional 
prevention controls and recovery measures to lessen the risk associated with a select population 
of major mining hazards.  The basic ingredient for a successful MHRA is the desire to become 
more proactive in dealing with the risks associated with events that can cause multiple fatalities.  
If a mining operation does not commit sufficient time or is not willing to utilize its most 
experienced personnel to this effort, it is unlikely to produce a successful outcome.  A successful 
outcome is marked by a thorough examination of existing prevention controls and recovery 
measures and the generation of new ideas to further mitigate the risks associated with the major 
hazards under consideration.  It is also essential for a mining operation to be receptive to a 
written report that discusses key existing controls and identifies who will investigate the risk 
assessment team’s list of new ideas. 
 
All mines arguably have major hazards with the potential to produce multiple fatality events.  
The ten case studies demonstrate that most mines currently go beyond the minimum 
requirements for mitigating the risks associated with major hazards.  When pressed to consider 
more controls to further mitigate the risk, a well-staffed risk assessment team was able to identify 
additional controls.  For these mining operations, it was important to add additional controls, 
even if they were not required by existing mining regulations, to lower the risks associated with 
the major hazards under consideration.  These operations realize that the negative consequences 
associated with these potential unwanted events require additional actions and that current 
regulations do not totally protect their miners from all the specialized site-specific hazards 
shaped by local characteristics.  The MHRA methodology represents a structured approach that 
helps mining operations develop additional controls aimed at mitigating the risk associated with 
their most significant hazards. 
 
While all mines have major hazards, not all mines are prepared to utilize an MHRA.  If a mining 
operation is not willing to commit its best people to an MHRA or will not provide them with 
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sufficient time to see the process through to its conclusion, the MHRA output may prove to be 
useless.  Additionally, if a mining operation is not prepared to discuss its major hazards in an 
open and honest fashion and to present the findings of the risk assessment in a written report, the 
MHRA output will be unclear, and attempts to monitor or audit important controls may not be 
possible. 
 
An MHRA can be most effective when the mining operation possesses 1) a proper understanding 
of its hazards, 2) experience with informal and basic-formal risk assessment techniques, 3) 
proper facilities, machinery and equipment, 4) suitable systems and procedures that represent 
industry Best Practice, 5) appropriate organizational support with adequate staff, 
communications and training, 6) a formal and thorough plan for emergency response, and 7) a 
safety risk management approach that is promoted and supported at all levels of the organization. 
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APPENDIX A – Example of a Bow Tie Analysis (BTA). 
 
In the paper, parts of a BTA were often provided to demonstrate the application of this risk 
analysis technique.  Table 56 and Table 57 are exhibits of a fully completed BTA. 
 
Table 56 - Left side BTA for Mine I. 
Causes Prevention Control Measures 
Top Event  = Fire on Locomotive or mantrip 
PC1 Maintenance, weekly checks of loco (general inspection) [P] 
PC2 Pre-operation check by operator (brakes, trams, etc.) [P] 
PC3 Operator is experienced enough to recognize abnormal operation [PST] 
PC4 Locomotives have fuses and breakers [MH] 
PC5 Some cables are protected in conduits [PB] 
PC6 Operators training [PST] 
PC7 Radio communication is available to get assistance/advice, re abnormal operations [PST] 
PC8 Abnormal operation is reported to supervisor and maintenance shop [P] 
PC9 Locomotive designed to standard [MH] 
PC10 State electrical inspector inspects any loco that has had major rebuild [P] 
1 - Short circuit 
PC11 Mine personnel inspect new equipment and rebuild before it is used [P] 
PC12 Maintenance batter is cleaned, watered, checked for dead cells as part of a battery 
maintenance program (contractors and others) [P] 
PC13 Supervisors know motor operator and they select competent operators for heavy/difficult 
loads [PST] 
PC14 Pre-operation check by operator – battery OK (water levels, clean, etc.) [P] 
PC15 Operator is experienced enough to recognize abnormal operations (low power) [PST] 
PC16 Battery is charged when trolley wires and gage indicate charge level [WD] 
NI1 Reinforce and follow the requirements of the maintenance program or batteries, consider 
checklists/verification procedure that it is being followed [P] 
NI2 Investigate defining a specific percentage battery charge that is minimum to enter panel 
[P] 
NI3 Add checking gage accuracy in the battery maintenance program [WD] 
2 – Overheated 
battery (water, 
load, charge) 
NI4 Investigate whether there is an identifiable level of complexity/experience for major loads, 
thereby a list of heavy load operators [P] 
PC17 Maintenance battery is cleaned, watered, checked for dead cells as part of a battery 
maintenance program (contractors and others) [P] 
PC18 Pre-operation check by operator – battery OK/ obvious damage [P] 
PC19 Safe Work Instruction and Best Practice Teams sometimes observe pre-op inspections on 
Locomotives [P] 
PC20 Operator is trained to open breakers (2) and take plugs off batteries if there is a short.  If 
that doesn’t work, main lead is disconnected [P] 
PC21 Battery rebuilds are done to mine specification [P] 
As above:  see PC4 and PC9 
3 – Battery short 
circuit 
NI5 Reinforce the need to remove any baking soda that has been used to absorb water or 
batteries so that it doesn’t become a conductor (during pre-operation inspection) [P] 
PC22 Resistors are designed to standards and government inspected [MH] 
PC23 Additional fans installed on some locomotives to provide additional cooling [MH] 
PC24 Operator is aware of hot resistors because braking will be reduced and other locomotive is 
then used to brake [PST] 
PC25 Operator stops machinery and lets resistors cool if overheated (breaking reduced) [PST] 
PC26 Resistors are closed in so trash in area is unlikely [MH] 
4 – Resistor 
overheating and 
trash on loco hot 
spots burns 
NI6 Add checking inside the resistor area (lift lid) for any combustibles to pre-operation 
inspection (NOTE that dust can get into resistor compartment) [P] 
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NI7 Investigate changing or modifying resistors to perform under load without overheating 
[MH] 
PC27 Design to standard/inspected [MH] 
PC28 Pro-operation test brakes before operating equipment [P] 
PC29 Maintenance – brakes are fixed as required [P] 
PC30 Normal braking is electrical so overheating of other brake is unlikely [MH] 
PC31 Operator smells brake heat if park brake left on [PST] 
5 - Brake lockup, 
left on or applied 
due to bleed off, 
causing failure and 
brake fluid/grease 
fire (mantrip) PC32 There is a red light to indicate brakes are on [WD] 
PC33 Loads are about 10 ft from locomotive heat sources (hydraulic oil/wood equal fuels) [PB] 6 - Fire occurs with 
explosive/oil on 
locomotive 
PC34 Any explosives are transported in specialized container and hauled separately [PB] 
Top Event  = Fire with High-Voltage System 
PC35 Rail maintenance program where each shift is given an area of track to install and maintain 
(to standards for track installation) [P] 
PC36 There is a pre-shift examination by the mine examiner [P] 
PC37 Locomotive operators report any track issues to supervisor [P] 
PC38 Load guidelines are applied at the mine to avoid oversized/shifting loads that might derail 
the locomotive [P] 
PC39 HV shielded cable, located in rib/roof corner reduces likelihood of damage, there is also 
some guarding [PB] 
PC40 HV circuit breakers/GFCI/pilot circuits protect system from overload/fault/fires and are 
tested and recorded on a monthly basis [MH] 
PC41 HV hung to regulatory requirements [P] 
1 - HV line hit by 
derail/impact form 
load 
PC42 Examiner inspects the area including HV [P] 
Top Event  = Fire due to welding/cutting 
PC43 Each shift is responsible for cleaning up trash in an area [P] 
PC44 Trash is bagged and put on empty car [P] 
1 - Trash/loose coal 
in area ignited by 
welding/cutting PC45 Locomotive operators pick up trash on outby areas around tracks [P] 
PC46 Mine has strict procedures for cutting and welding underground [P] 
PC47 Qualified person must be present to make CH4 checks including checking area before they 
leave [P] 
PC48 Fire protection and rock dust is included in the procedure [P] 
2 - Damaged/faulty 
torches or hoses 
lead to fire 
(practices) 
PC49 Where possible a water line (charged) is also taken to the area [P] 
3 - CH4 blowers 
ignited by 
welding/cutting 
As above: see PC49 about qualified person and CH4 monitoring 
Top Event  = Fire on rock duster battery car 
PC50 Rock dusters are designed to standard and inspected before underground use [MH] 
PC51 Dedicated crew takes care of charging and inspecting equipment, including operator being 
in the area during operation [P] 
1 - Rock duster 
battery packs 
battery shorts/faults 
PC52 There is a weekly electrical check of the stone dusting equipment by maintenance [P] 
PC53 Compressors are designed to standard and inspected before underground use [MH] 
PC54 There is a weekly electrical check of the compressor equipment by maintenance [P] 
2 - Compressor 
overheats 
PC55 Operators check oil in compressors [P] 
PC – Prevention Controls 
NI – New Ideas 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
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Table 57 - Right side BTA for Mine I. 
Consequences Recovery Measures 
Top Event  = Fire starts on the Locomotive/mantrip 
RM1 All locomotives are fitted with heat sensors and manually initiated fixed fire suppression 
and hand-helds (20 lbs) [WD] 
RM2 Hand helds are located so they can be easily accessed in a fire at battery/brakes/etc. [P] 
RM3 Operators are trained re: hand-held/charged system every 2 years [PST] 
RM4 Fixed and hand-helds are checked regularly [P] 
RM5 Pre-operation checks including making sure hand-held is charged and pinned [P] 
RM6 Persons are trained that an air line can be charged to a two-inch water line to provide fire 
fighting water to the track heading [PST] 
RM7 There is also a return water line that can supply water to fight a fire until air pressure to 
face is lost [MH] 
RM8 There is a real time continuously monitoring system that detects CO located every 2500 
feet in track heading [WD] 
RM9 System is linked to the underground bunker and outside surface hoist house that is 
continuously monitored by a person [P] 
RM10 System alarms at 5 ppm CO (alert) + 10 ppm CO (alarm).  System also has a malfunction 
alarm [WD] 
RM11 Person reacts to alarms by notifying shift foreman and persons in area using radio or 
telephone.  That person goes to check area with CO detector. [P] 
RM12 There is a CO alarm at the conveyor tail (10 ppm CO) in the panel [WD] 
RM13 The mine has a designated Responsible Persons (RP) who is notified if a fire (small) is 
identified and appropriate other notifications are formalized [P] 
RM14 All persons evacuate the mine if a big fire is identified [P] 
RM15 RP makes decisions about actions to be taken underground to fight fire, change 
ventilation, etc. [P] 
Small fire becomes 
big fire (lost assets) 
NI8 Make operators aware that, if possible, when there is a small fire or smoke from a 
locomotive/mantrip/rock duster there may be an opportunity to reduce/stop smoke to the 
face by putting equipment into a switch/spur track and open man-door into the return 
heading to short circuit into the return [P] 
Top Event  = Fire caused by high-voltage 
RM16 Jackets and insulation are fire resistant [PB] 
RM17 System is designed to de-energize quickly (GFCI, etc.) [MH] 
RM18 HV cable hung in a manner (location) so it is not exposed to materials that can come from 
a short, high-temperature heat source [P] 
Small fire becomes 
big fire (lost assets) 
As above: see RM6 to RM15 
Top Event  =  Rock duster/compressor fire 
RM19 Equipment has fixed, automatic and manually operated fire suppression on the battery 
areas and mounted hand-helds [PB] 
RM20 Operators are trained every 2 years [PST] 
RM21 Certified contractor does maintenance inspection on the fire suppression system every 6 
months [P] 
RM22 There are weekly inspections to see if system is faulted and if it alarms if faulted or 
discharged [P] 
As above: see RM6 to RM15 
A - Small fire 
becomes big fire 
(lost assets) 
NI9 Investigate whether fixed fire suppression can be located over/at compressor [PB] 
Top Event  = Cutting/welding fire 
RM23 Hand-helds are part of welding equipment used underground [P] 
RM24 Area will be rock dusted before welding [MH] 
As above:  see RM6 to RM15 
Small fire becomes 
big fire (lost assets)  
NI10 Put one joint of fire hose to be carried on the track jeep at all times [P] 
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Top Event  = BIG FIRE 
See previous re: phones, conveyor shut down warning, CO alarms, visible smoke/smell re: warn of 
fire 
RM25 Supervisor maybe present with portable gas monitor to deal with CO level [WD] 
RM26 Persons on face are trained to put on M20* self-rescuers, leave the panel if dense smoke 
is in intake, meet at the power center, grab an extra SCSR, tag together, go to return, and 
use lifeline in return to egress the section (M20 O2 20-minute supply). [P] 
RM27 There is a cache of 1 hour SCSRs at the load center on mobile equipment and caches are 
located 5700 feet in the intake track entry and 5700 feet in the return (staggered every 
2850 feet down panel) [PB] 
RM28 Lifelines lead to caches and there are two cones on line to alert that a door or SCSR cache 
is present [P] 
RM29 There is a practice return egress escape every quarter (intake twice per year and return 
twice per year) [P] 
RM30 Caches are located in cross-cuts with doors in stoppings [PB] 
RM31 Persons are trained to take an extra SCSR [PST] 
RM32 Per MSHA requirements barricading materials have been located in panels and persons 
have been made familiar with methods of building barricades (escape, escape, escape...) 
[PB] 
RM33 There are trained and qualified mine rescues teams available to attempt underground 
rescue [PST] 
RM34 Mine ER Plan includes external and internal communication, external medical services, 
family notification, security, etc. [P] 
NI11 Add clarification to ER training , re: egress in light smoke – i.e. if light smoke in intake 
use transportation to exit as far as possible* then cross to return to egress (* smoke is too 
dense to see ahead) [P] 
NI12 Make sure the caches are located in cross-cuts with doors in stoppings [P] 
NI13 Reinforce the need to put self-rescuer or, if closer by, SCSR on as soon as any smoke is 
detected (issue:  smoke may get worse and easier/safer to don SCSR now) [PST] 
Miners affected by 
smoke at the face 
NI14 A method should be developed to access stopping doors at caches to check if intake is 
fresh air so that a person can remain attached to lifeline and/or team.  The method should 
be included in 90-day ER training. [P] 
RM – Recovery Measures 
NI – New Ideas 
MH – Minimize Hazard 
PB – Physical Barrier 
WD – Warning Devices 
P – Procedures 
PST – Personnel Skills and Training 
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APPENDIX B – Action Plan of New Ideas. 
 
 
Identified Potential New Controls Specific Required Actions Responsibility 
Due 
date 
Investigate changing or modifying loco resistors to 
perform under load without overheating 
 
 
  
Investigate whether fixed fire suppression can be 
located over/at compressor 
 
 
    
D
es
ig
n 
Put one joint of fire hose on loco to be carried on the 
track jeep at all times 
 
    
Reinforce and follow the requirements of the 
maintenance program for batteries, consider that 
checklists/verification procedures are being followed 
 
   
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
Add checking gauge accuracy in the battery 
maintenance program 
 
   
Investigate defining a specific percentage battery 
charge that is minimum to enter panel 
 
   
Investigate whether there is an identifiable level of 
complexity/experience for major loads, thereby 
creating a list of heavy load operators 
   
Reinforce the need, during pre-operation inspection, 
to remove any baking soda that has been used to 
absorb water or batteries so that it doesn’t become a 
conductor 
   
Add checking inside the loco resistor area (lift lid) 
for any combustibles to pre-operation inspections    
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
Make operators aware that, if possible, when there is 
a small fire or smoke from a loco/mantrip/rock duster 
there may be an opportunity to reduce/stop smoke to 
the face by putting equipment into a switch/spur 
track and open man-door into the return heading to 
short circuit into the return 
   
Add clarification to ER training, re: egress in light 
smoke – i.e. if light smoke in intake use 
transportation to exit as far as possible* then cross to 
return to egress [* smoke is too dense to see ahead] 
 
  
Make sure the caches are located in cross-cuts with 
doors in stoppings 
 
 
  
Reinforce the need to put self-rescuer or, if closer by, 
SCSR on as soon as any smoke is detected (issue:  
smoke may get worse and easier/safer to don SCSR 
now) 
 
  
Fi
re
 a
nd
 E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
R
es
po
ns
e 
A method should be developed to access stopping 
doors at caches to check if intake is fresh air so that a 
person can remain attached to lifeline and/or team.  
The method should be included in 90-day ER 
training. 
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A
PP
E
N
D
IX
 C
 –
 R
isk
 R
eg
ist
er
 
 
H
az
ar
d/
R
is
k 
R
eg
ist
er
 T
em
pl
at
e9
 
 
Pr
oj
ec
t N
o:
 
Se
ct
io
n 
of
 F
ac
ili
ty
: 
D
at
e:
 
Pa
ge
: 
T
ea
m
 L
ea
de
r:
 
 
 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 S
ce
na
ri
o:
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 D
oc
um
en
ts
: 
T
ea
m
 M
em
be
rs
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
in
ut
es
 B
y:
 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 P
ot
en
tia
l C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s (
in
cl
ud
in
g 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 
an
d 
Ef
fe
ct
s)
 
Ex
ist
in
g 
C
on
tr
ol
 M
ea
su
re
s 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 P
ot
en
tia
l E
ffe
ct
s(
on
 si
te
 a
nd
 o
ff)
 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
R
at
in
g 
It
em
 
N
o 
In
iti
at
in
g 
 
E
ve
nt
 
T
yp
e 
A
nd
 
M
ag
ni
tu
de
 
Pe
op
le
 
Bi
op
hy
sic
al
  
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
t 
Pr
op
er
ty
 
E
co
no
m
ic
 
Im
pa
ct
 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
C
ri
tic
al
 
C
on
tr
ol
? 
SM
S 
R
ef
 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
St
d 
N
O
 
C
O
P 
D
at
a 
Sh
ee
t 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 
L
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
of
 P
ot
en
tia
l 
E
ff
ec
ts
 
(O
n/
of
f 
sit
e)
 a
nd
 
L
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
R
at
in
g 
R
isk
 
R
an
ki
ng
 
A
ct
io
ns
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
9  A
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 M
IH
A
P 
N
o 
3 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 N
SW
 H
az
ar
d 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n,
 R
is
k 
A
ss
es
sm
en
t a
nd
 R
is
k 
C
on
tro
l 
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A
PP
E
N
D
IX
 D
 - 
R
isk
 M
an
ag
em
en
t C
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 S
el
f-A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l P
ro
gr
es
s i
n 
R
is
k 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
 A
 n
um
be
r o
f l
ea
di
ng
 a
ut
ho
rs
 o
n 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t o
f r
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
ul
tu
re
 h
av
e 
id
en
tif
ie
d 
th
e 
ch
an
gi
ng
 n
at
ur
e 
of
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
as
 it
 
pr
og
re
ss
es
 a
lo
ng
 it
s j
ou
rn
ey
 o
f e
m
br
ac
in
g 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f m
an
ag
ed
 ri
sk
.  
H
ud
so
n,
 C
le
m
m
er
 a
nd
 Jo
y 
ha
ve
 a
ll 
di
sc
us
se
d 
a 
5-
st
ag
e 
m
od
el
 to
 id
en
tif
y 
an
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n’
s s
ta
rti
ng
 p
oi
nt
 a
nd
 g
au
ge
 th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f c
ha
ng
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 e
ff
ec
tiv
el
y 
im
pl
em
en
t h
ig
he
r o
rd
er
 ri
sk
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
rin
ci
pl
es
.  
M
ea
su
rin
g 
w
he
re
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
fit
s i
n 
th
is
 m
od
el
 is
 a
 su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 th
at
 e
va
lu
at
es
 a
 v
ar
ie
ty
 o
f 
m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ys
te
m
s f
or
 th
ei
r r
el
at
iv
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f r
es
ili
en
cy
.  
 
 Th
e 
lo
w
es
t r
un
g 
on
 th
e 
la
dd
er
 o
r f
irs
t s
te
p 
in
 th
e 
jo
ur
ne
y 
is
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
de
sc
rib
ed
 a
s v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e,
 n
on
-c
ar
in
g 
or
 p
at
ho
lo
gi
ca
l. 
 S
uc
h 
an
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
w
ou
ld
 v
ie
w
 th
e 
m
in
im
um
 le
ga
l r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 a
s a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 b
ur
de
n 
an
d 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
un
lik
el
y 
to
 p
ur
su
e 
fo
rm
al
 ri
sk
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ys
te
m
s d
ue
 to
 th
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 o
f t
im
e 
an
d 
re
so
ur
ce
s r
eq
ui
re
d.
  O
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r e
nd
 o
f t
he
 sp
ec
tru
m
, t
he
 h
ig
he
st
 
or
de
r o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
is
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 a
s r
es
ili
en
t, 
fu
lly
 in
te
gr
at
ed
, o
r g
en
er
at
iv
e.
  N
on
e 
of
 th
e 
le
ad
in
g 
pr
ac
tit
io
ne
rs
 o
f r
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t f
ee
l 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
ye
t r
ea
ch
ed
 th
is
 le
ve
l a
s a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n.
  T
he
 m
id
dl
e 
of
 th
e 
jo
ur
ne
y 
or
 la
dd
er
 is
 th
e 
zo
ne
 w
he
re
 m
os
t m
in
in
g 
op
er
at
io
ns
 fi
nd
 
th
em
se
lv
es
. 
 A
 S
el
f-A
ss
es
sm
en
t T
oo
l 
Th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
se
lf-
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
is
 in
te
nd
ed
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 m
in
e 
m
an
ag
er
s w
ith
 a
 to
ol
 to
 id
en
tif
y 
th
e 
st
re
ng
th
s a
nd
 w
ea
kn
es
se
s i
n 
th
ei
r 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
an
d 
ch
an
ge
s n
ee
de
d 
fo
r s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 a
n 
M
H
R
A
.  
 
 Fo
r e
ac
h 
ca
te
go
ry
 se
le
ct
 th
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
th
at
 b
es
t f
its
 y
ou
r m
in
e:
 
 In
fo
rm
al
 R
is
k 
M
an
ag
em
en
t S
ys
te
m
s:
 
1.
 
W
or
ke
rs
 in
sp
ec
t t
he
ir 
ow
n 
w
or
kp
la
ce
, c
or
re
ct
 a
s n
ee
de
d,
 n
o 
do
cu
m
en
ta
tio
n 
un
le
ss
 re
qu
ire
d 
by
 la
w
 
2.
 
W
or
ke
rs
 in
sp
ec
t t
he
ir 
ow
n 
w
or
kp
la
ce
, c
or
re
ct
 a
s n
ee
de
d,
 d
oc
um
en
t f
in
di
ng
s, 
re
co
rd
s r
et
ai
ne
d 
fo
r r
ev
ie
w
 
3.
 
W
or
ke
rs
 in
sp
ec
t t
he
ir 
ow
n 
w
or
kp
la
ce
, c
or
re
ct
 a
s n
ee
de
d,
 d
oc
um
en
t f
in
di
ng
s, 
re
co
rd
s r
et
ai
ne
d 
fo
r r
ev
ie
w
, s
up
er
vi
so
rs
 ra
nd
om
ly
 
au
di
t d
ur
in
g 
sh
ift
 
4.
 
W
or
ke
rs
 in
sp
ec
t t
he
ir 
ow
n 
w
or
kp
la
ce
, c
or
re
ct
 a
s n
ee
de
d,
 d
oc
um
en
t f
in
di
ng
s, 
re
co
rd
s r
et
ai
ne
d 
fo
r r
ev
ie
w
, s
up
er
vi
so
rs
 a
ud
it 
du
rin
g 
sh
ift
 
5.
 
W
or
ke
rs
 in
sp
ec
t t
he
ir 
ow
n 
w
or
kp
la
ce
, c
or
re
ct
 a
s n
ee
de
d,
 d
oc
um
en
t f
in
di
ng
s, 
su
pe
rv
is
or
s a
ud
it 
du
rin
g 
sh
ift
, r
ec
or
ds
 re
vi
ew
ed
 
by
 m
in
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 fo
llo
w
-u
p 
ac
tio
ns
 p
ur
su
ed
. 
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0 
Ta
sk
/J
ob
 T
ra
in
in
g 
Sy
st
em
s :
 
1.
 
Pe
er
 to
 p
ee
r (
H
an
ds
-O
n)
 ta
sk
 tr
ai
ni
ng
, n
o 
fo
rm
al
 d
oc
um
en
te
d 
w
or
k 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
2.
 
Pe
er
 to
 p
ee
r t
ra
in
in
g 
ba
se
d 
on
 w
rit
te
n 
w
or
k 
pr
ac
tic
es
 th
at
 a
re
 u
pd
at
ed
 a
s n
ee
de
d 
3.
 
Fo
rm
al
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 p
ro
gr
am
 u
si
ng
 d
ed
ic
at
ed
 tr
ai
ne
rs
 a
nd
 w
rit
te
n 
w
or
k 
pr
ac
tic
es
 th
at
 a
re
 u
pd
at
ed
 a
s n
ee
de
d 
4.
 
Fo
rm
al
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 p
ro
gr
am
 u
si
ng
 d
ed
ic
at
ed
 tr
ai
ne
rs
 a
nd
 w
rit
te
n 
w
or
k 
pr
ac
tic
es
 th
at
 a
re
 re
vi
ew
ed
 re
gu
la
rly
 a
nd
 th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
of
 th
e 
tra
in
er
s r
ou
tin
el
y 
au
di
te
d.
 M
in
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
ss
ig
ns
 re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
fo
r a
ct
io
n 
ite
m
s 
5.
 
Fo
rm
al
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 p
ro
gr
am
 u
si
ng
 d
ed
ic
at
ed
 tr
ai
ne
rs
 a
nd
 w
rit
te
n 
w
or
k 
pr
ac
tic
es
 th
at
 a
re
 re
vi
ew
ed
 re
gu
la
rly
 a
nd
 th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
of
 th
e 
tra
in
er
s r
ou
tin
el
y 
au
di
te
d 
by
 lo
ca
l a
nd
 c
or
po
ra
te
 sa
fe
ty
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
.  
M
in
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t r
ep
or
ts
 o
n 
ac
tio
n 
ite
m
s t
o 
co
rp
or
at
e 
sa
fe
ty
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
 A
cc
id
en
t I
nv
es
tig
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 A
na
ly
si
s:
 
1.
 
Th
e 
fr
on
t l
in
e 
or
 sa
fe
ty
 su
pe
rv
is
or
 in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 re
po
rta
bl
e 
ac
ci
de
nt
s a
nd
 g
iv
es
 th
e 
re
po
rts
 to
 th
e 
sa
fe
ty
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t f
or
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 
2.
 
Th
e 
fr
on
t l
in
e 
or
 sa
fe
ty
 su
pe
rv
is
or
 in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 a
ll 
ac
ci
de
nt
s, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
ne
ar
 m
is
se
s a
nd
 g
iv
es
 th
e 
re
po
rts
 to
 th
e 
sa
fe
ty
 
de
pa
rtm
en
t f
or
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
3.
 
A
 te
am
 in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 a
ll 
re
po
rta
bl
e 
ac
ci
de
nt
s a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
s a
 re
po
rt 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
4.
 
A
 te
am
 in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 a
ll 
ac
ci
de
nt
s i
nc
lu
di
ng
 n
ea
r m
is
se
s a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
s a
 re
po
rt 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
 M
an
ag
em
en
t a
ss
ig
ns
 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
fo
r a
ct
io
n 
ite
m
s 
5.
 
A
 te
am
 in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 a
ll 
ac
ci
de
nt
s i
nc
lu
di
ng
 n
ea
r m
is
se
s a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
s a
 re
po
rt 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
 M
an
ag
em
en
t a
ss
ig
ns
 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
fo
r a
ct
io
n 
ite
m
s. 
 H
az
ar
d 
(F
ire
, G
as
se
s, 
D
us
ts
, G
ro
un
d)
 M
on
ito
rin
g 
Sy
st
em
s:
 
1.
 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
sy
st
em
s m
ee
t m
in
im
um
 le
ga
l r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
, r
ep
or
tin
g 
as
 re
qu
ire
d 
by
 la
w
 
2.
 
M
os
tly
 m
an
ua
l m
on
ito
rin
g 
sy
st
em
s o
f c
om
m
on
 h
az
ar
ds
 w
ith
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
s r
eq
ui
re
d.
  A
ct
io
n 
le
ve
ls
 re
qu
ire
 re
po
rti
ng
 
to
 S
up
er
vi
so
rs
 fo
r r
es
po
ns
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
3.
 
M
ix
 o
f a
ut
om
at
ic
 a
nd
 m
an
ua
l m
on
ito
rin
g 
sy
st
em
s w
ith
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
nd
 m
on
ito
re
d 
by
 su
pe
rv
is
or
s i
n 
lin
e 
w
ith
 fo
rm
al
 
re
sp
on
se
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
4.
 
M
os
tly
 a
ut
om
at
ic
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
sy
st
em
s w
ith
 re
al
 ti
m
e 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
by
 su
pe
rv
is
io
n 
an
d 
pr
e-
de
te
rm
in
ed
 a
ut
om
at
ic
 re
sp
on
se
s. 
 
Sy
st
em
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
ud
ite
d 
ro
ut
in
el
y 
5.
 
M
os
tly
 a
ut
om
at
ic
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
sy
st
em
s w
ith
 re
al
 ti
m
e 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
by
 su
pe
rv
is
io
n 
an
d 
pr
e-
de
te
rm
in
ed
 a
ut
om
at
ic
 re
sp
on
se
s. 
 
Sy
st
em
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
ud
ite
d 
ro
ut
in
el
y.
 P
ar
am
et
er
s m
on
ito
re
d 
in
cl
ud
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l b
ut
 n
ot
 y
et
 re
gu
la
te
d 
ha
za
rd
s t
o 
he
al
th
 a
nd
 
sa
fe
ty
. 
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1 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 B
eh
av
io
r:  
1.
 
N
o 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 b
eh
av
io
r w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
sa
fe
ty
 is
 d
on
e 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
w
ha
t i
s r
eq
ui
re
d 
by
 la
w
 
2.
 
In
fo
rm
al
 b
eh
av
io
r m
on
ito
rin
g 
pr
og
ra
m
s h
av
e 
be
en
 in
tro
du
ce
d 
on
 so
m
e 
to
pi
cs
.  
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
oc
cu
rs
 d
ur
in
g 
in
ci
de
nt
/a
cc
id
en
t i
nv
es
tig
at
io
ns
 
3.
 
So
m
e 
be
ha
vi
or
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
oc
cu
rs
 th
ro
ug
h 
fo
rm
al
 sy
st
em
s a
nd
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 o
n 
se
le
ct
ed
 to
pi
cs
. I
nv
es
tig
at
io
ns
 o
f i
nc
id
en
ts
 a
nd
 
ac
ci
de
nt
s c
om
pa
re
 b
eh
av
io
rs
 to
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 
4.
 
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
n 
be
ha
vi
or
 a
re
 w
el
l-d
ef
in
ed
, c
om
m
un
ic
at
ed
, f
or
m
al
ly
 m
on
ito
re
d 
an
d 
pe
rio
di
ca
lly
 re
vi
ew
ed
 o
n 
pr
io
rit
y 
to
pi
cs
.  
Fe
ed
ba
ck
 o
n 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
ob
st
ac
le
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
w
or
kf
or
ce
 is
 so
ug
ht
 a
nd
 in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
to
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 
5.
 
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
n 
be
ha
vi
or
 a
re
 w
el
l-d
ef
in
ed
, c
om
m
un
ic
at
ed
, f
or
m
al
ly
 m
on
ito
re
d 
an
d 
pe
rio
di
ca
lly
 re
vi
ew
ed
 b
y 
al
l w
or
ke
rs
 o
n 
al
l 
to
pi
cs
. A
ll 
le
ve
ls
 o
f t
he
 w
or
kf
or
ce
 se
rv
e 
as
 m
on
ito
rs
 a
nd
 e
nf
or
ce
rs
 o
f e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
.  
 A
ud
iti
ng
 o
f E
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
: 
1.
 
N
o 
au
di
tin
g 
of
 sa
fe
ty
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
cc
ur
 o
th
er
 th
an
 b
y 
M
SH
A
 o
r S
ta
te
 in
sp
ec
to
rs
 
2.
 
A
ud
iti
ng
 is
 p
ar
t o
f a
cc
id
en
t/i
nc
id
en
t i
nv
es
tig
at
io
ns
 
3.
 
Th
e 
sa
fe
ty
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t c
on
du
ct
s a
 p
er
io
di
c 
au
di
t f
or
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
ru
le
s, 
M
SH
A
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
al
 
4.
 
A
ud
iti
ng
 is
 d
on
e 
by
 a
ll 
le
ve
ls
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t t
o 
ch
ec
k 
fo
r c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 e
xi
st
in
g 
ru
le
s a
nd
 to
 id
en
tif
y 
pr
io
rit
y 
is
su
es
 
5.
 
A
 fo
rm
al
 si
te
-w
id
e 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
sy
st
em
 is
 in
 p
la
ce
 to
 b
ot
h 
re
vi
ew
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
nd
 v
er
ify
 w
or
k 
sy
st
em
s a
re
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
as
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
in
 si
te
-s
pe
ci
fic
 ri
sk
 a
ss
es
sm
en
ts
.  
Th
e 
si
te
-w
id
e 
sy
st
em
s a
re
 p
er
io
di
ca
lly
 a
ud
ite
d 
by
 o
th
er
s. 
 C
ul
tu
re
:  
1.
 
W
e 
do
 w
ha
t w
e 
ha
ve
 to
, s
om
et
im
es
 w
e 
ge
t c
au
gh
t 
2.
 
W
e 
do
 th
e 
be
st
 w
e 
ca
n,
 d
is
ci
pl
in
e 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 d
on
’t 
3.
 
W
e 
pu
t e
ve
ry
 e
ff
or
t i
nt
o 
co
m
pl
yi
ng
 w
ith
 th
e 
la
w
 e
ve
ry
 d
ay
. W
e 
ch
an
ge
 sy
st
em
s w
he
n 
w
e 
ha
ve
 tr
ou
bl
e 
w
ith
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e.
 W
e 
ge
t f
ew
 c
ita
tio
ns
 
4.
 
Th
e 
fr
on
t l
in
e 
m
an
ag
er
s l
ea
d 
th
e 
sa
fe
ty
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t i
n 
id
en
tif
yi
ng
 p
ro
bl
em
s a
nd
 so
lu
tio
ns
.  
M
SH
A
 is
n’
t m
uc
h 
of
 a
 p
ro
bl
em
 
be
ca
us
e 
w
e 
al
w
ay
s d
o 
m
or
e 
5.
 
A
ll 
le
ve
ls
 o
f t
he
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
pr
om
ot
e 
sa
fe
ty
 a
s t
he
 fi
rs
t p
rio
rit
y.
  R
eg
ul
at
or
s l
oo
k 
at
 u
s a
s a
n 
ex
am
pl
e 
of
 h
ow
 to
 m
an
ag
e 
ha
za
rd
s. 
 P
ro
po
se
d 
ne
w
 ru
le
s a
re
 a
lre
ad
y 
a 
w
ay
 o
f d
oi
ng
 b
us
in
es
s h
er
e.
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Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
th
s t
o 
Pr
og
re
ss
:  
A
dd
 th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 o
f e
ac
h 
se
le
ct
ed
 re
sp
on
se
 fo
r y
ou
r s
co
re
 to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
w
he
re
 y
ou
 st
an
d 
w
ith
 su
gg
es
tio
ns
 o
n 
pa
th
s t
o 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t: 
 7-
10
   
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e:
  A
cc
ep
t t
he
 n
ee
d 
fo
r c
ha
ng
e.
 E
m
br
ac
e 
in
fo
rm
al
 ri
sk
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t t
oo
ls
.  
Fo
llo
w
 a
cc
id
en
ts
 a
nd
 in
ci
de
nt
s w
ith
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
ns
 th
at
 p
ro
du
ce
 JS
A
s t
o 
pr
ev
en
t  
a 
re
oc
cu
rr
en
ce
. 
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R
ea
ct
iv
e:
  U
nd
er
st
an
d 
hu
m
an
 e
rr
or
 a
nd
 a
cc
ep
t t
ha
t m
os
t o
f i
t i
s u
ni
nt
en
tio
na
l. 
 F
or
m
al
iz
e 
st
an
da
rd
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s a
nd
 m
in
im
iz
e 
re
lia
nc
e 
on
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
.  
Ex
pa
nd
 in
ve
st
ig
at
io
ns
 b
ey
on
d 
se
rio
us
 in
ci
de
nt
s. 
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 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
D
riv
en
: E
m
ph
as
iz
e 
qu
al
ity
 a
nd
 c
om
pe
te
nc
y 
of
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 o
ve
r t
im
e.
  P
ur
su
e 
fo
rm
al
 ri
sk
 a
ss
es
sm
en
ts
 o
n 
to
pi
cs
 w
hi
ch
 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 y
et
 b
ee
n 
a 
pr
ob
le
m
.  
In
cr
ea
se
 in
te
rn
al
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
co
nf
or
m
an
ce
.  
In
cr
ea
se
 c
on
su
lti
ng
 w
ith
in
 a
ll 
le
ve
ls
 o
f t
he
 
w
or
kf
or
ce
 fo
r a
cc
ep
ta
bl
e 
so
lu
tio
ns
. 
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Pr
oa
ct
iv
e:
  F
ul
ly
 in
te
gr
at
e 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t i
nt
o 
al
l d
ec
is
io
n 
sy
st
em
s a
nd
 p
ro
je
ct
s. 
 S
hi
ft 
fo
cu
s o
n 
el
im
in
at
in
g 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 
m
an
ag
in
g 
ha
za
rd
s. 
 D
riv
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
 u
p 
th
e 
hi
er
ar
ch
y.
 O
pe
n 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n.
 S
ee
k 
ou
t 3
rd
-p
ar
ty
 a
ud
iti
ng
. 
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5 
 R
es
ili
en
t: 
 Y
ou
 a
pp
ar
en
tly
 d
on
’t 
ne
ed
 th
is
 d
oc
um
en
t. 
 Th
e 
st
ep
s a
lo
ng
 th
is
 p
at
h 
ar
e 
lik
e 
th
e 
st
ep
s a
lo
ng
 a
 jo
ur
ne
y.
  T
hi
s j
ou
rn
ey
 is
 o
ne
 o
f b
ui
ld
in
g 
a 
st
ro
ng
 c
ul
tu
re
 o
f s
af
et
y 
(F
ig
ur
e 
40
). 
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V
ul
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P
re
ve
nt
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ci
de
nt
s 
be
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re
 th
ey
 
oc
cu
r
Tu
ne
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 
th
ru
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
W
ay
 w
e 
do
 
bu
si
ne
ss
A
cc
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t t
ha
t 
in
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de
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pp
en
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R
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re
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ci
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nt
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ro
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tiv
e
P
ro
ac
tiv
e
R
es
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nt
R
es
ilie
nt
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
P
re
ve
nt
 
in
ci
de
nt
s 
be
fo
re
 th
ey
 
oc
cu
r
Tu
ne
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 
th
ru
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
W
ay
 w
e 
do
 
bu
si
ne
ss
A
cc
ep
t t
ha
t 
in
ci
de
nt
s 
ha
pp
en
 
Fi
gu
re
 4
0 
- S
te
ps
 a
lo
ng
 th
e 
pa
th
 to
 a
n 
im
pr
ov
ed
 sa
fe
ty
 c
ul
tu
re
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